This is probably the best commentary I've seen on the topic of how many rounds you should incorporate into your KDF (Scrypt/Bcrypt/PBKDF2 all let you dial as many as you wish), so I won't try and improve on it: http://security.stackexchange.com/a/3993
If you have typical users, with typical user passwords, then take a few minutes to read through: http://security.stackexchange.com/a/3993 (it discusses the importance of taking into account entropy) to determine what work factor is appropriate for your situation, then just deploy one of scrypt/bcrypt/PBKDF2 with that work factor.
The argument here seems to be that if people simply don't use passwords, but instead secure AES keys, password hashes won't matter. Ok, but we're talking about passwords, and so was he, upthread.
Given that the strength of security is measured in how long it takes to break it, and hash time is directly correlated with brute force time, for the same password, faster is weaker.
Having high-entropy passwords certainly increases security, but it's a well-known fact that users don't use high-entropy passwords, so that's pointless to talk about.
This is a solved problem: use 10,000+ rounds of PBKDF2, 4-5+ rounds of Bcrypt, or a sufficient work factor for Scrypt.
None of that changes the fact that the _more secure_ thing to do is implement bcrypt/scrpt/PBKDF2. I bet there are plenty of people at Sony, Target, Adobe, Home Depot, Staples, etc. that wished they had taken the more secure route and spent that extra money.
For applications requiring basic auth, you could cache the username/password combination after the first login.
For bcrypt to be a killer on modern systems, you are botching something in your authentication system.