Modern psychology is very much a science today, and if anything, it's like the relativity to neurology's QM. Both are useful and ultimately related aspects, we're just still in the middle of working out the details right now. It's disingenuous to deem either more/less valuable than the other so prematurely.
This is partly because psychology is such a young science in comparison, and possibly partly because by the nature of complex systems we are less able to create such precise mathematical models which describe it.
It is nothing like relativity and neurology has no analog in QM. I am not sure if it's psychology/neurology or relativity/QM you lack a firm grasp of but it appears to be at least one or the other.
If I understood the parent correctly, the argument was that the brain was still a 'black box' in that we don't understand how/why exactly it works, therefore it's sketchy to use it without the public knowing that it's 'just a model'. The point is not that gravity is anything like psychology, but that they both seem to share the same predicament with regards to their origins. It'd be naive to say that we don't know much about it, but if I'm behind on some findings that detail what gravity is, that would be helpful feedback.
> This is partly because psychology is such a young science in comparison
Exactly. This is why discrediting it as a legitimate science when it needs all the cross-disciplinary help it can get is so unnerving. We aren't gonna make inroads into understanding ourselves too quickly if we raise a generation of people to dismiss it like that.
>I am not sure if it's psychology/neurology or relativity/QM you lack a firm grasp of but it appears to be at least one or the other.
Both my good sir! (academically speaking anyway). The point I was emphasizing was the relationship, not either science -- thus, unless I'm wrong and we're convinced the effects of relativity are not emergent from QM, I'm not sure how it makes a difference? What seems to be disingenuous is dismissing the metaphor (read: literary analogy) for not being in complete 1:1 correspondence in practice -- it was a conceptual point. I was talking about forests, and you seem to be talking about trees. But if you feel I lack some critical knowledge about said trees, please do try to clarify your point, because I've received a fair number of upvotes for that comment so I think a good number of us 'laypeople' would benefit from such an analysis.
Anyway, just to clarify, psychology is valuable without being science, and it has been for thousands of years. It's our society's insistence that science is the only valid way of understanding the world that is the problem.
Ah, but this is where neurology steps in (when possible), no? There are ways of objectively observing the physical phenomena that are associated with such abstract actions after all, we just don't quite know what they mean or how exactly they fit together yet -- but that shouldn't matter because everything will still be just as correct, since we're speaking in terms of macro-level abstractions. Not knowing about atoms didn't hinder our development of insight into classical mechanics after all.
> psychology is valuable without being science... It's our society's insistence that science is the only valid way of understanding the world that is the problem.
See, this is odd. I think it would help a lot of people if you explained your definition of "science" a bit instead of just giving us your conclusions, because to me it feels like we're speaking different languages right now.
As far as I've understood it, Science is a process (adhering to the Scientific Method), and I recognize that there exists good science and poor science, and that results can be qualitative or quantitative, but your definition of "science" seems to convolute all these different concepts into a set of arbitrarily rigid conditions. Science can be of totally bad quality + with no quantitative measurements and still be "Science". But your definition of "Science" seems to be based around the exclusion of such endeavors (hence getting reactions that link it to a negative connotation). I'm confused. I think it would be beneficial to see an elaboration on what you mean here.
Yes, advances in neurology might make such claims testable, at which point they'll become falsifiable, but until then the brain essentially remains a black box for which much of the speculation about its workings is outside the realm of science. As our experimental techniques get better, the number of things that we can include under the umbrella of science grows.
In the end, science literally means objective (i.e. agreed upon) knowledge, and at this point we are unable to generate much objective knowledge about the inside of our heads. Subjective, experiential, and personal inquiry, via psychology, into the workings of our minds is however tremendously valuable, and it yields a different and complementary kind of knowledge.
It will be interesting to see the extent to which neuroscience bridges the gap in our lifetimes.
At to defining science, there is a long history of defining what is and isn't science. This isn't arbitrary. When something is dismissed as not science it's not just bias, it's because people see it as failing to meet certain criteria. That's too long to go into here, but a good starting point in your reading there would be Karl Popper. His description of scientific theories requiring the property of falsifiability, revolutionary as it was at the time, is fairly well accepted at the heart of what is thought of as science today.
At risk of spinning off a complete tangent, as you appear interested in the topic from a lay perspective (I'm a physicist myself by training) there are also some very interesting, and thorny, challenges when understanding brain science in general, and many of them (surprisingly to many scientists who often shun it) are really questions of philosophy, understanding the questions themselves and what can/cannot follow logically from our observations and reasoning on the topic. For a great blog on, and introduction to this angle of it I'd recommend http://www.consciousentities.com/
I agree that the brain/mind sciences should not be dismissed, as they're very important, and increasingly we see that cross-disciplinary approaches are essential to more and more areas of science. I guess I was nit-picking with the appropriateness of the analogy as the specific one you chose isn't a good fit for the point you were making.
Continuing on the 'philosophical challenge' tangent, this talk recently came to my attention: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JnA8GUtXpXY
I haven't delved into the matter much beyond what's presented there, but it seems plausible enough (given the evidence) to be another thorny aspect relating to 'consciousness'. Just thought I'd share.
All sciences* have the same problem as you decribe - we can rarely, if ever, be sure that a hypothesis is true.
* Mathematical sciences excepted
How do I test the claim that the brain has a single pool of resources allocated to cognitive processing and willpower? I cannot think of a way to examine the brain and measure the levels of this resource pool, cognitive processing, and willpower. In the same fashion, you cannot measure the brain and tell me that it isn't an instance of "hard work merits a reward" at work. There is no way that you can falsify my alternative hypothesis.
Then we can design experiments to challenge the hypotheses, as in any other science.
If you want to test "cognitive processing reduces willpower" vs "hard work merits reward", you would presumably define these four terms differently (or preferably rewrite them to be less ambiguous) and then you could design experiments which test each statement.
I am not an expert in experimental psychology but the main wikipedia page even makes direct reference to this idea as operational definitions: "Operational definitions are definitions of theoretical constructs that are stated in terms of concrete, observable procedures".
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Experimental_psychology#The_Fo...
I don't actually have a problem with unfalsifiability, I think these models are quite valuable, I have a problem with it being presented as scientific truth.