Price Cost Twitter Cash but Gave It Credibility
dealbook.nytimes.com
dealbook.nytimes.com
This gem from the article:
>Should a stock offering maximize value for the companies selling shares, for the investors looking to gobble those shares up or for early employees and funders? And why are investors buying the shares — because they love the company’s fundamentals or because they sense a good deal?
This is a ridiculously false dichotomy. In any efficient market, sellers are trying to raise the price as far as the demand will bear, and buyers should be willing to purchase up to their estimated value of the company, taking into account their risk tolerance. Price should be a tug-of-war between these actors.
The way I see it, there's only two possibilities:
1) Pre-IPO Twitter thought there was a realistic risk of not fully selling the shares they put up if they raised the price.
2) Twitter purposefully got less money in a fair market trade than they could have.
And (2) seems totally insane to me for a rational actor. (1) seems plausible; apparently these things are hard to price.
Auctions sound good in theory but don't work very well (see Google). You generally want some banks selling the crud out of the offering and committing to the company.
Dutch auctions do sound good in theory, and I'm aware of what happened with Google's: a 17% pop, which left some money on the table, but much less than Twitter did. Google's stock did abnormally well in the months following, but it's hard for me to divine how much of this had to do with the IPO mechanism. In any case, I think a sample size of one is probably not enough to draw much of a conclusion one way or the other.
Twitter was clearly playing the whole thing conservatively and aagreed to a price that was probably low (hindsight to some, foresight to most).
There's some incentive so appease the banks as they historically do play a meaningful role going forward as related to M&A and fundraising.
The Google IPO was lousy not because it only popped 18% but because the auction format severely depressed the whole thing. Google inexplicably got pretty much the same result as Twitter ($1,8b on a $23b valuation) despite being an order of magnitude more impressive (I like Twitter).
It sounds like an a posteriori justification of the status quo for playing on Wall St, to me.
I recall a lot of hand wringing in the press when FB IPO'd but their market making bank wasn't able to score anything out of it precisely because it was accurately priced. The more I read about this, the smarter, more incredible of a negotiator I think Zuckerberg is.
Bankers are same folks that argue that they are adding efficiency to the market and thus deserve a big paycheck, and yet their IPO pricing maxim seems to be "guess a number and just make sure it's below the actual value so you don't anger the market". When Facebook tries to price it right (using the greenshoe to adjust) or when Google tries to do a reverse auction they get up in arms. Does anyone actually have a good argument for leaving in a margin for the investors in the IPO? This article's only attempt seems to be this:
"But it is also in Twitter’s long-term interest to remain in the good graces of institutional investors that believe in the company and will continue to invest. After all, based on fundamentals alone, it was hard enough to justify valuing Twitter at $18.3 billion, based on $26 a share, let alone $31.8 billion, based on $45.10."
This to me reads like "they need to bribe the market so they'll keep putting money in Twitter".
http://epicureandealmaker.blogspot.com/2013/09/go-ask-alice....
>Those who were able to secure an allocation of shares recognized an instant 73 percent gain
Doesn't sound like miscalculation.
I am confused why this seems to happen, though. I'd have to assume that the people at Twitter have access to more information and advice than I could possibly hope to understand. Even so, they choose to not use an auction or anything, but let GS make a huge amount for themselves and choice customers. There must be some reason these companies' allow their IPOs to be managed that way.
I also do not quite understand how "winning the good graces of the market" means anything. Unless they're suggesting that Twitter is planning on tens of millions of more shares in the future, and hoping a good IPO leads to even higher "long term" share price.
In the case of FB: If FB stock had stayed at $20 or so, would that really affect FB? It'd be less than fantastic for employees and other shareholders that had options or shares, but would it hurt FB the company itself?
Having an individual trade close at $50.09 doesn't mean you'll be able to move tens of millions of shares at $50.09.
The IPO process is more or less bankers emailing clients asking "Hey, want to buy this brand new company at $26? How about $32?" You essentially have to make a decision without information on how other buyers behave, which forces conservative behavior.
The press also seems to cover the stock market mostly as a casino, not as a money-raising or social capital-allocation mechanism. So stock rises==good, drops==bad. So the FB IPO "failed," even though the so-called failure mode actually raised Facebook more cash to expand its business than most alternative outcomes would've.
Besides, it's not leaving money "on the table," it's handing it to non-company insiders, for the benefit of those who sold into the doubling.
Twitter IPOd at a much much higher price than those traded on private markets before the IPO. Facebook on the other hand went to almost the same price as on private markets. [1]
[1] http://america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/real-money-with-ali...
But no Twitter insiders sold stock as part of the offering, so their shares, valued at as little as $17 just a week ago, are now worth more than $40 a share. With the shares still at least 60 percent above the initial offering price, Twitter’s insiders must feel rather pleased with how the offering was executed.