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Comment by annnnd | Hacker News Reader

I can't shake the feeling that current security measures are designed in the wrong way. Antiviruses are fundamentally flawed (blacklist instead of whitelist; mostly curing instead of preventing). Filtering traffic is difficult (it is relatively easy to hide information in heavy legitimate traffic).

Maybe the way ahead is in ensuring that files (and images in memory, flash,...) don't get changed. Maybe we should have some external device which monitors computer components for change? It should have access to all the computer parts and should be without any interfaces except for physical ones (typing directly on its touch screen). Just an idea...

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The problem is that we currently rely on user discretion. Users are really bad at preventing malware from infecting their system.

We can do some things, sure -- sandboxing by default, etc. But when it comes down to it, if the user is able to click an 'allow access to my banking information' button, then that user will be getting screwed.

The only response I can think of is taking that power out of the hands of the user, and putting everyone in a walled garden. That is something that I find distasteful.

Is there a solution that leaves users in power over their own computers? I don't know.

In practice I have power over my computer but there is no 'allow access to my banking information' button for most of my bank stuff because the banks don't allow it. The info is on their servers and in the most extreme case I have to use a physical security device to generate a code to access it. Dunno if that's the way forward?

A tripwire monitor with "immutable" data (btrfs/zfs snapshots or nix pure packages) to rollback in case of suspicious modification. ChromeOS does this at the OS update level. There's also the genode way http://genode.org/ for strong isolation (AFAIK it's different from VM and Containers)

Microsoft has tried to do security in the way you have mentioned. It only pisses pleb users off, and power users don't really need it.

The real solution is not in prevention but in recovery. If the recovery option is easy and fast, then prevention doesn't really matter - detection and recovery will be key.

How would you recover if the intent of the attack was to ex filtrate something, say payment information?

I only meant for my statement to apply to consumer devices. Servers are a completely different matter, and IMHO you should never store that kind of data on a laptop or desktop. That's what VPNs are for.

The financial system is great at recovering from that sort of thing.

1) Transactions have to reconcile somewhere--monitor at that point for unexpected activity.

2) Use insurance policies to pay back losses due to theft.

Payment info is among the data I worry about the least; I check my card statements every month, and flag any unknown activity. Under my card and bank agreements, I'm not liable for losses if I catch them within the defined window (30-60 days depending on card), even if I did something stupid like set a weak password or lose my own wallet.

Well, just when we discussed that : https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=8723693

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