The Unreality of Time
en.wikipedia.org
en.wikipedia.org
> [spacial dimensions] involves change, but because [north-south] relationships never change (e.g. [Atlanta] is always [South of New York]), [geometry] must be an inadequate account of [space].
Sure, there are time-dilation effects in special and general relativity, but those are theories that explicitly mention time and timelike dimensions. Time, in those theories, is not at all an illusion.
So: if it's an illusion, what is the illusion made of?
More like humans agreed that X oscillations of element Y counts as 1 second. We all agree on the length of 1 second on earth and go from there.
We use that time unit as a reference to explain the motion we perceive.
> if it's an illusion, what is the illusion made of
Would the inability of prehistoric desert tribes to explain mirages or the movement of the stars have made those things less real?This would result in a tree where each node (present) is either the Big Bang or hangs of some other tree (the past) and has branches for each possible configuration (futures) to generate from that state.
But while this is an interesting idea to ponder about it is also not very helpful. If true you are lost and there is nothing you can ever learn about the world. Maybe you can explore the illusion created by your mind but even this only if your mind behaves nicely and does not randomly decide to completely change the illusion or whatnot.
It seems to make a lot more sense to assume not everything is just an illusion, believe that there is a real world accessible by your senses and then explore this world. And once you have decided that there is a real world it no longer makes sense to ascribe a special role to you or your mind because that is part of the position you just left behind.
it is made from neural correllates of consciousness. Your brain basically runs this gfx.
This is also inconsequential - you say that time is an illusion created by your brain but that still requires that your brain exists in some reality and that it is doing things which prerequisite time because doing means change over time.
It might of course be the case that there is a time in the real world that allows things to happen and your mind might create an internal representation of that, the thing we call time, that is a poor representation of the true nature of time, but that does not mean time does not exist, it means there is the real thing and the thing we perceive.
And this may actually be the likely scenario because there are hints in physics that neither time nor space are fundamental things but are the result of something more fundamental in a similar way that atoms are made out of quarks and electrons.
Like if the universe is this Block Universe, being the complete state space of everything, wherein these "conscious structures" exist (that are us), which are connected by causal steps (possibly branching), these steps being tied by the rules of physics as we experience them. Perception of time exists completely within these structures. The concept of "when the last human (or animal or alien)" dies, in this context, just points to a region of this state space beyond the boundaries of these conscious structures. Doesn't mean "there" does not exist.
The word "illusion" ought to be all but struck from philosophy, in my opinion. It seems to lead philosophers down a road of reductionism until they explode into a paroxysm of reductionism so complete that they won't even admit subatomic particles "exist". Further the idea that either A: I can explain it or B: it doesn't "exist" really ought to be struck too... even in 1908 I would have called that sheer ivory tower arrogance but in light of what we know today is it simply absurd. There are true, meaningful, and incomprehensibly large statements, such as "a true specification of the full state of the world economy". (In theory nothing prevents such a statement from being produced, but you won't be fitting that into your head anytime soon.) There is always C: I can't explain it but it exists.
It remains a current theory that time is not an atomic element of our universe, and that it may arise from something else (entropy? the connections in loop quantum gravity? something something holographic principle?), but regardless of what the truth is, "time" as a useful concept won't go anywhere.
Quite right! It's the folk-theories of those objects that are illusions, in the sense of providing intuitive but false causal explanations for the phenomena in question.
>The word "illusion" ought to be all but struck from philosophy, in my opinion. It seems to lead philosophers down a road of reductionism until they explode into a paroxysm of reductionism so complete that they won't even admit subatomic particles "exist".
The word should be doubly struck-out because the same philosophers, in the attempt to get out of that paroxysm, tend to start reifying more and more concepts into metaphysical "existence", until they wind up claiming that reductionism just doesn't really work and we were bloody idiots to try it in the first place. Reversing idiocy doesn't get you accuracy.
>It remains a current theory that time is not an atomic element of our universe, and that it may arise from something else (entropy? the connections in loop quantum gravity? something something holographic principle?), but regardless of what the truth is, "time" as a useful concept won't go anywhere.
Since "time" as we talk about it really means causal ordering, I can't see how any of those other things can replace time. It's not exactly a radical statement to say, in a post-relativity physics, that time isn't a real scalar but instead a more complex causal ordering that happens to look like a real scalar when you work at Newtonian scales.
http://www.ditext.com/mctaggart/time.html
But it still comes across as a bit too much like 'woo' or maybe I just don't understand his way of explaining his idea.
From a university lecture slide note:
"His central philosophical conviction was that reality was fundamentally spiritual; and his central aim was to show this by deriving contradictions from the assumption that the material world exists"
https://www3.nd.edu/~jspeaks/courses/2009-10/20229/LECTURES/...
Still, of the main arguments for the eternalist view comes from special relativity (one source: http://www.amazon.com/Four-Dimensionalism-Ontology-Persisten...), and I think it's rather compelling, as far as it goes.
That is, "time" doesn't exist, but we created it.
I really wish I remembered where I read ideas such as this, but I think most of it came as a consequence of Relativity theory.
[1] http://www.cornell.edu/video/playlist/nima-arkani-hamed-on-f...
