Noise: Box and pipe cryptographic core
github.com
github.com
In addition to DJB's Curve41417 (not yet implemented), Mike Hamburg's Goldilocks-448 curve looks pretty good, so I'm waiting for that to shake out.
http://sourceforge.net/p/ed448goldilocks/wiki/Home/
The "curves" mailing list will (hopefully) be a good place to track that discussion:
https://moderncrypto.org https://moderncrypto.org/mail-archive/curves/2014/000139.htm...
Edit:
They are already up!
http://news.gmane.org/gmane.comp.cryptography.moderncrypto.c...
http://news.gmane.org/gmane.comp.cryptography.moderncrypto.g...
http://news.gmane.org/gmane.comp.cryptography.moderncrypto.m...
The last two error out because they have not yet received any mailings since the registration on gmane.
But yeah, those might be 3 good candidates for a higher-security curve (Curve41417, Goldilocks, E-521).
I completely get where you're coming from on the "one ciphersuite to rule them all" problem but as an early adopter I would happily use curve25519 as a stopgap until you decide what the One True Curve should be. Instead I have to do my own CurveCP implementation now and then maybe rip it out later.
I wonder if a higher security margin curve is really required here, though. (Block) ciphers usually have to worry about multi-target attacks; 128-bit security starts to feel small in that scenario. But curves don't have that problem: you need to actually do 2^128 computation even in the multi-target case, so it seems less necessary to insist on >256-bit curves. What's the rationale behind the higher security margin curves?
The rationale for an "extra-strength" curve is the hope it might resist future cryptanalytic breakthroughs. The extra bits aren't needed for brute force, but if some cryptanalysis comes along in 20 years and lops a bunch of "security bits" off, you might be glad you had extra ones...
That's a hard thing to quantify, but if we can get, say, 96 extra security bits for only a ~3.5x slowdown over Curve25519, it seems worthwhile.
[1] https://docs.google.com/a/trevp.net/spreadsheet/ccc?key=0Aie...
That's a characteristic of good cryptosystems.
The wiki itself is highly recommendable; I learned a lot just by reading about how his design works. This is what "modern" (post-2009?) crypto looks like.
> The recipient of a Noise box can authenticate the sender, but cannot produce digitally-signed evidence binding the sender to anything.
This seems contradictory -- how can a recipient prove that the expected sender was the one who sent the box, without having binding evidence?
Given that the recipient knows that they did not forge the signature, they can infer that the signature is legitimate.
Given that a third party, to whom we fear the recipient might reveal the message, cannot know that the recipient did not forge the signature, they cannot infer that the signature is legitimate.
It's possible that i have misunderstood the OTR protocol, or Mr Perrin's claim about Noise boxes. As a result, please do not infer that the above explanation is definitely correct!
Other than that, Noise looks very interesting. It's from the same guy who came up with TextSecure's Axolotl ratchet and I think he was the main or one of the main (along with Moxie) architects of TACK, in case you're wondering who wrote this:
An interesting illustration of the power/benefit of branding: lots of people who don't really "do" crypto know the name of a key exchange ratchet. There's a lesson here that is applicable outside of crypto.
CurveCP: CurveCP lacks in-connection forward secrecy and resistance to key-compromise impersonation for the server. Also, a compromised ephemeral client key can be used permanently for impersonating the client. CurveCP requires the client to know the server's key prior to connecting, so trust models based on server certificates or "Trust-on-First-Use" are not directly supported. Like NaCl, it has a 128-bit security level.