Police chief: “Paying the Bitcoin ransom was the last resort”
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Now, they delete your data, but offer a quick time-rewind to undo the damage. $500 seems like a not-so-bad deal, and if the data was deleted instead of encrypted, I would imagine you'd pay more than $500 to send it to a recovery shop.
So really, it's just doing a good job of teaching users about data loss, without actually forcing them to lose data, just a bit of money. That seems like an overwhelmingly good bargain, overall. Especially if it gets someone to make backups before they suffer a hardware failure that truly renders the data lost.
And terrorists? Wikipedia indicates "Russian hackers". I suppose you can stretch terrorist to cover that but well, that's just being dramatic.
The majority of malware now is a commercial effort, it's just trying to turn you into part of an obnoxious ad network, use your computer to send spam, pick up account information or credit card details that in aggregate are worth a little bit on some particular forums, that sort of thing.
Cryptolocker is amazing because the developers didn't screw it up. It runs very quietly in the background. Most people never realize it's there. It comes in multiple pieces, so your AV software might disable the UI portion of Cryptolocker but all your files will still disappear (oldest files first). Each file is encrypted with a different key, and then a master key is used to encrypt all of those keys. It's basically, "the kind of malware tptacek would build if tptacek built malware."
It's also been a huge boon for us in convincing people to get backups going finally, because the sort of people that are willing to gamble that their hard drive will never fail aren't also willing to gamble that they'll never click on the wrong thing online. I hate having to scare people into getting backups, but, that's how it is.
There is nothing novel about extortion, even on the internet, and it's not defensible as "doing a good job of teaching users about data loss"
/s
None of the definitions of terrorism I can find would describe this. Exaction, perhaps? Is there a better term?
‘‘(5) the term ‘domestic terrorism’ means activities that— ‘‘(A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State; ‘‘(B) appear to be intended— ‘‘(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; ‘‘(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or ‘‘(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and ‘‘(C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.’’
1. How is security on a police server so bad it can be infected with malware in the first place
2. It sounds like they didnt have (good enough) backups, where they could just format the server and restore the data
3. Doesnt this mean that all the data on the police server is effectively compromised? i.e. the hackers could have made a copy before encrypting - so it is likely the data is breached?
From their point of view, if anything goes wrong with whoever they hire to work on their infrastructure, they get excoriated by the public. That smart high school kid turns out to be fond of child porn? The department ends up in the state newspaper.
So, they publish RFPs and select for established companies. The RFP publishing process isn't that great, so generally speaking there's a subset of companies that monitor for RFPs at various governmental levels, and those companies don't tend to be supplying the most cutting edge technology at the lowest prices.
Then, to cover themselves, the departments require a stupid amount of paperwork and a carefully-prepared proposal that's supposed to establish firm costs on vague requirements, like, "cost per computer to provide hardware support for offices in the county". So, the businesses writing the proposals stuff pork all over the place so that they don't end up upside-down on the deal, and besides, they have to pay somebody just to sit and write up reports like these and fill out paperwork and supply background information and client references and attend social mixers and so on and so forth just to get the work in the first place.
The entire process is not great, and it's the direct result of everyone just trying to watch out for their own best interests.
CryptoLocker doesn't lay in wait or try specifically to target backups. However, it will hit shared network drives; basically, anything that Windows has mounted as a drive letter at the time of infection can end up getting its files encrypted. (And I'm betting that's how the police department's file server was affected -- it wasn't the point of infection, it was just a shared network drive.)
CryptoLocker bets on most Windows users not having reliable backups, and it's usually right. This is one area where Mac users often have no idea how good they have it; there is simply nothing in the Windows ecosystem that is as simple, reliable, and complete as Time Machine, at any price.
You can trade completeness for reliability by going with Backblaze or Carbonite or CrashPlan or SpiderOak for online backups. All of those offer a really good overall backup system, you just don't get a bare-metal restore and if you store files in an unusual location on your drive or use unknown file types, the backup service might not grab them.
