For Privacy and Security, Use Public Keys Everywhere
cacm.acm.org
cacm.acm.org
Your email messages themselves may be encrypted but the addresses and other metadata -- who you converse with, when, and how often -- is completely open. If you exchange mail with a person B, who exchanges mail with a person C, who exchanges mail with a person T that is the subject of a "terrorism" investigation, your mail will be collected and, whether encrypted or not, the fact that you are thus "implicated" will be noted. Indeed the fact that you are "hiding" your email will increase the level of interest in you.
In addition, email encryption does nothing to protect your text messages, web browsing, ftp transfers, skype calls etc.
I disagree. Encryption, done correctly, maintains the secrecy of the message.
> Your email messages themselves may be encrypted but the addresses and other metadata -- who you converse with, when, and how often -- is completely open.
Absolutely true, but this is a secondary issue that requires a combination of technical and political solutions.
> In addition, email encryption does nothing to protect your text messages, web browsing, ftp transfers, skype calls etc.
Right. But there are other solutions to these problems.
Security requires a layered approach. There's no way to protect all communications with a single solution, given our current systems.
I would like to point out BitMessage uses streams. Streams are a collection of nodes that have a particular part of their address in common. If you have an address that is part of one of these streams, your computer will listen into that stream. So you won't download all streams keys and messages, only those that pertain to you.
Your 4096-bit-encrypted email would probably not be crackable. However, the NSA would know from the metadata that your mails were "of interest" (because they know your correspondent was someone on whom they are trying to build a case) and they can come to you and demand the key, and impose secrecy on you making it a felony if you tell anyone you had surrendered your key.
(1) Unique keys per service? (2) Easy portability? (3) Syncronization of keys across multiple computers? Or unique keys on each device? (4) Expiry/Rotation of keys (5) Protection of keys such that they are only "usable/unlockable" via password as opposed to being accessible by any person who may sit down at your computer when you're away for five minutes.
Etc.
Good key management and practices are one of those things that are never really taught anywhere and most people get into managing theirs haphazardly with little consideration of best practices and best protection.
Now, add to that the problems of exchanging keys over the internet and the fact that this almost always involves some loss of control somewhere. I am not entirely convinced that all these problems are solved once we get into government interference scenarios.
(2) See (1). Don't. Instead, register any new device with a new keypair. Have the user confirm the registration of a new device, using a trusted communication channel (low security requirements: e-mail confirmation, medium: SMS or RSA token handed out to users, high: token coupled with bio-information such as fingerprint scan).
(3) See (1) and (2).
(4) Well, let them expire, prompt the user to reregister their device according to (2) 1-3 months in advance with increasing frequency.
(5) Store the key in an OS controlled keychain that gets locked on device lock. Avoid OSes such as Windows, that still don't offer this feature.
What if a service doesn't allow you to register multiple keys per account?
If I'm using an OS controlled keychain, what is the best way to handle it's contents in a OS agnostic way that is easy to back up just like dotfiles work?
Are there any resources that go into how to handle keys safely in a lot more specific detail?
In fact, a per-device public keys makes the whole process much easier, obviously, since specific devices can be locked out, rather than locking a whole user account.
About OS keychains: I'd imagine there are some multi-platform wrapper libraries to deal with this, but I've never specifically looked for such a thing, sorry. If there isn't already such a library in place I'll probably write one in javascript in 2014, since we're going to need it for the PaaS we're currently developing.
Therefore, in implementations such as OpenPGP/PGP, a new random symmetric key is generated with which the plain text will be encrypted, for example using AES as you suggested. Afterwards, this symmetric key will be encrypted with the public key of the recipient and attached to the cipher text.
When sending a document to multiple recipients, you only need to encrypt the symmetric key multiple times. The symmetric key is usually short compared to the rest of the document.
So if you are only encrypting for a single recipient you could encrypt using the public key directly. However, it would still need more computing power. This might be negligible on modern Desktop computers with lots of computing power and even hardware crypto support, but for embedded devices such as your smartphone it's still an important factor.
PS: Of course, there is more to OpenPGP/PGP such as the Web of Trust and digital signatures for verification of the sender of a document.