This is a terrible writeup.
>>There is no way to ever prove or disprove whether any encryption was ever happening at all, and whether it was or not makes little difference.
That is the whole point in open sourcing the code!
>>There is no way to ever prove or disprove whether any encryption was ever happening at all, and whether it was or not makes little difference.
That is the whole point in open sourcing the code!
Unfortunately, that would be DRM, which evokes knee-jerk cries of "Evil!" The point here is that DRM is not fundamentally evil. The particular way that lots of companies want to use it and slip it into everyone's machine under the radar is most certainly bad. However, there are situations where it would actually be useful and help protect individual rights. (In particular, when it is used by individuals as a tool to protect their own interests.)
(Yes, I know I'm preaching to the choir, but this is really for 3rd party readers.)
No, it wouldn't. DRM means someone other than the hardware owner restricts what the hardware can do. If you're the owner and control all the relevant keys, the setup enhances rather than removes security - the opposite of DRM.
Also I don't think the concept would work. Suppose you have something like a TPM chip and the so-called "trusted computing" scheme - except that the hardware owner has the ability to replace the "attestation key" at will. This would remove the "evil" quality of the TC scheme, which relies on a vendor or corporation acting similarly to a CA, keeping something mathematically related to the Attestation key, and concealing it from the hardware owner.
Now as the server owner, you can remotely verify it's still running the software you specified. But without that third party role, you can't prove this to anyone else! And to the extent you could, you would have to point would-be users to the third party, which could "sell out" or use its power to foist treacherous software, or refuse to sign yours, etc. - IOW, right back to the evils of the TC plan.
Why doesn't it include someone voluntarily giving up what the hardware can do?
> Now as the server owner, you can remotely verify it's still running the software you specified. But without that third party role, you can't prove this to anyone else!
Why couldn't the license holder of the software take this role?