Intact tail fin offers clue to Air France crash
latimes.com
latimes.com
Oddly, the other LA Times article was complaining (inaccurately) that the computerized controls in the Airbus would limit the pilot's ability to use the controls. This article complains that the controls don't limit the pilot's ability to mess things up.
What's needed is the truth, not this speculation. Perhaps the vertical stabilizer did rip off. If it did we need to know why.
Instead to me the point was the difference in what the pilots thought of the design of the airplane and how the airplane was actually designed.
That's an important point. I'm sorry he used this crash to make it, but I think it deserves to be discussed, especially with fly-by-wire (but really with any FAA-approved airframe)
It offers nothing but further rampant speculation on top of the usual news cycle on airline crashes. Worse, it offers zero closure to the families of the crash victims nor relief to the air crews and passengers of the 100s Airbus A330s now flying on a daily basis.
At least it's labeled as "opinion" and the author clearly demarcates this line of reasoning as pure speculation. That's far more disclosure than most "professional" journalists do these days.
This is pure -- and premature -- speculation. But it is not speculative to observe that some vertical fins are weaker than they should be, and that this is because of the regulations that govern how airplanes are built. The FAA, together with its international counterparts, should amend certification requirements for future aircraft to restore to the maneuvering speed the safety status that pilots always believed it had. The rules that govern the structural integrity of airliners should not include asterisks.
Peter Garrison has a long history of writing and editing aviation pieces. He's written a fair number of accident reports for the aviation community. He understands the nature of premature speculation. He made the call that this issue is important enough to use the crash as a vehicle to bring up.
I agree.
The purpose is not to speculate on the crash, provide closure to the crash victims or relief to the air crews. The purpose is to bring up a regulatory issue that needs further attention. In this case, I think it's a worthwhile cause. In 99% of the other stories, I did not. In fact, I blogged about how terrible it was to use a crash just to drive traffic. http://www.whattofix.com/blog/archives/2009/06/funeral-home-...
Indeed. I saw a documentary on Flight 587 a while ago, and seem to distinctly remember that both Airbus and Boeing planes suffer from this "rudder reversal" issue.
I don't believe so.
> The bulletin also stated that a rudder reversal was also known as a "rudder doublet" and was defined as "a large rudder deflection input in one direction followed immediately by a rudder deflection input in the opposite direction." In addition, the bulletin stated that "large 'rudder reversals' or 'rudder doublets' must be avoided on Transport Category Aircraft" because "these inputs can result in loss of control or structural failure of the aircraft."
-- Report on Flight 587: http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2004/AAR0404.pdf (page 114)
[Edited to add: i.e. the pilot goes from having the rudder full left to full right, or vice versa. This is what happened to Flight 587.]
In short, while Boeing and Airbus both have rudder-related problems, they are different problems. Boeing have an issue with uncommanded rudder movements, whereas Airbus' older models (if the author is correct) have the problem that it is too easy for pilot-commanded rudder inputs to put the plane beyond its structural limits. This problem can surface on the newer models if the fly-by-wire systems go down.
I know - my point was that, as far as I can remember from the documentary I saw, this danger wasn't/isn't peculiar to Airbus planes. And as I think the above quote from the Flight 587 report shows, this issue can correctly be called "rudder reversal".
As mentioned in the article, pilot-commanded rudder reversal is relatively easy to obtain on older airbus models because they have very sensitive rudder pedals. This is not an issue on Boeing aircraft. As I said, I think you are recalling the problem that certain Boeing aircraft have with uncommanded rudder reversal, but although this is an equally serious problem, it is not the /same/ problem. In particular, there is no evidence that boeing aircraft have insufficiently strong vertical stabilizers. (In the rudder reversal incidents, the stabilizer remained in tact IIRC, it was the loss of control that was problematic.)
Well. OK. I'm willing to concede that either the programme, or my memory of it, could be wrong.
[Edited to add: Wikipedia backs you up on the very sensitive rudder controls on an Airbus. I think what I was remembering was that, if a pilot of any large plane did this deliberately, the same problem could occur. But yes, it seems it might be easier to do accidentally on an Airbus.]
"As I said, I think you are recalling the problem that certain Boeing aircraft have with uncommanded rudder reversal"
I assure you I'm not.
Of course it is speculation. The NTSB experts (or at least, their equivalent) are doing the same thing at this point. I guarantee that the way root causes for aviation accidents are established is exactly via speculation (aka hypothesis), followed by rigorous testing of that speculation where possible.
Peter Garrison is well-known in the aviation community and may well be considered an expert on flight safety. He is a pilot with thousands of hours of flight time. He designed and built several airplanes himself, and for decades has written Flying's "Aftermath" section, which takes a hard look at general aviation's accidents.
Should Feynman have avoided "speculating" when he compressed an O-ring in ice water on television during the Challenger safety board inquiry, when NASA and the Rogers' board were plodding along? Or did it help lead to a rigorous and open inquiry?
