Why is it likely? There are many private companies controlling amounts of money comparable with amounts of money controlled by some governments. I'm not talking US government of course but there are many smaller ones. Such companies are usually multinational corporations carrying much less local political risks and less prone to engaging in stupid things like trying to build communism or invade neighboring country to steal their supply of goats.
>>> If the government doesn't collapse, everyone gets made (more or less) whole again.
That is certainly not so, since unless you are controlling world reserve currency (read: US government) your resources are limited unless your deposits are nominated in your local currency. If you have monetary crisis, local currency quickly becomes worthless. Thus, you have very limited resources for making your citizens whole. On the contrary, big multinational corp would usually have balanced deposits in many major currencies - and usually good political ties with US and EU governments - which would ensure any local currency risk would be survivable for it. Thus, for a private corporation it would be much easier to make everyone whole - unless we're talking about US government.
So, for most governments out there which are smaller than US government, it is not true that their form of insurance is preferable for those reasons. The only reason it may be preferable is that the government has monopoly on violence (at least until overthrown) and thus can extract money by coercion, which private corporation usually can't. But if your government has to resort to robbery, are you sure it's a good insurance?
You assume complete rule of law is maintained in the absence of government, which is a non-trivial assumption. To exercise control of said money, especially in times of turmoil, you need an underwriter, usually in the form of police and/or army, which usually require the government to be functional.
> But if your government has to resort to robbery, are you sure it's a good insurance?
It's a game of semantics. Some people consider any taxation "robbery at gunpoint". Most people would consider that only about "unjust taxation". However, the number of definitions of "unjust taxation" is close to the number of voters.
You seem to operate under impression there's only one government. That is not so - in fact, there are many different governments and many different ways to store money, which allows to hedge the risks.
>>> It's a game of semantics.
It's not. There's a point when failing government resorts to actions which go beyond regular taxation - such as hyperinflation, confiscations, defaults, etc. In such cases governmental insurance is no good as there's much more chance it will hurt you than benefit you. For the private company, the minimum you get is zero, but for the government it can get way worse than that.
For the omnipresent omnipotent investor, that might be true , but probably is not true even for that investor -- e.g. the US government can and does have a wealth tax in the form of inflation, that applies to every single asset class anywhere in the world, enforced through FATCA/FBAR; You have no legal way to protect your assets against inflation+taxation).
If you're in Cyprus, and you need money usable in Cyprus, you are dependent on a functional Cypriot government, one that did not employ capital controls (But they did...)
Furthermore, a lot of people here are unaware, but for at least 3 months, there was more than one currency called "Euro": The Greek Euro, and the non-greek Euro. Banks in Germany would NOT accept greek Euro, or remit non-greeo Euro to a greek bank without collateral or other guarantees. All fiat money is fungible.
>> It's not. There's a point when failing government resorts to actions which go beyond regular taxation -
Your statement is ironic. Who gets to define what "regular taxation" is? The US had, at times, 80% taxation. Is that regular? The US government has been running a much higher than reported inflation for years. Is that regular?
The first point that's not quite understood is that this generally stops the bank run because people don't feel worried about their money anymore (or not all given existing state insurance).
The second point is that the "inflation of funds" actually didn't happen at the point when government printed money but at the point when the private institution multiplied the perceived amount of money in the system. Think about it, people that are withdrawing their money during a bank run don't suddenly feel richer.
The third point is that banks can and have operated fractional reserve systems using gold just as MtGox seems to have done with bitcoin. 19th century US banks printed their own gold certificates and failed on a regular basis.
J.K. Galbraith refers to this as the "bezzle" in The Great Crash: 1929. It's the monetary surplus created by fraudulent transactions, and, he notes, nobody has a problem with it until reality asserts her presence.
Update: More on the bezzle, found an online reference.