> That is, "time" doesn't exist, but we created it. Honnestly, I very much like the Wikipedia introductory paragraph on time: "Time is a measure in which events can be ordered from the past through the present into the future, and also the measure of durations of events and the intervals between them" [4] I think time is just a measure used when describing dynamic systems (where past, present, and future make sense). Assume for a moment that the Big Bang happened at t = t_BB, and assume that for all t < t_BB, there was absolutely nothing in the universe and nothing was happening. Would time make sense in such a pre-Big Bang universe ? I think time is a fundamental property of a dynamic system because without it, the said system would not be dynamic. I'm not sure however that time is a fundamental property of the universe. Maybe of a dynamic universe ? In which case time would be a fundamental property of our current universe, in accordance with Einstein's theory or relativity, but not in a pre-Big Bang universe such as the one mentioned just a few lines ago.
Finally, from the article: > McTaggart argues that time is unreal because our descriptions of time are either contradictory, circular, or insufficient I think Einstein would probably agree with him in that time is at least contradictory [5]. Although I'm not sure they would mean that in the same way. To take McTaggart's A-series argument: > Specifically, [McTaggart] argues that since every event that occurs will at one time be the future, at another time be the present, and at a third time (and forever henceforth) be past, every event exemplifies or instantiates every temporal property: futurity, presentness, and pastness. Since these properties are mutually exclusive (they cannot be co-instantiated), the A-series conception of time generates an absurdity, a contradiction. If both parts of his argument are sound, then time must just be an illusion; it has no genuine ontological status. I disagree with this logic. Notions of past, present, and future are mutually exclusive at any given time t; but events can of course go from future to present to past. It just can't be more than one at the same time. Kinda like when you're sprinting a 100m race, you can't be before, on top, and after the finish line at the same instant. But you can go from one to the other without questioning the notion of distance. The analogy is far from perfect, but that's how I see it. I may have misunderstood his argument though.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spacetime [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Riemannian_geometry [3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/4-manifold [4] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Time [5] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hafele%E2%80%93Keating_experim...
Yes, pretty much that. The "units" of z remain constant/consistent independent of the values of x,y. However, t, cannot be thought of separately in the same way. The experience of/speed of/duration of/distance of/... of t is dependent upon the x,y,z location.
Can somebody please explain the logic used here, because I got lost here?
P2. The designations "past", "present", and "future" are a true trichotomy, such that it is impossible for any moment to not have any of these designations.
P3. The designations "past", "present", and "future" are mutually exclusive; it is impossible for a moment to be in the past and the future, the future and the present, etc.
P4. According to the A-Series model of time, every moment is at some point designated future, present, and past.
C. From (P3) and (P4), via reductio ad absurdum, an A-Series interpretation of time produces a contradiction.
I don't buy it because (P3) is more accurately phrased "it is impossible for a moment to be in the past and the future, the future and the present, etc. simultaneously" and (P4) is better phrased "every moment is at some point designated future, present, and past, but never simultaneously", so (C) breaks down.
This is at least in some sense wrong - past, present and future are no absolute things but only defined relative to the moment in time one calls present and therefore there are many pasts, presents and futures.
The designations "past", "present", and "future" are mutually exclusive [...]
This in turn is only true if one is referring to the past, present and future defined relative to the same present. Today is in the future of yesterday and in the past of tomorrow.
All in all past, present and future are binary relations, not unary ones. Mystery solved.
That's basically what I meant when I said "(P3) is more accurately phrased 'it is impossible for a moment to be in the past and the future, the future and the present, etc. simultaneously'".
> only true if one is referring to the past, present and future defined relative to the same present. Today is in the future of yesterday and in the past of tomorrow.
That's basically what I meant when I said "(P4) is better phrased 'every moment is at some point designated future, present, and past, but never simultaneously'".
So yeah, I think we're on the same page :)
>2.That these A-properties are incompatible (or mutually-exclusive) with one another.
>A person may object to the first premise, accusing McTaggart of assuming that all events have these properties at the same time. It is in assuming that all events start out with a contradiction that requires tensing that creates the regress, but once we reject this, the contradiction does not even take off. An event is said to be past, but is not also present nor future, and as well, an event is said to be present, but not past and future.
>He concludes these arguments by stating that "Our ground for rejecting time, it may be said, is that time cannot be explained without assuming time."
He's saying that any event was at one point in the future, at some point was in the present, and eventually went into the past. This makes sense, right?
However, to judge where the event is at some point in time (past, present, or future), you need another point in time by which to reference it. For a concrete example, on "Monday July 13th, 2015", "Wednesday July 15th, 2015" was in the future. On "Wednesday July 15th, 2015", "Wednesday July 15th, 2015" was in the present, and by "Thursday July 16th, 2015", "Wednesday July 15th, 2015" is in the past. Without a specific reference point, any point in time is just a point in time and exists in all three states at once (because it is the future for any time before it, present for any time during it, and past for any time after it).
Like most philosophical works... I can't really see why it's right, but I can't obviously point out why it's wrong; it won't affect my day to day life, but it's fun to think about.
This is like saying that without a reference point any point in space is simultaneously left, right, in front, behind, above, and below. It's incoherent; all these words necessarily must be expressed in relation to a reference point. McTaggart's argument commits a sort of linguistic fallacy in thinking that you could possibly talk about "past", "present", and "future" without a point of reference.