In fact, the companies who use default simply use it. Period. And they use default in spite of it being slower than something else.
I'm not sure about you, but when I see a chronic change in performance I look into it, and if there is a vendor recommended suggestion, I usually try it.
This is particularly true for the Java tools as it is trivial in the extreme to compare the bsafe performance with the standard oracle crypto performance.
Basically, as tptacek points out, there is a lot of information we aren't privy to and there is no point assuming every bsafe customer is using ec .
And it has nothing to do with what you do when you "see a chronic change in performance." If somebody uses something and not something else, there's no "change" at all. Nobody ever claimed "every customer uses Dual_EC."
The claim is: there are a lot of famous customers and products using BSAFE and the Dual_EC is the default in BSAFE.
Interestingly, Dual_EC can still be negotiated in other implementations too. Poisoning the standards sets leaves some possibilities as long as the dangerous implementations are present.
For awhile during the late 1990s, some products used BSAFE because there were patent concerns with using any public key encryption in a commercial product, and BSAFE was an innoculation. Also, some products have codebases that date back before credible open-source crypto libraries. But those same products tend to have crypto features that were implemented later.
Like I said, we do a lot of casual reversing, and we look at a lot of random products that big F500 companies deploy, because F500s pay us to do that. I see a lot of OpenSSL. After that, I see a lot of Windows Cryptography API. Next in line is probably cryptopp, and then Bouncycastle. I see BSAFE once in a blue moon.
The more I think about it, the more interesting the research project of working out exactly why different products depend or don't depend on BSAFE actually starts to sound.