Hacker News Reader

Comment by guiomie | Hacker News Reader

From the link: According to the book "Skunk Works" the 15th rule is: "Starve before doing business with the damned Navy. They don't know what the hell they want and will drive you up a wall before they break either your heart or a more exposed part of your anatomy."

any examples out there?

View on HN

In Ben Rich's book, he gives a couple of examples. First, one with a proposal for a design of a stealth submarine, and then second, another example of an actual prototype of a stealth ship that underwent a year of testing (in which it performed admirably) before being rejected.

Here's a telling excerpt from the submarine adventure:

> That submarine captain epitomized the hidebound Navy at its worst. He frowned at my drawing and backhanded my concept. "We don't build submarines that look like that." He admitted that our test results were "interesting" but added, "Your design would probably cost us two or three knots in speed." I countered, "But why care about losing three knots, when you are invisible to your enemy?"

> He ignored me. "This looks more like the _Monitor_ or the _Merrimac_ from the Civil War," he said. "We'd never build a modern submarine that looked like _that_." [1]

Then there was the full-scale testing of a stealth ship in which nightly tests were made with the Navy trying to detect the prototype with radar, and virtually always failing. Eventually the Navy decided not to go ahead, on the grounds that they couldn't keep it secret. Rich also speculated on motivations:

> A future commander resented having only a four-man crew to boss around on a ship that was so secret that the Navy could not even admit it existed. Our stealth ship might be able to blast out of the sky a sizeable Soviet attack force, but in terms of an officer's future status and promotion prospects, it was about as glamorous as commanding a tugboat. [2]

[1] p272-273, Skunk Works by Ben Rich

[2] p278, Skunk Works by Ben Rich

> He ignored me. "This looks more like the _Monitor_ or the _Merrimac_ from the Civil War," he said. "We'd never build a modern submarine that looked like _that_."

it is beyond ironic, giving how revolutionary the Monitor and the Merrimack/Virginia were, how one battle between them has changed the naval warfare for the whole world ....

It seems military types have a tendency of finding new designs "useless", "a toy", etc until it's attacked by a similar technology from the enemy side

See: Ferdinand Foch

In a more recent example, the F35 Jet is having delay and cost overrun problems. I hear that one of the reasons is that there is 3 different version of the same jet and it may have been cheaper to design 3 completely different planes oriented toward each niche.

The 3 configurations are:

A) Conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL). A normal fighter jet, intended to replace the F16.

B) Short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL). This model essentially has a big fan in it to allow it to hover and land on aircraft carriers.

C) Similar to A, but with larger, foldable wings and a stronger tailhook for landing with a carrier arrestor cable.

Model B is intended for the Marine Corp, and C is intended for the Navy.

Now I admit that I am fairly uninformed about military hardware and design, but I think something can be concluded from the F35 program issues.

And the exact same thing happened with the TFX in the '60, except it was proposed to also fill the air superiority role that the F-22 was designed for, and not the V/STOL one. The F-111, in the deep interdiction role, was the only surviving model.

Not clear the Navy or Marines had anything to do with this Charlie Foxtrot, at least prior to the decision to save money by having only one basic plane.

This is a common peacetime "savings" measure. Same thing happened with the M14 rifle, which had about the shortest time as a combat rifle in US history (although part of that was due to the utterly corrupt Army institution that procured it when pretty much every other contemporary battle rifle design was better, except for trigger pull).

Situation like this always remind me a quote from the highly esteemed Goon Show[1]:

"He was all things to all men... it was hell in there."

[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Goon_Show

If I remember correctly, the Marines use amphibious assault ships that don't have conventional runways (such as on Navy aircraft carriers) to take off/land on thus the need for a VTOL aircraft. A VTOL wouldn't be necessary for a Navy aircraft carrier (example: F18 Super Hornet). Another example of this is why the Marines wanted to keep the Harrier around for so long before it became too problematic and expensive hence why they wanted VTOL capabilities on the F35 JSF (also another factor in the cost/time overruns).

Citations:

[1] http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/7-things-the-marines-have-t...

[2] http://www.funker530.com/397-billion-spent-on-the-f-35-fight...

That. Thanks.

Different contractor, but you can read up on the story of the A-12 Avenger II for the gist.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McDonnell_Douglas_A-12_Avenger_...

Ironically, the hangar at Patuxent River NAS that was built to house the A-12 test fleet is currently used to house F-35 test aircraft.

Ever wanted to kill your project manager for changing specs during a project?

That but your project manager is the US Navy. I meant for these to be more generalized as most are pretty applicable to tech, as Skunk Works airplanes was high science on a budget.

Or, how about when your project manager (the Navy) provides incorrect specs? http://news.usni.org/2013/12/23/navys-f-35-starts-new-tailho...

Relevant portion: "Lockheed and the Joint Strike Fighter program office ultimately traced the problem back to the shape of the hook and a faulty wire dynamics model supplied by the Naval Air Systems Command. The solution was to reshape the hook point and adjust the system’s hold-down damper, which helps prevent the hook from bouncing around upon touchdown."

Reply on news.ycombinator.com