As long as there are more nodes who would not benefit from this particular rigging as there are nodes who would, everyone can act in their own self-interest and the outcome would be correct.
Oh, so it has a built-in mining subsidy that miners are rewarded with? Because without that bitcoin suffers from an even worse version of the exact same problem and is not incentive compatible.
> As long as there are more nodes who would not benefit from this particular rigging as there are nodes who would, everyone can act in their own self-interest and the outcome would be correct.
What counts as a node? Can I spin up a million or a billion nodes on AWS and influence the vote that way?
Proof of work? Proof of stake? It's not exactly an unsolved problem.
Really? Where does it assume honesty on the part of all participants? If we could assume that, Truthcoin would just be a majority-vote...
> What stops me from making a massively stupid bet, and then rigging the market to diverge from reality?
How do you do that, given that everyone has massive incentives to vote against your rigging?
Is it a vote mechanism? Then how do you protect against sybil attacks?
Is it a proof of work system? Then how do you align incentives of the miners with accuracy of the prediction market?
It's a weighted vote, with loss of coin penalties for not voting or for voting against the majority and coin rewards for voting on low vote "decisions" and for voting for the outcome that ends up being the majority.
The defence here is the assumption that the usefulness of the market long term will motivate people to vote "fairly". I think that's incredibly naive but it might still work. There are strong incentives to vote for who you think the eventual winning side will be and the assumption that that will likely be the truth (for well designed questions) isn't crazy.
There are a lot of obvious ways to attack this type of system but I don't have the expertise to know how viable they are.
Synthetic assets are very much vulnerable to manipulation by whales. Ultimately you are just providing some incentive structure to keep the small players honest, and hoping that the small-bit players add up to significant security in aggregate, more than any possible combination of colluding players.
Generally speaking that's not a very safe assumption to make, particularly when the underlying settlement medium is irrevocable.