Also, Feynman didn't speculate about the O-ring freezing, he knew it would happen and gave a simple demonstration.
The angle of attack (alpha) is the angle between the wing and the airflow. If you increase alpha above a certain angle, the wing stalls, and ceases generating lift. Stalls are commonly encountered when flying really slow, but can occur at any speed. Pull the stick hard enough, and the elevator rudder will increase alpha above the threshold, momentarily causing the wings to cease generating lift and no longer stress the airframe.
The lifting force generated by the wings is proportional to the angle of attack. However, when the airplane reaches a certain airspeed, flying the wings at an alpha just below stalling will cause the wings to generate more lift (measured in accelleration, or G units) than the airframe is designed to handle. This is the "maneuvering speed", the maximum speed at which full rudder deflection in smooth air will not cause the plane to exceed its design loads.
The misunderstanding lies in that this speed is considered an absolute safe speed to do whatever you want with the controls. This is not the case. Turbulence, the airframe's current position in relation to the airflow, the plane's attitude and current position of the flight control surfaces can all add to the forces that work on the airframe. So when you pull 4G at the maximum maneuvering speed and encounter a 2G gust of turbulence, the air works 6Gs on the airframe, which will cause you to exceed the design specifications.
Every professional pilot should know this, but it wouldn't surprise me if there are some who don't. It is really, really common among hobbyist pilots.
The manufacturer who adds extra "beef" to its structure ends up with a heavier
airplane that carries fewer passengers or uses more fuel, and loses sales to the
lighter and more efficient, though "weaker," competitor. The same is true of
cars. We willingly sacrifice greater safety to get cheaper, more
fuel-efficient vehicles.
If this wasn't published by a U.S. based paper, I'd think this writer was European or something. The historical trend (prior to the recent price hikes with gas of the last couple of years) has been the direct opposite. Americans were buying bigger and beefier cars (read: SUVs and minivans) to protect themselves and any children. (The whole "soccer mom" phenomenon, remember?) This was a contributing factor to the implosion of the U.S. car industry, since they faced selective pressures at home that caused them to develop vehicles that didn't sell as well to the world at large. And now that fuel prices are starting to invert the equation, foreign auto makers are eating our lunch,Light fuel-efficient cars don't meet everyone's needs. (Yup, mom-mobiles/mini-vans are needed.) And few people can afford to have both a commute car and an "everything else" car per daily-driver. (Besides, a commute-only vehicle means that you can't do as much in transit.)
Besides, the "if everyone drove small, everyone would be safe" assumption is wrong because many car accidents don't involve another car.
I'm unaware of significant efforts to make "not cars" (not just trucks, but immobile structures) more crash friendly. (Yes, I know about break-away traffic signs. Even if all signs were break-away, that wouldn't be enough.)
Lose points for misreading and putting words in my mouth. I said that, "engineering quality, not greater mass, would be the dominant safety factor for the buyer." It is the prevalence of large passenger vehicles that makes greater mass an issue in North America. I wouldn't see so many small single women driving around alone in Suburbans, Expeditions, and other SUVs if there wasn't an on-road arms race here in terms of vehicle mass.
I've spoken with two other people who have been in major collisions in a little teeny Honda CRX. The engine dropped out the bottom of the car, the front end crumpled, and everything happened exactly like it was supposed to, and everyone came out mostly unscathed. Consumers here as a whole would be much better served by paying attention to the safety engineering of vehicles, instead of just feeling secure because they are perched high in a huge metal behemoth.
No scheme or factor is going to make everyone safe. Don't put that straw man on me. More consumer attention to safety engineering is going to ground the market on more economical principles, however.
Nope, people want to feel safe not be safe.
Lose points for continuming to assert something after being told of counter examples.
Trucks exist. So do overpass supports. All other things being equal, mass and distance helps. Bigger vehicles provide more of both.
But, let's not stop there.
> I wouldn't see so many small single women driving around alone in Suburbans, Expeditions, and other SUVs if there wasn't an on-road arms race here in terms of vehicle mass.
You're assuming something about them that's false. The fact that someone is driving alone doesn't mean that said someone always drives alone.
Do you really think that they should drive the kids to {wherever}, leave the car and take the bus home and then take the bus back to pick them up?
Besides, I've shown the arithmetic - it rarely makes sense to buy an extra car to save gas - the other costs dwarf the savings.
No, you still don't get it. I'm talking about motivation, not about safety directly. If the motivations of consumers are misplaced, it's harder for the market to work from the right ones.
Trucks exist. So do overpass supports. All other things being equal, mass and distance helps. Bigger vehicles provide more of both.
Yes, mass matters in a collision. I never said it doesn't. I paid attention to momentum in high school physics. Again, it's the prevalence of large vehicles that's the issue. It's the distortion of the North American market that causes many more large vehicles than are actually needed to be on the road.
You're assuming something about them that's false. The fact that someone is driving alone doesn't mean that said someone always drives alone.
