Yes, I have a PDF of my paper,
but I might torque off the
journal (
Information Sciences,
1999) if I make the PDF available
in public. I don't know the legal
situation. The journal was nice
enough to do a good job handling
my paper; I should not be nasty
to them.
The point of my post here was to
urge the authors of the OP and
also others in anomaly detection
to address, for their work,
carefully, the issues
of the error rates and being
both distribution-free and
multi-variate.
The paper of the OP starts with
a description of the importance
of anomaly detection; I fully
agree with their description;
it is close to what for some years
I wrote VC firms!
Alas, no VC firm was able to
evaluate my work. Most firms
just ignored my contact.
A few firms asked when
all the associated infrastructure
software would be ready and
I had early customers.
So, right,
the VC firms were ignoring the
work and looking just at the
early hints of traction.
And they had no clue about
just how much work the infrastructure
software would be to be ready
for a high end enterprise sale
for a really important function
in their server farm or network.
Or, if I had all that work done,
then why the heck would I still
need their cash? Because
I had four kids, all ready
for a freshman year in college
and a wife who had just given
birth to triplets?
Or, why would a VC firm think
that I was giving them part
ownership of such a nice body
of work with paying customers,
in high end enterprise computing?
Or, VCs like "warm introductions".
Well I was giving them
a founder with a STEM Ph.D. from one
of the world's best research universities,
with a dissertation advisor President
at CMU, with relevant experience in AI
at IBM's Watson lab,
with a paper of original research
and prototype software that had
already passed peer-review at a
leading journal, and
with more relevant publications
in the field.
And, still,
what they wanted was a "warm
introduction"? Did they
know the President at CMU?
Likely not. They wanted
a "warm introduction" from
who, a CEO in their portfolio?
Why would they think that
a founder with a good project
would know people like the
CEOs in their portfolio?
The arrogance of VCs believing
that they know the most knowledgeable
people in technology.
To quote Betty Davis, "What a dump.",
although what she was calling
a "dump" was actually quite nice.
Or, do I really want to report to
a BoD of such clueless people?
That lesson was one of the early
ones I got that VCs just will
not look at unique, new, powerful,
valuable technology.
So, some of the
VC firms claimed, on their Web
sites, that they have "deep domain
knowledge" in "enterprise software"
and want "breakthrough technology"
(or some such) but, really,
just want some good words back from
some early customers who are happy.
What a scam. Can get good words
back from happy customers just
from selling, say, lemonade.
The technology is what makes
the work promising for a
successful business, the technology,
especially powerful technology
with the power confirmed by
theorems and proofs in
a peer-reviewed paper,
not just some words from
some early customers.
The VCs seemed not to understand the
work at all -- how the heck could
I want to report to such people
on a BoD? I can't want.
Net, to the VC firms, technology
is just flatly irrelevant.
They believe in essentially
a Markov condition: Technology
and the future financial value
of the business are conditionally
independent given current
traction.
If the US DoD had thought this way,
then for the Manhattan Project they
would have said "You build and
demonstrate one and then we will
chip in for the aviation gasoline
for the Enola Gay". Similarly
for the SR-71, GPS, Keyhole,
Sosus, the B-2, the F-22, etc.
ROI? From a book of Richard
Rhodes, the Manhattan Project
cost about $3 billion but
saved, according to some common
estimates, 1 million US casualties
that would have resulted from
the planned alternative, an invasion
of the main islands of Japan.
So, that was $3000 per casualty.
Fantastic ROI.
Thankfully for
US national security, the US
DoD is actually able to
evaluate technology, early on,
just on paper,
even on the back of an envelope.
VCs? A good peer-reviewed
paper for an important problem,
yes, with some prototype
software running on some real
data -- nope. No wonder on
average the ROI of the VCs is poor.
VCs -- what a joke. What
a total upchuck of a joke.
"Deep domain knowledge" --
what a scam.
Again, in strong contrast,
the journal worked hard
on my paper; I don't want
to kick dirt in the face of
the journal.
For my paper,
all you need is trip to a
university library and
a few coins for a
photocopy machine. For now,
that's still the way such
things work.
Heck, in part I still work
off paper in books I bought
and paid for. Just this
morning it finally dawned on
me that that one of the .NET
collection classes for
key, value pairs was
storing the values without
my ever saying what the data
type was. I was concerned about
that, but I've programmed before
with memory address pointers
with no associated data type
indications. Then, finally,
for some slightly more advanced
usage of that collection class,
I discovered that .NET says
I can't do that without
enabling late binding. Okay.
So, I guessed, somewhere in
.NET there is likely a solution.
So, I got out a big book by
Francisco Bolena, read a
few pages, and saw that,
apparently, all I have to
do to get what I really
want is, for a class of
mine, say my Class A,
and .NET
collection class List,
say (type in)something like
Inherits List (Of A)
So, I still like books.
And I have a lot of books
I like. And copies of
some published papers.
There are some things
I don't like: Did I
mention VCs claiming
"deep domain knowledge"
in enterprise software?