There's one difference between the brain-in-a-vat question and the simulated-universe question: one, in theory, characterizes "you" as part of reality being deceived, and the other characterizes "you" as not part of "reality". But those are just words; they don't even have consequences within the hypothetical. Literally everything else that can be said about one can be said about the other. They're both impossible to gather evidence for or against, and they both (relatedly) have no ramifications either way. If you think there's any merit in positivism, then the only possible response is "that's a stupid question". A question for which evidence cannot be gathered one way or the other is meaningless.
The brain in a vat idea, on the other hand, requires brains, vats and all manner of other support structures (eg. energy, entropy, etc.) to exist as well as the brain in a vat. In which case, we basically require an "outside universe" which is very similar to the "inside universe", so reductionism says that we're adding complexity with such an argument, so it's unnecessary.
The chance that a universe simulation appears at random is much higher than the chance a brain simulation appears at random, even though a universe simulation may take vastly more resources to run.
Whether you describe that in terms of a meat brain being suspended in nutritive solution and hooked up to cables, or in terms of an electronic circuit receiving input from other electronic circuits, has no bearing on that.
Bostrom uses simple assumptions and basic probability to "prove" that it is overwhelmingly likely that you live in a simulation.
Now, the question is 'why simulate the universe when you could just simulate a brain'? This is basically the Boltzmann Brain argument. In terms of bits (see Kolmogorov complexity) the universe is simpler to describe (physics + initial conditions) than a whole brain (neurons, synapses, hormones, etc.). Basically, the universe can unfold from a tiny core (the big bang), whereas a single brain can't (it could unfold from a fertilised egg, but that's already huge, and requires all kinds of matter and physics to work which the big bang would have used anyway). In that case, a random program running on an 'outside' computer is much more likely to be a universe than a brain. By the anthropic principle, we could ask if our universe is the simplest which can support life, in terms of the number of bits required to encode the laws of physics as a program.