In UK, Two Convicted of Refusing To Decrypt Data
it.slashdot.org
it.slashdot.org
1) Encrypt sensitive data by the method of your choice, and store it in a filesystem X.
2) Generate a plain text filesystem Y full of disinformation, the same size as X.
3) When the key to decrypt X is demanded, compute Z = (X xor Y), and provide Z to the police on a DVD with instructions to the forensic cryptologist that it's a one-time pad.
The thing is were fogetting (or they're forgetting) is that this is, what, 2 people prosecuted out of 11 refusals over the course of 1 year. That's maybe 0.001% (this is a typo - I meant 0.01%, see below) of all the encrypted material investigated in a year (very rough figures, I only have a tiny portion of the data: it could be lower still).
I dont think it's "panties in a twist" material yet :)
Seriously?
Anyway my main point was that the other 99.99% you generally dont need the access keys for: either there is sufficient evidence elsewhere, or not enough data/evidence to warrant a (uh) warrant [this one being the main factor] or you can break throuhg the encryption in some way.
Secret Police?
Whether or not you can plausibly deny the existence of encrypted data in a convincing manner probably isn't going to be that important. Everyone draws a line somewhere and that might be the stand you wish to take, I suspect you'll end up in jail regardless though.
Except replace "Drug him and hit him with this $5 wrench..." with "Charge him with contempt and throw him in jail...".