I don't think this is an east-coast/west-coast thing, but I think people all over the USA use the word "park" to mean anything on the scale of corner playground to national wilderness area.
Enshrine it in actual law. Theodore Roosevelt donated some of his land when the national parks became law, and that’s held up reasonably well. There’s no such thing as a guarantee, but it is pretty decent precedence.
The announcement elucidated this, and it's IMO worse than this. They don't downgrade to a cheaper model ([edit] for certain classes of offense they suspect you of). They sabotage the model's outputs in other, undisclosed, ways (specifically, "prompt modification, steering vectors, or parameter-efficient fine-tuning"). So, for example, they might load in a steering vector that just forgets the API to PyTorch. But it isn't just "we redirected you to a cheaper model!"
It's unstated, but I'm willing to assume that only the root package.json is consulted to decide if these scripts are allowed. Otherwise, yes, this would not actually change anything.
> Our biggest perf/resource gain is dynamic memory, which reduces memory usage a lot by releasing unused memory back to macOS. Nothing else supports this, including Containerization.
Wow, missed this when reviewing OrbStack. I assumed that you just used Containerization and therefore would have the same limitation.
If you can express that operation in Terraform, then Coder would let you do that. First problems I can think of are connectivity from the Coder provisioner to your local machine (Tailscale? Local?), and migrating disk images if you want to actually switch a workspace between environments (local provisioner could do this, but no matter what it’ll be slow and janky).
Not quite, it’s still a VM. And while it supports virtio balloon for growing RAM, it doesn’t yet support releasing that RAM back to the host. And there isn’t a convenient way to shrink the sparse disk images as they grow yet, either.
I'm using https://coder.com for all my development containers. I've got mine hooked up to a k8s cluster, but anything that you can provision with Terraform can be used (e.g. docker containers).
And that fact is also true for all of the books on all of the discontinued Kindles.
Given, the kindle won't last 500 years, but the support window is in some senses longer than for those 500-year-old books, which never received a single security update.
Can you cite this? It's not YAML execution syntax, surely Github doesn't do it, the only vector I can see is if you put it unquoted into a shell script inside of a GHA yaml.
That doesn't feel like a repetition at all? You said that the first time there was "traffic loss but without the extra google money", but that this time there's no extra google money either way.
Things on my workstation that the container does not have access to: browser cookies, 1Password cli, SSH keys (even if I allow the SSH agent socket), cargo publish tokens (unless it’s a rust project), npm tokens (unless it’s an npm project), and not to mention anything relating to my other clients (don’t compromise my employer when I vibe install some dep for a random side project).
Given Anthropic's existing track record of producing terrible hallucinated inaccurate documentation in Claude Code, I'm very curious how Bun will handle this as it continues development. Anthropic probably doesn't care about Bun's external compatibility as long as it runs Claude Code. Will Bun be eventually become "the JavaScript flavor that Claude Code uses"? Will they even bother updating external documentation as it changes? Docs currently live at https://bun.com/reference, but I don't know how much of this is separately maintained documentation versus JSDoc-style generated documentation.
I'm also switching back to Obsidian after a few-year stint on Anytype, and the Notebook Navigator plugin is the only one I have installed. This is (I assume) a UI-only plugin, which shouldn't need access to external network or processes, so a quite good candidate for sandboxed plugins.
Proc title is very easily forged (without root even). Obviously a real privileged process could modify the kernel and do whatever it wants, but if I were trying to detect this I would start with /proc/$id/exe.
Would certainly be interesting to learn more about. A simple check: allowlist of known "processes that run as root". Any new process shows up, something happened.
Honestly I'm not really thinking about the boss-programmer relationship, but rather the programmer-agent relationship. At best, you get what fnordpiglet is talking about, where it's a symbiotic relationship. On the other side of the coin, you get a parasitic relationship like the OP is talking about: the agent delivers results, you take credit, you fail to develop (or maintain) long-term skills, you become a non-value-adding middleman, you get replaced.
Exactly this. We need to be more precise than blanket statements like "agentic coding is a trap" and start figuring out what a "tasteful" application of agentic coding looks like. ChatGPT is destroying liberal arts curriculums because students can choose to not do anything of the thinking themselves and produce mediocre work that passes the bar. I think the same problem is showing itself with agentic coding, just with more directly measurable consequences (because the pile of software ends up failing in a more spectacular way than the pile of bad writing).
I've built this twice before. The main problem that I hit is that the AI agents suck at the process lifecycle management: leaving processes alive, starting the same daemon multiple times, etc.
From a brief glance over the code I like the approaches I see. Using the `/etc/resolver/` mechanism is a new trick to me!
The interesting part to me isn't the port numbers, it's the automatic service start/stop, including idle route shutdown.
That's fair (although it doesn't have anything to do with getting "real root" in a userns in that case). I guess one approach would be something like modifying the host's logrotate binary and waiting for it to trigger, or something like that. Would escape the container to root on the host directly. I imagine it wouldn't be a sure thing to pull off, either, but definitely straightforward enough that any APT should be asking Claude to develop it.