In many ways the effect of the crash on embezzlement was more significant than on suicide. To the economist embezzlement is the most interesting of crimes. Alone among the various forms of larceny it has a time parameter. Weeks, months, or years may elapse between the commission of the crime and its discovery. (This is a period, incidentally, when the embezzler has his gain and the man who has been embezzled, oddly enough, feels no loss. There is a net increase in psychic wealth.) At any given time there exists an inventory of undiscovered embezzlement in — or more precisely not in — the country’s businesses and banks. This inventory — it should perhaps be called the bezzle — amounts at any moment to many millions of dollars. It also varies in size with the business cycle. In good times people are relaxed, trusting, and money is plentiful. But even though money is plentiful, there are always many people who need more. Under these circumstances the rate of embezzlement grows, the rate of discovery falls off, and the bezzle increases rapidly. In depression all this is reversed. Money is watched with a narrow, suspicious eye. The man who handles it is assumed to be dishonest until he proves himself otherwise. Audits are penetrating and meticulous. Commercial morality is enormously improved. The bezzle shrinks...
Just as the boom accelerated the rate of growth, so the crash enormously advanced the rate of discovery. Within a few days, something close to a universal trust turned into something akin to universal suspicion. Audits were ordered. Strained or preoccupied behavior was noticed. Most important, the collapse in stock values made irredeemable the position of the employee who had embezzled to play the market. He now confessed.
J.K. Galbraith, The Great Crash: 1929, pp 132-133.
http://www.goodreads.com/work/quotes/1466583-the-great-crash...
And the association between Galbraith's bezzle and Bitcoin / Mt. Gox has already been made:
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/johncassidy/2014/02/bi...
For now, though, Bitcoin, like innumerable speculative vehicles before it, appears to be falling victim to what John Kenneth Galbraith, in his book on the 1929 stock market crash, referred to as “the bezzle.” In any economy, Galbraith noted, crookery and theft are present. But, particularly when money is plentiful and financial markets are rising, “the rate of embezzlement grows, the rate of discovery falls off and the bezzle increases rapidly.” It is only after the market falls and “audits are penetrating and meticulous” that much of this chicanery is uncovered.
I'd just note the money effect doesn't have to be fraudulent (though I'm sure it helps).
Just the simple effect of banks being able to loan the funds under their care creates an effect where people have access to more money, even if it isn't there and they act accordingly (and certainly adds to the pure embezzlement as well).
Also, this highlights to me the contrast between '29 and 2008. In 2008, the problems up past a certain were covered up, effectively insolvent banks were supported and whole industries were bailed out. So one presumes the position of the embezzlers has been different, though some certainly were caught. Indeed, I would imagine that today's embezzler is trying to steal as much as possible as quickly as possible so as to get into and remain in the too-big-to-fail mafia.
You're pretty much precisely inverting Galbraith's insight.
First: the whole point of the bezzle is that it is fraudulent. It's that during the period before you realize this, everything looks hunky-dory. It's Wile E. Coyote running off the edge of the cliff, before looking down and realizing he's suspended in the air.
The other is that an expansion in the money supply, in the short run, leads to consequences generally seen as favorable: those whose apparent financial wealth is increased suddenly have the ability to make claims on (purchase) resources they wouldn't have been able to previously. There's a model of money as exchange particles, and the concept of virtual particles which can be created under certain circumstances, which I'm finding increasingly compelling. The problem is when the wavefront collapses -- that's when misery sets in.
As for '29 and '07: yes, individual institutions were allowed to fail (mostly) during the Great Crash. Again, Galbraith goes into detail on this, I recommend his book. Where addressing the situation failed was in not creating liquidity elsewhere in the system to make up for this resulting in tremendous deadweight losses as the economy simply tanked.
In 2007, an institution was allowed to fail (Lehmann Brothers), but the consequences were so severe that politicians stepped in to staunch the collapse. The manner in which they did this was both useful (the liquidity was absolutely needed) and utterly flawed (the very individuals and institutions which had, in large part, assisted in creating the problem were greatly enriched by the intervention). And yes, getting into a business in which profits are privatized and losses socialized is very much the modern mantra.
And if they print so much money that it becomes worthless, then that'll have a similar impact on lenders than if they just default, which is the government's first option and everyone else's only option. The government's only option, too, if the debt is denominated in someone else's currency.
To that extent, governments having the option to print money to satisfy debts is a good thing. As soon as there are two evils to choose from, it becomes possible to select the lesser of them.
In other words, don't think of lending money to a government in a currency it can't debase as if it were somehow less risky. There's still plenty of risk, it's just that it comes entirely in the form of default risk rather than as a mix of default risk and exchange rate risk.