This is obviously a rehash of an argument that recurs on HN a lot, but just to be fair to what I'm trying to say here: that argument has (as far as I can tell) never been resolved.
Remember, I'm not asking how many vendors keep the BSAFE default. I'm asking how many use BSAFE in a way where the RNG matters.
If you gave us a piece of software that used BSAFE, you could reasonably expect detailed mitigation advice on not having a PKRNG exposed in your system.
No process in the market compensates us for acquiring a Ricoh printer and digging into its firmware to find how any why it's using BSAFE. It's not an especially interesting research project either.
I'm not surprised we don't know which products actually use Dual_EC, and I don't find the fact that we don't particularly telling. I'm saying something different: that I have worked with software that used BSAFE, and it used BSAFE for idiosyncratic reasons that didn't much implicate Dual_EC. I would not, for instance, be at all surprised to find an embedded device that used BSAFE for some goofy thing, but used OpenSSL as its TLS library.
In this case the mitigation is so simple ("don't use PKRNG; avoid RSA, Inc. going forward.") that it's not monetizable, so it's really only for reputation points.
In fact, the companies who use default simply use it. Period. And they use default in spite of it being slower than something else.
I'm not sure about you, but when I see a chronic change in performance I look into it, and if there is a vendor recommended suggestion, I usually try it.
This is particularly true for the Java tools as it is trivial in the extreme to compare the bsafe performance with the standard oracle crypto performance.
Basically, as tptacek points out, there is a lot of information we aren't privy to and there is no point assuming every bsafe customer is using ec .
And it has nothing to do with what you do when you "see a chronic change in performance." If somebody uses something and not something else, there's no "change" at all. Nobody ever claimed "every customer uses Dual_EC."
The claim is: there are a lot of famous customers and products using BSAFE and the Dual_EC is the default in BSAFE.
Interestingly, Dual_EC can still be negotiated in other implementations too. Poisoning the standards sets leaves some possibilities as long as the dangerous implementations are present.
For awhile during the late 1990s, some products used BSAFE because there were patent concerns with using any public key encryption in a commercial product, and BSAFE was an innoculation. Also, some products have codebases that date back before credible open-source crypto libraries. But those same products tend to have crypto features that were implemented later.
Like I said, we do a lot of casual reversing, and we look at a lot of random products that big F500 companies deploy, because F500s pay us to do that. I see a lot of OpenSSL. After that, I see a lot of Windows Cryptography API. Next in line is probably cryptopp, and then Bouncycastle. I see BSAFE once in a blue moon.
The more I think about it, the more interesting the research project of working out exactly why different products depend or don't depend on BSAFE actually starts to sound.