Grabbing them in a virtualized environment is even easier.
Grabbing them in a virtualized environment is even easier.
The HSM market makes me really sad. I'm kind of considering doing an "open source HSM" -- something using COTS components, ideally a few generations old, with everything totally verifiable by the user/assembler, and a key loadable at manufacture time -- the idea being companies could assemble and certify their own, or a third party or industry association could certify them for their regulees. Goal would be to price a low end version around $100-200, and a high-end (x86-64 performance) in the low thousands, unlike the rape that is Thales or SafeNet ($20k+ for mediocre performance). Plus, if you're at all "interesting", there's no way you'd trust a European defense contractor or a US defense-affiliated company with a "black box for keys, trust us".
Not sure if this would be a good business, though. Would need to raise actual VC for it, and while I know some awesome HW people, including in the tamper-resistance space, I've never done volume production of any hardware myself.
A COTS implementation would be interesting. Securing SSL keys would require very quick public key crypto and probably a PCI-E interface to talk to the server, the PCI-E interface making it much more expensive (FPGAs with PCI-E hard blocks have gone down in price, but are by no means cheap, not to mention the increased cost of the PCB). Prototypes probably wouldn't need VC for a proof of concept, but after that you typically need to put up a bit of money for any manufacturing.
I'd be interested in a way to securely generate and store a Root CA certificate and sign other keys with it. Ideally using something like secret sharing so that no single person can access the Root CA as well without having n out of m people.
Proof of concept can be done with a regular dev board or even a cellphone; it's volume production which requires VC.