I don't know if Macrium made it into our last round of backup software evals, and we're overdue for another one anyway (and not terribly happy with Acronis).
Anything about it you don't like?
Private companies would still be involved in filling procurement orders for hardware needed to implement the logical infrastructure.
It's like having 10,000 offices write their own dress-code, you only need a central standard gov dress-code for office workers; individual locations could overload or enforce the code as they see fit but you reduce the workload using scale.
A police department should be more like a fast food restaurant [or at least a UK one], you come along with a pre-built infrastructure and implement it, rather like "apt-get police-department", bang there you have it cookie cutter infrastructure.
Local citizens are still refusing to accept any tax increases or new fees of any kind to keep the fire department 100% open.
It's really that bad.
Centralizing services can get you some gains in efficiency -- sometimes! -- but I doubt there'd still be enough to go around.
It's a slow-change environment. Salaries are low. Morale is often low. Sometimes it's contracted out to the lowest bidder. It's a procedure-orientated environment.
It's not like someone has a physical thing in their hands and are willing to give it back if the ransom is paid. That is a bad situation as well, of course; but I find this to be worse.
The developers are savvy business people and CryptoLocker is very well done.
What a frustrating way to interact.
"the infected computer contained a significant amount of police data, including its "Computer Aided Dispatch, records management, arrest logs, calls for service, [and] motor vehicle matters"
"But I have a NAS with two hard drives and all my files are on it. That's my backup."
"Yeah, the company that set it up did it wrong. Your files were spread across both drives, instead of copied to each drive. When one of the drives failed, all of your files went with it."
"..."
True story.
However, this was the very first business I had the pleasure of working with that had even attempted something resembling a comprehensive backup system, and the system they got was wrong.
Less dramatically, sometimes people make mistakes, like editing a document, then fat-fingering a mass deletion in the document during the save process and not noticing it until a month later. Again, RAID doesn't protect you from that, but a proper backup system does.
And finally, it's not unheard-of for RAID systems of any kind to just fall over. Even a RAID 10 is a whole lot of redundancy all running on a single drive controller; if that drive controller does something very silly -- and I've seen it happen, we've personally shipped systems to data recovery outfits for this -- then you can end up with garbage on all of your drives.
There are two different concepts at work here. "Redundancy" and "High Availability". RAID uses redundancy, but it belongs under "High Availability" -- it's a system that's designed to still be mostly available even if it suffers a hardware failure. But strictly speaking it does not provide for redundancy of your data.
Point entirely accepted but I can't help feel there is a deficiency in the language here - a hardware failover is a backup of a sort; it's not a sufficient backup to address even most potential failures.
Unfortunately, for a lot of people, especially computer novices, "backup" is confused with "absolute guarantee against data loss", which forces me to occasionally say things that aren't 100% true in an engineering sense. If I say, "Well, RAID is kind of a backup, but...", people seem to stop listening just before "but".
For example (and I'm just making this up): If the malware contacts a server, send a rapid response team there. Find out where the data goes next, repeat. If they make it a national security or terrorism issue, they would have the cooperation of many western/interpol states (at least Europe, Australia and Canada). I also can't imagine that its in the interest of the Russians to be a host to this kind of crime, so you might get them to cooperate, too.
I realize that this is complicated through the bitcoin protocol (if the malware doesn't communicate back in any other way - although it has to get the key from somewhere). But in an age where the GHCQ can record all trafic in and out of the UK for a day, it shouldn't be beyond their technical reach to monitor all bitcoin transactions passing through their nets in realtime. A transaction from/to a tainted wallet was issued from your PC? Expect a SWAT team in 10 minutes at your door.
Of course this would be grossly undemocratic, complete overkill, and create huge collateral damage. But I believe the capabilities for such a crackdown are almost there. And if criminals start targeting infrastructure and law enforcement (and don't just "accidentially" attack them), something like that might happen.