Actually, with our Private Cloud offering you pretty well can guarantee privacy by simply firewalling the virtual appliance from the rest of the world, if you would like to :)
Feel free to sign up and packet inspect the traffic!
Feel free to sign up and packet inspect the traffic!
One of the things I didn't like about AeroFS when I last looked at it was the dependency of having Java avail on systems. I try to remove Java as much as possible and it certainly would be nice if the AeroFS client were avail in a different bundle.
This leaves users holding the bag. Well, it should work for you but remains subpar.
Congrats nonetheless.
Having said that, the idea of running software I mistrust so much that I have to firewall it on my network is unacceptable.
Slightly sad that we can't trust things on our own network now... goes and turn on firewall for individual machines on my own network
This attack isn't purely theoretical. I believe Ian Goldberg and David Wagner's group at UC Berkeley demonstrated it in the 1990s against a LAN-based NFS server that was serving shared software to workstations. Instead of making the NFS server itself malicious, they raced against it to provide modified binaries that the workstations would then execute. However, if the NFS server had been malicious, it could have carried out the same attack, without directly leaking user data to the Internet.
I guess this is a reference to that work:
https://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~daw/papers/endpoint-security.ht...
If you could compromise workstations this way, you could then try to find another channel through which to have the workstations themselves exfiltrate data. One example might be a variant on the Telex system:
Instead of signaling Internet routers with requests to browse censored websites, you could signal them with the content of exfiltrated files.