It's a question of whether the idea is fundamentally sound.
You're routing your data through several strangers, who are all volunteers and may be individuals who support anonymity or governments who are trying to break it, relying on them discarding logs in order to preserve your anonymity. Since the data is encrypted, and routed between several nodes, you do have some redundancy in place in case one of the middle nodes is an attacker.
However, there are several problems. The data coming out of the exit nodes is unencrypted. Now, everyone advises you to always encrypt anything that will pass through an exit node, but that's not always possible. Some protocols just don't have widely available encrypted versions (like DNS), or even with encryption, where you are connecting to is leaked, as well as some information in things like the TLS handshake that may be de-anonymizing.
There are also lots of ways that data can leak at your endpoint. For instance, many programs may make DNS queries that don't go through Tor, so what you are looking up may be leaked.
Furthermore, Tor doesn't sent data at a constant bitrate. Someone who can monitor traffic on a large portion of the network can correlate it across points.
Finally, due to the nature of routing traffic between several points, a fairly limited number of exit nodes, and the encryption, Tor is fairly slow. So most people won't really be able to use it on a day to day basis, making mere use of it somewhat suspicious, and likely to subject you to more scrutiny.
None of these are fatal flaws, but they are some fundamental weaknesses, and many of them can't really be fully fixed.
I think that focusing on widespread, end-to-end encryption, rather than anonymity service like Tor, would be more valuable. Yes, you will still be vulnerable to metadata monitoring, which is a problem, but it would help a lot more with the content of your communications.