Unless you have religious objections, it's also quite reasonable to call the brain a computer.
I have no objections to brain being modeled through a bunch of linear algebra. I'm not sure that we have all the particular interactions required for a full model yet?
In any case none of those analogies are entirely wrong, they are just increasingly more accurate. An eighteenth century person couldn't have understood computers, so clockwork is the closest analogy.
of course that person is. GP is saying "each model is a better approximation, but still an approximation" - and you are saying "they all said that, and they were all wrong."
but are they getting _less_ wrong over time?
It's just that the later analogies include some hint of emergent properties that are missing from the earlier ones.
Is the brain really a Turing machine? I doubt it's the right model, but obviously I have no way to prove this.
But here's a question - if the brain is a symbolic data processor, what exactly does it process? This sounds like it should have an obvious answer, but the more you think about it (ironically...) the less obvious the answer becomes.
No, he's arguing against a specific argument by analogy with an analogy.
Or rather, he's not even doing that. He's arguing not against "argument by analogy" (in general) or a "specific argument by analogy" (in particular), but against an analogy bare from argument.
Specifically, a factory with a steam engine, hence the language of internal "drives" and so on.
The 21c part of this analogy should be "the internet," following the principle of us basing our mind-model on the newest technology around at the time.
I always thought it odd to say that our mind is like a computer, when we created computers in the image of our minds.
Only we didn't do that. We created computers as machines doing arithmetic. In the image of our abacuses would be a better description.
Before we had the mechanical implementations, "computer" was a human occupation.