Newman follows from that assumption: breach of duty requires personal gain, so you cannot know duty has been breached unless you know there was personal gain. If you don't know there was personal gain, you can't tell simple negligent disclosure apart from breach of duty. And if you don't know about the violation of the duty, you can't be held liable for violating it derivatively as a tipee.
proof_of_breach <-> proof_of_benefit
You are arguing that it could be the case that: proof_of_negligence -> proof_of_breach
proof_of_negligence -> (proof_of_benefit v ~proof_of_benefit)
in which case there could be a contradiction.However, there is probably an argument that:
proof_of_negligence -> (proof_of_benefit v ~proof_of_benefit)
is wrong and that there actually is a rule: proof_of_breach -> proof_of_benefit
For example, if someone is negligent, we already know they received a personal benefit (eg. reduced cognitive load, received compensation for work not performed, etc.).To show a logical incorrectness, you need to show an `x` where:
proof_of_x -> (proof_of_breach ^ ~proof_of_benefit) v (~proof_of_breach ^ proof_of_benefit) proof_of_negligence -> (proof_of_benefit v ~proof_of_benefit)
easily simplifies to true
and therefore doesn't need a case to be made for it. It's always true.The argument made was that negligence could occur without benefit (ie. proof_of_negligence does not imply either proof_of_benefit or ~proof_of_benefit).
My argument is that `proof_of_benefit -> proof_of_negligence` and that `proof_of_negligence -> (proof_of_benefit v ~proof_of_benefit)` (or otherwise) is nonsense.
Exclusive or, being a logical relationship, is allowed in propositional logic. It is traditionally indicated, in mathy areas, by the symbol ⊕, but you can just compose it from the standard and, or, and not operations.
And (proof_of_benefit ⊕ ¬proof_of_benefit) still simplifies to true, unless you're a hardcore constructivist.