Interesting. This suggests you're storing all passwords in plain, is that true?
Interesting. This suggests you're storing all passwords in plain, is that true?
we've thought long and hard about this too, and don't consider it to be a large threat, as the only two people with access to the box[1] could silently replace the AUTH code and log all the passwords anyway, rendering any secured password store irrelevant.
[1]: it's not even known outside the core where the box lives, and it's also essentially completely isolated from the internet at large.
What year is this?
Add on a layer of encryption (unique key per password, keys in a separate encrypted table) and you're way better off than you are now.
Also, since MD5 can be collided, consider SSL for the login process.
In real CRAM-MD5 this is not true. It uses HMAC-MD5 of the key directly. To be able to calculate that, you need to do
MD5((key XOR opad) || ...)
Which means that you either store "key XOR opad" (not meaningfully different from storing key), or an intermediate result from MD5, which is tricky.Quakenet's authentication mechanisms, except for LEGACY-MD5, call MD5, SHA1 and SHA256 before using it as the key, so they could store just each of those different hashes (unsalted). The LEGACY-MD5 mechanism does require the plain text password to be known by the server.