Tim Berners-Lee: Spies' cracking of encryption undermines the web
theguardian.com
theguardian.com
> it's naive to imagine that if you introduce a weakness into a system, you will be the only one to use it. A lot of the IT industry feels that's a betrayal. [...] The two governments have elevated the fight against organised hacker gangs and militarised cyber-attacks from states such as China to the rank of a top national security priority. Yet at the same time their spying branches have actively aided cybercriminals by weakening encryption.
and the effect this has on users through lowered confidence in the privacy of exchanged information.
And if the agencies are steering people towards crypto they know is broken but the public do not?
The problem comes because the win of the cold war somewhat skewed the western view of their own capabilities.
When NSA had adversaries that they deemed worthy - they took the effort to strengthen everyone's communications. Right now while looking at the others with disdain and (wrongly) refocused the efforts on terrorism - they prefer weak networks.
I am not sure if what I said above is even possible, but I hope it is. Trying to remove the side effects of humanity from something created by humans is not an easy task.
It will always be an arms race between defenders and attackers, because the cost of everything changes over time. You will always have to worry about some genius getting struck by a satori that makes your entire encryption scheme worthless.
The problem is akin to someone in the shipbuilding business worrying about the discovery of a beam that can reduce the strength of a 1-cm thick steel plate to 1-cm thick toilet paper--and the effect is not attenuated by normal matter. The inventor could build a facility in the hinterlands that could instantly and tracelessly sink any steel ship, anywhere in the world.
That is what encryption designers are up against. TBL is upset because intel agencies have been quietly quashing non-vulnerable schemes and/or actively promoting vulnerable ones, paying no heed to the possibility that their enemies might also have some geniuses, or that their own geniuses' ideas might replicate and leak outside of their info-fortress.
The internet should be thought of as something that transcends the notion of governments and nations; it's a tool for all of humanity regardless of who they are and where they live. The NSA should be considered just another "bad guy" in this scenario - a well-funded arm of a group of people who don't necessarily have the good of humanity as a whole at heart. Literally anyone who wants to manipulate the way the internet works away from an open tool for communication and sharing, to subvert it and break it for their personal gain, or that of their corporation, organisation, government or nation, is the bad guy.
And among the hard things is the fact that you can't have it both ways. In TBL's case this means he has to realize that DRM is Big Brother Inside. Standardizing DRM means building a standard framework for back doors. You can't be an enabler for the big entertainment companies without being an enabler for snooping.
Many security experts have not faced the fact that they cannot protect their users from state actors and still be deputized by the same state in crime-fighting. The only way to protect the user is to put the user's data out of reach of both spies and police. The security priesthood is easily co-opted and turned into witting and unwitting tools.
Any country that tries to create what he calls a "walled garden" of the internet would find the value of its GDP drop through the floor. Trade would be disrupted, cross-cultural exchange wither
While I agree with the sentiment of the article, I can't help but look to China's version of a "walled garden of the internet" and how that has affected China's GDP. It seems that China continues to do quite well in spite of the aforementioned "walled garden" approach to the internet.Is the rest of the world doomed to a similar situation?
In practice, the singularly boneheaded decision to allow DRM into the official HTML5 spec will have a far greater impact on the average user's web experience than NSA backdoors will.
You are right, though, that this will have a pretty big impact on the average user's web experience. Namely, it will let them view protected content without requiring proprietary plugins (e.g. Flash, Silverlight, etc). So it's pretty good for the average web user.
Yet.
From the 14 Nov 2013 draft:
>This proposal extends HTMLMediaElement providing APIs to control playback of protected content.
In other words, they're extending HTMLMediaElement to allow Hollywood to put whatever DRM measures in place that they choose. What this WILL NOT do is increase accessibility. Maybe Tim thought it was a good idea, but the old adage is that the road to Hell is paved with good intentions.
The copyright industry are not the good guys, and they will find some way, just as they always have, to make the user experience worse in the interests of their bottom line(s). But who knows? Maybe I'm wrong, or maybe you just have more faith in the industry that was shipping malicious rootkits on music CDs than I do.
You're also a bit off your rocker if you're trying to paint "the copyright industry" as some kind of secretive cabal of people who just want to cram DRM on users' computers. Not to mention the fact that sites that don't use this won't even be affected by it. The vast majority of websites out there won't even care, and the ones that do care already have a solution to deal with protected content today, it's just a crappy solution (e.g. requiring Silverlight). Hell, using EME to handle protected content is a far better experience for the user than requiring the installation of a third-party plugin that can has far more capabilities than just decryption content. So if anything, this actually limits the scope of what protected content playback code can do on users' machines.
There was a proposal, I think in the HDDVD spec maybe, wherein the dvd drive itself would be remotely disabled and prevented from playing future content based on the sole discretion of some nebulous 3rd party.
There's the Sony BMG rootkit thing that Mark Russinovich uncovered.
Yes, they absolutely want to cram your computer with DRM and you're a fool for thinking they don't.