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The mutually authenticated TLS connection between Cloudflare and the oracle uses a certificate that has been signed by Cloudflare's internal CA. When you manage the CA and have influence over both endpoints, revocation can be trusted.

>but have just shifted the problem downstream (it is now the bank's job to revoke you, rather than the user's browser's job).

You make it sound like that's not a _huge_ win... Which would you rather do, ensure revocation on millions of end user systems, or a handful of systems that are controlled by a party you have a close partnership with?

It is a heck of a lot easier to revoke one certificate on one oracle you control yourself than to revoke a certificate on every end user though.

Breaking into a CloudFlare server does not get you this private key. CloudFlare does not keep this authentication key unencrypted on disk.

If you have access to a machine, why would you ever look for a key on disk instead of in memory?

There are different levels of "accessing a machine", and some of them might not give you access to the memory area where the key is stored.

I would imagine that that link would be IP Restricted, VPN'd maybe, carefully monitored etc.