Economist's Theories Led to Carbon Trading – Ronald Coase Died Monday at Age 102
online.wsj.com
online.wsj.com
The Nature of the Firm: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0335.1937.... (1937) (introduced the theory of transaction costs).
The Federal Communications Commission: http://old.ccer.edu.cn/download/7874-1.pdf (1959) (introduced an economic theory for allocation scarce resources using market mechanisms).
The latter paper looks at the basic models of allocating spectrum (at that time a classical rival resource) and demonstrates how market trading of spectrum rights would lead to optimal allocations, assuming no transaction costs. The former paper looks into transaction costs in the context of asking why firms bother to hire permanent employees instead of contracting everything out, which would in theory lead to more efficient allocations of labor.
I am sad to learn of his passing but it was a life well lived.
"To illustrate this, Coase used the example of a cattle
farmer’s herd straying onto the cultivated fields of a
neighboring grain farmer.
If the law said the cattle farmer was legally responsible,
then mostly likely he would end up paying for the cost of a new fence.
If putting up a fence was prohibitively expensive, he might end up paying the
grain farmer for the occasional damage to his crops. But what if the cattle
farmer wasn’t legally responsible, perhaps because the property lines were
unclear? In these circumstances, Coase said, the grain farmer would likely end
up paying for a fence. Or, if the grain farmer believed that constructing a
fence would be more costly than the occasional damage done by straying
cattle, he would reluctantly accept the odd incursion.
The assignment of property rights would determine who pays. But from a
broader economic point of view, Coase argued, the outcome would
essentially be the same, regardless."
This doesn't hold up in real life with negative externalities and transaction costs. The article cites an example of pollution, but pollution can affect thousands of people, and there's no way to get all of them together to reach an efficient outcome without transaction costs.[1] http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/johncassidy/2013/09/ro...
To come back to the pollution example, it doesn't matter if the factory has the right to pollute or the people have the right to clean air: what matters is that transaction costs prevent them from working out their competing interests without intervention.
Surely this means assuming the externality is covered by property rights. In which case it's no longer really an externality. In practical terms assuming adequate property rights is assuming half the problem away.
Under the assumption that property rights can and have been allocated and can be and are enforced.
This is more a point about how the Coase theorem gets interpreted rather than about a flaw in it.