Uh, you're assuming the opposite? I'm not assuming anything about a particular individual. I estimate that the prevalence of the phenomenon is out of whack. Please stop putting inaccurate renditions of my ideas into my mouth!
Step 1 - misread other's post. Step 2 - respond to the distorted/simplistic idea you just misread. Step 3 - repeat until you feel smart.
Look, if your brain can't handle the one level of indirection involved with prevalence or motivations in a market, then get out and go back to the mental kiddie pool. At least criticize me for using mental impressions of prevalence instead of hard numbers. Then you'd be actually criticizing my actual idea and not your misreading.
Tiresome.
As am I. I'm pointing out that people don't just see cars when they think of safety so it's absurd to think that their safety motivation would be just cars.
I've actually talked with people about this. The ones who express safety concerns tend to be concerned by trucks and most don't consider cars at all. Maybe they're wrong, but that's their motivation....
You have actually talked to your target audience about this, right?
>>> I wouldn't see so many small single women driving around alone in Suburbans, Expeditions, and other SUVs if there wasn't an on-road arms race here in terms of vehicle mass.
>>You're assuming something about them that's false. The fact that someone is driving alone doesn't mean that said someone always drives alone.
> Uh, you're assuming the opposite? I'm not assuming anything about a particular individual.
You were asserting something about a broad population that isn't true. The stated basis for your assertion is your observation. I'm pointing out why your observations are inadequate.
I know a lot of people who have these vehicles, so I'm not assuming anything about them. I know that the vast majority use close to their vehicle's capacity an interesting amount of time even though they also do a lot of single-passenger driving.
How do you know which of your fellow travelers also do kiddie runs or other activities where they need more than a single passenger vehicle? (Kiddie runs tend to be disjoint from commute-corridors in time if not space.)
Let's get specific. My vehicle carries 2-3 divers and their cold water gear fairly often. How do you identify such use when I'm driving alone, which is the majority of my driving?
You can argue that they don't "need" a large vehicle to do their kiddie runs. (I certainly don't know why taking a couple of kids requires more equipment than invading France.) You could also argue that they should rent for fairly rare "very heavy" tasks and buy a little smaller. (However, be sure to run actual numbers.)
Either way, you're going to have to deal with the fact that they have these needs and acknowledge that their vehicle choice is driven by the totality of their use and your observations aren't seeing that.
And, yes, I'm concerned with the prevalence of truck-sized vehicles. Thanks for finally getting on the same page, only requiring me to repeat the phrase 3 times. (Though you seem to do this by claiming the concept as your own.)
I know a lot of people who have these vehicles, so I'm not assuming anything about them. I know that the vast majority use close to their vehicle's capacity an interesting amount of time even though they also do a lot of single-passenger driving.
Your sample size is, what, 12? 24? Look, I'm not pretending to have a significant sample size, or rigorous methods, but in terms of people I've observed in Houston Rush Hour, it's more like 100's. Also note that I'm not assuming anything about any individual. I'm just thinking: "My god, there are a lot of those goddamned things!"
Just because you know a handful of people who use their big vehicles a lot, doesn't mean you have anything resembling a refutation of my position. At most you have some relevant anecdotes. Please remember "anecdotes are not data." Recalling a few anecdotes then declaring the someone wrong on their basis is an all too common display of mental fluffiness.
I certainly don't know why taking a couple of kids requires more equipment than invading France.
Been over in Europe lately? We Americans just like driving much bigger vehicles than we really need to. The marketing strategies of US auto manufacturers were designed to exploit this specifically. Why is it some random guy in Tuscany can run a plumbing business with a little mini-pickup as small as an econobox hatchback, while my friend has to have his Ford Ranger to run his? He'd love to spend 1/3rd as much on gas, but his customers would look at him funny.
By and large, the populace is brainwashed into doing things against their best economic interests. I suspect that choice of vehicle is one of these cases.
> And, yes, I'm concerned with the prevalence of truck-sized vehicles.
That's nice but irrelevant because we're not talking about you. We're talking about the motivations of people who buy big vehicles. You remember them - you want them to do something different.
Those folks are concerned about actual trucks. Cars don't much register. We can argue about what they should be concerned about, but what they're actually concerned about is pretty clear.
> Look, I'm not pretending to have a significant sample size, or rigorous methods, but in terms of people I've observed in Houston Rush Hour, it's more like 100's.
And that's exactly my point. Your observation just tells us that a lot of people commute alone. It doesn't tell us what they do with those vehicles the rest of the time.
That's why I asked you how you know about their other usage.
Or, do you want to argue that their other usage is irrelevant? It's fairly easy to show that the economics of multiple vehicles are tough....
> Been over in Europe lately?
Not in the last three years, but yes, multiple times, one time being three months in Demark. I've recently been spending time in the Caribbean, Mexico, the Philippines, and the ABC islands. I've started to pay for trips to the Galapagos, Fiji, and the Baltics.
I'm not sure why this is relevant, but since you do, let's see your passport log.