15,814 karma · joined June 16, 2017
Immediate reservation about Parsec is that it requires internet access to its cloud services for authentication, session discovery, and connection setup. For me, that immediately sucks, but I'm still going to give it a go to see how low latency it is.
I have used Sunshine/Moonlight for gaming in the past and it was fantastic, but for whatever reason it was janky to use for remote desktop.
I have my own set of scripts that permanently bans IP addresses that have probed any non-service ports of my firewall.
Every time I use it I'm reminded of how good RDP is/was.
Trump himself relaxed laws on chip exports to China.
P.S. If you have any other liquidity available, maybe 'buy the dip'?
Common sense and judgement fluctuate. Humans, you know, we're prone to entirely unpredictable moments of emotional weakness. Maybe we're hungry, maybe we're tired, maybe the missus or the kids have been sick, maybe we just don't want to face leg-day after 12-hours of strategising. As per the attack and defense argument: A defender only needs to be wrong once.
AI will be fine.
Company sys admins have likely got all sorts of other issues to worry about, and the occasional report of an email not getting through is likely low on their to-investigate list.
Having said that, I self host a mail server, and have all those things setup correctly, and my workplace uses Outlook, and I've not had issues with delivery, so it's not a particularly difficult bar to jump.
I mean, that does sound very much like the future of our current timeline, unfortunately.
It should only be done as a Customer Service, however, and disclosed in a normal sized font and, as I said above, opt-out-able.
I would also extend this to say that ISPs should do the same for known-bad ASNs, and network ranges. Following on from yesterday's discussion about (p)residential proxies, blocking access to known C&C server domains and addresses at an ISP level would be a great solution.
I am, of course, looking at this through a utopian lens where ISPs aren't in bed with big tech and data brokers and other sketchy industries where profit can be made from selling out your customers' data. A 'real' ISP, you know, like 'no true scotsman'. It's all a question of trust and responsibility.
I pretty severely 'mess' with DNS on my home network and, damn, it makes using the Internet a much nicer experience. In fact, it makes using the Internet tolerable, where otherwise it is decidedly not. It could be classified as 'insecure' to not mess with DNS on any network[0].
[0]: https://www.pcmag.com/news/fbi-recommends-installing-an-ad-b...
I'm old. I don't understand how the economics of this work, and I think of it was explained to me, it would annoy me.
Thankfully security researchers exist to fill the gaps that lawmakers haven't gotten to / won't get to: https://blog.includesecurity.com/2026/06/the-smart-tv-in-you...
These are the specific URLs mentioned:
proxyjs.brdtnet.com
proxyjs.luminatinet.com
proxyjs.bright-sdk.com
clientsdk.bright-sdk.com
clientsdk.brdtnet.com
I use these regular expressions to block any connections to the domains or subdomains: /(\.|^)brdtnet\.com$/
/(\.|^)luminatinet\.com$/
/(\.|^)bright-sdk\.com$/
/(\.|^)luminati\.io$/
No idea if this actually prevents proxy functionality altogether, but prevents some phoning home if you're infected.Once the bully has been punched in the face once, they seem a little bit less scary, so hopefully the judicial system has been mostly MAGA-intimidated, so that there's hope for a sooner-rather-than-later return to sanity.
The lists generated by this tool can be useful as well: https://github.com/maximilianfeix/proxy-scraper (which point to here: https://github.com/maximilianfeix/free-proxy-list)
There is also this bot proxy IP list: https://github.com/antoinevastel/avastel-bot-ips-lists
I'd be very interested in AI capabilities in detecting anomalous activity given that it should be very effective at pattern matching across large data sets. What would be required, however, is significant training with industry/application specific 'normal' browsing traffic patterns to determine acceptable tolerances, and then design escalating deterrence if and when tolerances are breached.
How is the scraper process stepping through the site? It must be programmatic, even if it's programmed to be random. What does that look like in traffic data in terms of timing and content requests?
What hazards can be put in place that a normal user would never go near, but a scraper is likely to trip over?
If scraping is being performed from multiple locations in parallel, what might that look like? ie. joining multiple sessions together that may show a more 'scraper' kind of behaviour.
Under IPv6 wouldn't detection start burning a lot of addresses? Yes, the pool is large, but that just means it's a scaling issue from IPv4 to IPv6, rather than a new problem requiring new thinking to solve? (assuming ways of detection were successful).
I'm being somewhat devil's advocate in my blocking rhetoric. The internet is in a weird confluence of wild-west and surveillance state. I like that there are ways and means of being anon-/pseudon-ymous; I like a bit of anarchaos, that's where the spirit of hacking lives. But I also don't want it sticking to my boots when I walk in the house. I'm also not fundamentally against scraping; there's definitely good scraping. There is an irony, though, in protecting scraped data or services that are built on scraped data (and I'm not accusing you, personally, just my general logical ideology of scraping). On residential proxies, I think they're 99% run by erstwhile criminals leveraging what were, until recently, referred to as botnets into a service they can launder their botnets through as 'I am legitimate business man'. I think most, basically all, residential proxies are run involuntarily or unwittingly and that blocking them would provide a greater society benefit than it would a drawback. Anything that promotes the sanitisation of end user devices can only be a good thing. The whole ecosystem is in a terrible state and regulation doesn't even seem to be on the distant horizon.
Maybe I'm hypocritical, or I'm trying to maintain mutually exclusive positions. This is where I'm at though.
It should be a balancing act though, somewhere between what you said and my first sentence.
Rate limiting, or additional layers of input sanitisation for IP addresses known to have been malicious in the past.
It's unfortunate that good users will have to endure some difficulties because of bad users on the same network, but if security is the priority, then measures must be taken, you shouldn't just leave to door open to potentially known bad users / traffic.
IPv4 is a shared resource, but some ranges have worse reputations than others, and all are owned by organisations that have the ability to monitor and filter for malicious traffic. It gets into a fraught discussion about censorship, but it is possible for network owners to monitor for, and block / restrict traffic detected as 'bad'. It's just a matter of cost and scale, and those that put the effort in should have their users rewarded with fewer 'trust-issues' roadblocks.