You wrote on your blog:
> Altogether, what this means is that, unlike Bitcoin, Ethereum will likely still be fully secure, including against fraudulent issuance attacks, even if only a small number of full nodes exist; as long as at least one full node is honest, verifying blocks and publishing challenges where appropriate, light clients can rely on it to point out which blocks are flawed
The fact that someone can extract compact proofs of an invalid state transition was pointed out by me years ago (e.g. https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=96644.msg1064601#msg...), and I believe I described it you personally in Mountain View. It's equally applicable to Bitcoin (though not implemented anywhere for any system yet).
It's a bit irritating to see ideas from Bitcoin recycled as "innovations" in altcoins and incorrectly claimed as as not applicable to Bitcoin, especially when they're not even implemented yet.
This one has a bunch of gnarly engineering issues that make it hard to implement. You end up with fraud codepaths that are virtually never executed, so how do you gain confidence that multiple implementations actually implement them consistently? The best proposal I'd had on this (from bitcoin-wizards) was to always produce two versions of a block, committed under a common root, one which has a random flaw, and then always kill it and select the right block using a proof. But thats kind of complex and indirect.