There was fear that the attacks could be extended to SHA-2, thus we now have SHA-3 too. However, SHA-2 remains secure for now.
_____
¹ Wikipedia: »As of 2012, the most efficient attack against SHA-1 is considered to be the one by Marc Stevens[34] with an estimated cost of $2.77M to break a single hash value by renting CPU power from cloud servers.« I.e. it's quite expensive, but can be done in a reasonable time, especially by adversaries with interest and funds to do so.
SHA-1 and SHA-2 are similar at an architectural level, in some of the same ways that two mid-1990s Feistel ciphers might be similar, and share building blocks, but they aren't the same hash function. They are much more different than, say, DES and 3DES.
SHA-2 remains the best practical choice for most systems today. The truncated variants (like SHA2-512/256) even break length extension exploits.
[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pigeonhole_principle
Edit: source
That knowledge has driven adoption of SHA-2, and was partial motivation for the (completed in 2012) competition to design SHA-3. I don't believe any weaker-than-designed problems have yet been found with the SHA-2 family.
In 2012, Bruce Schneier reported on an analysis by Jesse Walker of Intel about when SHA-1 collisions might be practical to create:
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2012/10/when_will_we_...
That analysis suggests: "A collision attack is therefore well within the range of what an organized crime syndicate can practically budget by 2018, and a university research project by 2021."
But it also notes non-commodity approaches (GPUs, custom chips, etc) could achieve SHA-1 collisions sooner/cheaper.
We're getting there with reduced SHA-1[1] (that is, less than 80 rounds, that means less than 2^80 theoretical operations[2]). But the cost of finding a collision decreases over time[3], and this is why everybody says SHA-1 is obsolete.
[1] http://eprint.iacr.org/2010/413.pdf [2] https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/02/sha1_broken.h... [3] https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2012/10/when_will_we_...