That's tangential, though. More importantly, I expect NSA contributions to be poured over because the NSA isn't highly trusted, and it would make a great mailing list post to say "The NSA has a backdoor in our code here, here, and here."
Many eyes and a suspect contributor make all backdoors shallow.
They wouldn't need to purposely sabotage the linux kernel anyways it's like 15+ million lines of code they can easily review and find bugs as a homework assignment in first year internal classes on offensive exploitation.
Let's say they indeed decided to include something in the code submitted. It's an open source project, and it is a just matter of when someone will catch that. Once someone catch that, it gives them nothing but material evidence that they are up for something there. (and for that matter, it's not that every Linux users will have SELinux enabled to begin with.)
IMNO, hardware backdoor on the processors is a bit skeptical, though. I'm no expert on this but I don't know how easy to even exploit this type of backdoor without an assistance from the OS kernel. (Which MS might have implemented somehow.)
It's really a no-brainer to make such breakpoints that watch data in memory or registers that will be triggered by (e.g.) just processing a specific DNS packet.