In Germany, it is thanks to European monetary policy that artificially depresses the Deutsche Mark, allowing for cheaper exports and lower costs for German companies, as well as a captive market whose currency is overvalued in exactly the same way destroying local industry (i.e. German loans pay for German cars to be sold to the Europeans but the other way round is much harder). Hello VW, goodbye Rover. On top of this Germany is absorbing East Germany which is a handy source of incredibly cheap labour (in the same way that illegal labour is in the US food and farm industry) AND massive subsidies for whoever wants to go take advantage of it (I know a company that opened a very, very expensive plant 200km from Berlin because the subsidy was such that they came out profitable even if the plant lost money for 20 years).
In Japan, it is both systematic currency devaluation and the keiretsu system (which I think is what drives the continuation of "Japanese corporate culture" rather than the other way round). Its effects are/were (til early 2000s, not sure about today): cheaper currency from systematic yen devaluation (same as the eurozone effect), lack of competition including collusion to keep wages down locally (tough immigration laws help), collusion to maintain very high prices effectively "taxing" the population with the money directly "financing" inefficiencies within keiretsu companies. These are all structural advantages to Japanese manufacturers.
Culture plays a part, no doubt. There are appeals in the Tokyo metro to buy Japanese bonds as a "patriotic duty", which is a form of voluntary further taxation (and just look at who owns the majority of JGBs). The Mittelstand culture, excellent education and long history of industry in Germany certainly help. But I think macro factors are equally if not more important, and much fewer discussed in "normal" circles (i.e. outside finance).