(Not that Twitter was a giant company in 2009, and Facebook was just getting there)
Better to let the market sift out the successful founders than to payroll a hundred of them, hoping for a big win. Think of how many unsuccessful founder types that Facebook didn't hire too.
Also if this guy was working for Facebook, odds are he would have ended up on messenger, and someone else would have filled the SMS market need for Whatsapp in India. Then Facebook would be acquiring that company instead.
Sorry, I can't help myself, but at a salary of $160k a year, payrolling "a hundred of them" per year would only cost 1/10th of what FB just paid for whatsapp.
It's too bad companies like FB and Twitter would rather let the 'founder' types slip by than to take more chances. When Facebook last tried to recruit me, they described themselves as "a bunch of startups that just happen to work under the same company." Yeah, right.
Stated in a different way - Facebook could have paid 1,000 teams of 10 (founders + engineers) at 160k/yr per person, for 10 years... for what they just paid for whatsapp. The collective diversity of products developed by said teams would probably be worth more than whatsapp.
The problem with PARC and AT&T labs wasn't that having a bunch of really smart people doing interesting stuff failed to produce brilliant, world changing ideas, it was that the companies in question weren't always good at capitalising on them (arguably for the better, in the case of Unix).
There's lots of fun evidence for this - AT&T had an answering machine 1934 but shelved it for 60 years.
>AT&T firmly believed that the answering machine, and its magnetic tapes, would lead the public to abandon the telephone.
http://thinkofthat.net/2010/12/03/no-answer-how-and-why-att-...
Did WhatsApp make a profit?
Sure, of course that's exactly what they're doing.
But just giving up on being able to identify these sorts of people when there's tens of billions of dollars at stake seems like an irresponsible business decision.
At these acquisition prices, it's worth putting a great deal of effort and money into alternative processes.
There's nothing wrong with that, of course, but it supports the idea that not only do you let the market pick the winner, but that once the market HAS picked a winner, sometimes you have to buy that winner partly as a defensive strategy; it's not enough to find a cheaper way to "play offense".
Yeah and this is why Valve is a struggling company. Hiring really smart people and letting them make whatever products they want is doomed to failure.
Oh wait...
> But beyond the tactics, Donahoe realized there was a deeper issue bedeviling eBay. It had stopped innovating. [...] eBay also had a problem attracting and retaining innovative, entrepreneurial people into its executive ranks ...
> Andreessen’s second theory of innovation is that the people who are the very best at it are the people who create successful technology companies — founders. They are the people who have a proven ability to develop a concept and bring it to fruition.
> For this reason, Andreessen believes that tech companies should be run by their founders.
> The problem for eBay is that its founder, Pierre Omidyar, had no interest in running it. And Donahoe, a talented manager, had the wisdom to know he was not the kind of visionary who could found an innovative tech company.
> So he decided he was going to have to go after the next best thing. He was going to have to build a team of founders, or founder-types, and give them the run of the place.
I think ultimately the problem is that you end up lacking a competitive advantage against startups, who are more highly incentivized to take risks and under fewer constraints (legal, PR, infrastructure, etc.) Most of the ideas that Google put out during that 2004-2011 period were really stuff that could've been done as startups and would've probably been even better products as such, but because Google was able to put them out for free they basically "strangled" the startup ecosystem. Witness how the much-decried Reader cancellation has opened the door for Feedly to really take off.
One of the biggest lessons for me, having worked at Google from 2009-present, is just how context-dependent strategy is. It's been really interesting to see Larry make (or try to make) certain changes in company culture, understand why they're being made and that Google and the world as a whole is probably better off for them, and yet also realize that they aren't very good for me as an entrepreneurially-minded Google employee.
Easy, do what you want.
P.S. Care to hire me?