So really the law on this has always been pretty broken in theory, but maybe it worked well enough in practice. With computers that may change and the law will adapt to some other broken-in-theory system that works just well enough in practice.
I used to work for an ocean container shipping company, and due to idiosyncrasies of maritime law and the fact that these companies are considered "too big to fail" by governments, they are exempt from certain price-fixing laws in many countries including the US and Canada (but they are no longer exempt in the EU since 2008). Carriers are required to publish their rate schedules and surcharges and jointly announce rate increases 30 days in advance of the effective date.
They also share service strings, so a weekly Transpacific service may have a rotation of five different vessels from different carriers, who lease each other container space. They are officially not allowed to restrict supply in a coordinated fashion to prop up prices anymore, but they have to jointly make operational decisions to downsize or cancel service strings, which is effectively the same thing.
The result of this, along with numerous government and private bailouts, is that many of these perennially loss-making companies with inefficient operations and terrible service continue to limp along and slowly bleed shareholder value, whereas in a free market they would have been bankrupted and their assets liquidated years ago.
Why do you believe these behaviors are less likely? A single bug could wipe out all previous gains and incorrect assumptions could cause behavior that is later identified as irrational.
You maybe right about how the courts and regulators will find in this matter.
But if you build a machine that breaks the law on your behalf and you knew this was a possible outcome then you are obviously culpable. To come to another conclusion requires an inordinate amount of mental gymnastics. And in this decade's climate, it's quite possible those gymnastics win the day.
Consider more hypothetically: someone whips up a truly magnificent algorithm to make cash for him anyway what-so-ever, not just on the exchange. The programer made no effort to preclude illegal actions because that is essentially impossible. This hypothetical super program occasionally finds the best way to make money is reselling pirated movies and web based child porn and deposing the revenue straight into the programmers account.
You watch how fast the courts ban the practice and finds him culpable without a shadow of a doubt.
I wish that mainstream economists would accept that the collusion and not competition (aka price war) is the normal state of affairs and updated their school models accordingly.
"In this paper, we assume the only information a firm has is its own cost function, the decision it made on the previous time step (increase or decrease production), and what impact this decision had on its profit levels."
I wish that people would stop citing papers based on the abstract and complicated looking math, when the entire paper is based on a completely ridiculous assumption. That companies can collude without direct communication is not in doubt - they can just do a tit-for-tat strategy. What is in doubt is whether this is stable - new entrants can come in and use a different algorithm, play a different game. This paper does not address that issue.
Even if you would have an endless stream of market entrants, you would also need some companies to exit, otherwise everybody would get smaller and smaller piece of the pie. In the real world, those who come will usually set the price just below the current market value. If you think about it, it's nothing else than the Keen's model with just companies being renamed endlessly (after they make one step).
But go ahead and try to simulate it, and add more realism. I think you will find very similar result (that is, profit maximizing strategy will never be to compete on price). Except for the price wars, which (in my opinion) always happen only temporarily when the big company wants to drive smaller companies out of the market entirely to get more market share as a result (just like real wars). But you need to have inelastic demand for that, otherwise I doubt it can be considered a viable strategy.
MR!=MC in the real world, but the classic micoecon explanation for this is monopolistic competition. I'm not sure why there is a need to say that all of economics is wrong. Are there commodities markets with open entry and no open collusion where MR!=MC? (Where marginal cost is defined as the cost of bringing on a new production line, not just producing one more unit).
Non-commodity markets get quite complicated. Often the market bifurcates into a set of premium brands and a set of low cost brands. Premium brands often try to get a monopoly over one subset of customer, who need some special feature, or try to build their brand as something special, or otherwise differentiate. Premium brands explicitly do not compete on price. Salesmen will say stuff like, "Look I know we are pricy. If you want the el cheapo software, don't buy us. Buy us if you want the good stuff."
If the market just has premium brands, that all price way above cost of production, someone is going to try to enter the market with a lower cost product.
I never gathered what point Keen was trying to make, not what he was saying that was both novel and true.
The second point, IIRC, is that the Cournot model of perfect competition is mathematically wrong. The assumptions that no firm can influence the price and decreasing demand curve are contradictory, regardless whether or not these provide a good model for the real world.
By the way, I think this often happens in the real world, where some person irrationally (from the economist's point of view) provides a valuable, yet underpriced (with respect to the real demand curve) service, because he is just being misinformed, idealistic or is interested in success for its own sake, not for the sake of money. Or it's just that the product is new and actual demand curve hasn't been established yet.
Absurdly, this is then hailed as an example of market efficiency, while there is nothing rational in such behavior from the game theory perspective (unless you consider much wider frame of how human morality evolved etc.).