It is, however, entirely reasonable to question if a corporation that took part in "Team Themis" could/would actually develop such technology.
It is, however, entirely reasonable to question if a corporation that took part in "Team Themis" could/would actually develop such technology.
The genie is not going back in the bottle, but perhaps we can use technology to add some arc chutes and at least try to constrain where the pixie dust is going. In the end it will be the technological means help the people protect their privacy (who are after all, the only ones who can demand and truly enforce that).
Or as my father always said, "Locks don't keep bad people from breaking into your things; locks just keep honest people honest".
The solution is to stop funding concentrated surveillance programs, and to protect government/corporate whistleblowers.
We're headed in the exact opposite direction.
The PRISM program & Palantir's products do not give YOU any transparency into anything.
The kind of technical naiveté that believes that surveillance software can be secure and auditable, is what is allowing the NSA PRISM software to develop, and concentrating too much data. When you hear Obama claim that PRISM is transparent, he's referring indirectly to flawed technical arguments.
So no, of course Lessig won't argue for PRISM. But he is arguing for measures that PRISM probably already has, measures that cannot be sufficient.
And either way, technical measures that would be insufficient for PRISM may very well be sufficient for most of the rest of what government does.
As a final note I think that sometimes we tech types get way too wrapped around preventing outcomes which are already so implausible as to be merely theoretical, and use that to oppose measures which, while imperfect, would still be useful if applied. It's "The Perfect is the enemy of the good" that we see in software project management, applied to the government at large.