> Yeah, in a sense it actually makes it less reliable as far as mean-time-between-failures go.
It depends on what you're protecting against, how you're protecting against it, and how you've deployed those defenses.
Chained defenses, generally, decrease reliability. Parallel defenses generally increase it.
E.g.: Putting a router, an LB, a caching proxy, an app server tier, and a database back-end tier (typical Web infrastructure) in series (a chain) introduces complexity and SPOFs to a service. You can duplicate elements at each stage of the infrastructure, but might well consider a multi-DC deployment, as you're still subject to DC-wide outages (I've encountered several of these) and a great deal of complexity and cost.
Going multi-DC doesn't increase capital requirements by much, and may or may not be more expensive than 2x the build-out in a single DC. It though raises issues of code and architecture complexity.
In several cases, we were experiencing issues that would have pervaded despite redundant equipment. E.g.: the load balancer SSL bug we encountered was present on all instances of multiple generations of the product. Providing two LBs would simply have insured that as the triggering cipher was requested, both LBs would have failed and rebooted. Something of an end-run around our Maginot line, as it were.