Are you living in a computer simulation? | Hacker News Reader

Are you living in a computer simulation?

simulation-argument.com

23 pointshenryl27 comments

A modern rehash of René Descartes's "I think therefore I am" problem. He asked, essentially, am I living a fantasy dreamed up for me by a "great deceiver". Replace "great deceiver" with "computer simulation" and the argument plays out the same way (albeit, with more probability in the modern case)

Ultimately, your existence is exactly what you perceive it to be. Speculating on the nature of our existence, on this level, is indicative of those who don't have to pay their own rent :-) You can chase your own tail on this one literally forever. As we cannot access the simulation we are running in (just as you can't really think about thinking) this idea becomes a debate on par with the existence of God. It cannot be proven one way or another.

All this aside, I'll admit it was a fun read.

And by the way, the people who run these simulations could be one of our descendants who wanted to know how they evolved. Anyways, its definitely a fun read.

While it can't be proven either way, something I find interesting about Bostrum's formulation (and before it, Hans Moravec's 'Pigs in Cyberspace') is that it does seem possible to infer some probabilities.

As we get closer to a world where our own ability to create world-simulations approaches verisimilitude to our 'real world', it becomes more likely that we are ourselves in such a simulation.

Some people find this idea existentially-threatening, but if it's any consolation, those running the simulation can't be sure they're not in a simulation either.

For example, let's say we're inside a simulation run by a race of hyper-intelligent turtles, whose universe simulation, after a few tredecillion ticks, has given rise to our current perceived reality.

Well, it's turtles all the way up.

What if the turtle's universe was a dream thought up by the great flying spaghetti monster?

My probability math is rusty, but it's my understanding that probability is only relevant in a finite system. The article (in a very sneaky way) assumes, as it's premise, an infinite set of 'simulations'. But if this is the case, wouldn't that negate the usefulness of their 'probability'? In other words, if your conclusion is that we could be living in a simulation running inside a simulation running insi.....(keep going until blue in the face) doesn't that undercut your ability to say that one course of action is more likely than another?

Or, even better, isn't this the same as the proof for god that goes: "Our world is so complex and the probability of it coming about by by accident is so small that there must be an intelligent being controlling it'

(I was a CS/Philosophy double major in college, so my theoretical probability skills may be off, are there any math majors out there that can clear this up?)

The real numbers are infinite, and probabilities involving continuous functions on the reals make sense; it's just that P(X=c) = 0 for all constants c, and you have to integrate the probability density function to obtain probabilities. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Continuous_probability_distribu...

"Probabilities" are deceiving here. It's pure speculation and so any talk about probabilities is only adding a pseudoscientific veneer to what is really a high class entertainment.

Science fiction minus fiction does not equal science.

The trick is to come up with a probabilistic model for how they could have implemented this simulation that we're in, assuming that we are simulated.

Is there a way to exploit the simulation?

If I were to create a simulated universe, the program would have assertions that test for an interesting condition. (Say, if the simulated humans can achieve X, then break, and print a stack trace so we can study what lead to X)

When the universe simulator breaks, does that cause a perceivable difference for us, the simulated? Not necessarily. We would never experience such a break because by definition there is nothing to experience.

We can exploit the program if it is likely that the simulation program includes glitches. There are likely to be glitches if certain computations are innately difficult to do (e.g. NP hard?) so our simulation architects had to "hack" an estimation. For example, the strangeness of quantum mechanics may be just a poor (albiet optimized) implementation of newtonian mechanics.

Robin Hanson's suggestions for what behavior would best exploit living in a simulation are worthy of a debate all in themselves:

http://www.jetpress.org/volume7/simulation.htm

Abstract:

If you might be living in a simulation then all else equal you should care less about others, live more for today, make your world look more likely to become rich, expect to and try more to participate in pivotal events, be more entertaining and praiseworthy, and keep the famous people around you happier and more interested in you.

I suspect that the best response to this question is not yes or no, but rather "Who cares?"

It's in a similar class to "Can you prove that the Universe wasn't created by an invisible pink unicorn?" Well, no, I can't. But when I go to my grave, this inadequacy won't be at the top of my list of concerns.

In the same discussion on Slashdot years ago, one user insisted that the possibility of living in a simulation was the most horrific thing he could imagine, because someone could just pull the plug. Nobody managed to convince him that this was any less horrifying than, say, the possibility of the sun going nova, or being killed in a plane crash.

But, if the simulation is "airtight," you're exactly right. This possibility does not color our behavior one bit.

The only possible distinction I could see would be that interesting behavior might get your state saved for a future run of the simulation; the problem is that "interesting behavior" is impossible to determine.

I think it does color our behavior if we are able to produce such a simulation. If at some point in the future we are able to produce a simulation such as this don't you think our behavior would change in that we would acknowledge the possibility of ourselves being in such a simulation?

We already acknowledged the possibility. Our production of a simulation in no way affects the possibility that we're in one now.

The premise is falsifiable given enough time. Do you think we will ever be able to create artificial intelligence equivalent to a human being? If we accomplish that, do you think you simulate a world for these AI beings to live? Do you think these beings living in this simulated world would know they are in a simulated world?

It's fine to think that we will never produce such AI and/or simulations. But to compare it to something that is not falsifiable is a different thing, in my mind.

Quote from the introduction (emphasis mine) " Then it could be the case that the vast majority of minds like ours do not belong to the original race but rather to people simulated by the advanced descendants of an original race. It is then possible to argue that, if this were the case, we would be rational to think that we are likely among the simulated minds rather than among the original biological ones. Therefore, if we don’t think that we are currently living in a computer simulation, we are not entitled to believe that we will have descendants who will run lots of such simulations of their forebears. That is the basic idea. The rest of this paper will spell it out more carefully "

To distill the above: It is possible that some people are simulations. Therefore it is likely we are simulations. Therefore if we don't think we are simulations, we are not entitled to believe our descendants will run simulations of people.

Not sure if I even need to critique the logic behind that.

I love to watch my Sims playing the Sims on their little computers :)

Reading a few of the comment here...

I feel bad for some of you. This isn't serious (at least I hope not), this is the sort of thing you get to toy around with in your head when you're driving on a long road trip or coming home from a long day at work.

It's fun to think about this sort of thing (for me and, aparently, a few others at least...)...the way some of your are commenting on this makes me feel like you would be the type of people to ask

"Why? Are we going somewhere?"

of an invitation to go for a walk.

No, you're living in my simulation.

Prove me wrong.

Obligatory: http://destructionoverdrive.blogspot.com/2005/06/last-answer...

People's stupidity is infinite and therefore it can't be simuleted.

On a serious note, even if we are in simulation we are still part of the real world just like many computer programms today.

Yes

No.

How would you argue that?

Why do you have to? A perfect simulation of the real world is not a falsifiable hypothesis, therefore rational argument doesn't apply.

Not quite. Science doesn't apply, sure, but rational argument still does. Two very different things. Mind you, rational argument completely disassociated from any assumptions about the verifiability of the world we appear to inhabit has an irksome habit of going in circles.

Let's say person A claims we are all living in a perfect computer simulation, and person B instead claims the world was created by a pink unicorn. How do you construct a rational argument about which one to believe?

I don't see a contradiction here. Can't a pink unicorn run a computer simulation?

The problem really isn't constructing rational arguments. The problem is finding premises that are either verifiable or that both parties will agree are true. If the two parties will not make such an agreement, and the premises are inherently unverifiable, the arguments will all be a waste of time and will likely descend rapidly into trolling for kicks. Despite this, the arguments will still have been rational.

How do you know the solar system isn't like an atom in a drop of water?

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