Incidentally, someone on the mailing list brought up the issue of having a compiler flag to disable bounds checking. However, the Rust authors were strictly against it.
Incidentally, someone on the mailing list brought up the issue of having a compiler flag to disable bounds checking. However, the Rust authors were strictly against it.
This is Rust's greatest promise. Not only is writing memory-safe code possible, but it's also possible for Rust to do anything C is currently doing -- from systems, to embedded, to hard real-time, and so one. The promise of Rust cannot be overstated. And having finally grasped the language's pointer semantics, I've started to really appreciate its elegance. It compares very favorably to OCaml and other mixed paradigm languages with strong functional capabilities.
We really need at least a stable (in terms of the language and its standard libraries) of Rust before it can even be considered as a viable option. Even then, we'll need to see it used seriously in industry for at least a few years by early adopters before it'll be more widely trusted.
We keep hearing about how Rust 1.0 will be available sometime this year, and how there are only a relatively small handful of compatibility-breaking issues to resolve. But until those issues are all resolved and until Rust 1.0 is actually released and usable, Rust just isn't something we can take seriously, I'm afraid to say.
Perfect is the enemy of the good definitely applies here. Any of the last two releases of Rust (0.9 and 0.10) would have made a nice 1.0 release, particularly once managed pointers were moved out from the language core to the standard library.
I also worry about more complexity being added to the language, so the sooner it can reach 1.0, the better. Unfortunately, the Rust community seems to really enjoy bikeshedding, so my hopes for a 1.0 release this year are not very high.
Nonetheless, I've already been wrong about Rust once (re: complexity -- once you learn the admittedly tricky pointer semantics, it's really not that horribly complex). I would love to be proven wrong again.
A data point: I have a few little Rust projects that rely on some patches to some other libraries; whereas I used to spend above a half-hour compiling and sometimes an hour or two freshening making things compile for the new version, I'm now typically down to about 10 seconds to install the newest nightly and 5 minutes or to fix up some warnings and standard library changes. A stable 1.0 is starting to feel imminent and inevitable to me.
I wish godspeed to Rust and any other language which doesn't expose the raw underlying computer the way C/C++ does, which is IMO insane for application programming.
Wow, that sounds scary. Do you have any references or further reading about this?
Now, combining pointers and STL is not a good idea. In fact, using raw pointers in C++ is not a good idea, at least IMO (but you've seen I am a bit concerned about memory safety). However, this is perfectly supported by compilers, and not even seriously discouraged (some guides tell you to be careful out there). I've seen difficult bugs produced by this, in my case, in a complicated singleton object.
Not just your opinion; it's become the "standard of practice" in the C++ development community.
They're trying to get it that between STL, make_shared, C++14's make_unique, etc., that you won't actually be using "naked new"s in any but the rarest cases. For the rest of memory management you'd use types to describe the ownership semantics and let the compiler handle the rest.
In my experience well written C++ has a lot less security issues vs. similar C code. We've had third party security companies audit our code base so my statement has some anecdotal support in real world systems.
- Stricter type checking than C, (e.g. an error to add a centigrade value to a Fahrenheit value without casting)
- Bounds checked arrays and strings
Turbo Pascal added:
- Selectively turn off bounds checking for performance
- Inline assembler
- Pointers and arbitrary memory allocation
I don't think there's anything you can do in C that you can't do in TP. For example, it was easy to write code that hung off the timer or keyboard interrupts in MSDOS, which is pretty low level stuff.
The important thing is that the safe behaviour should be the default, you have to mark unsafe areas of code explicitly. This is the opposite to how it works with C.
"New" is a thing of the past, along with the need to even see T *.
These days good code in C++ is so high-level, one almost never sees a pointer, much less an arbitrarily-sized one. This is of course unless you're dealing with an ancient library.
Another thing of importance:
If you're working with collection iteration correctly (which tends to be the basis for a lot of these out of bounds errors), there is no contesting the beginning offset, or the end offset - much less evaluating whether that end is in sight. Even comparisons missing stronger types showing "this thing is null terminated vs that is not" can be eliminated if you just create enough definitions for the type-system to defend your own interests. If you're coding defensively, these shouldn't even be on the menu. One buffer either fits in the other for two compatible types, or you simply don't try it at all.
It'd be amazing what standard algorithms can leave to the pages of history, if they were actually put to good use.
Python has some nice high-level concepts with their "views" on algorithmic data streams that show where modern C++ is headed with respect to bounds checking, minus the exceptions of course :)
Or you have the cargo cult programmers, who don't know the language very well, so just pick up idioms from random internet postings or from some old part of the codebase that's been working for a while, so it must be a good source of design tips.
Remember, any time you talk about the safety of a language, you have to think about its safety in the hands of a mediocre programmer who's in a hurry to meet a deadline. Because that's where the bulk of the problems slip in; not when people are actively and deliberately coding defensively.