Cider9986

An amazing episode of Seinfeld. I recommend getting the 4k Remux version of the episode. They're about 10 GB each but totally worth it.

For more commentary on the relation:

Dateline NBC - The Real Soup Nazi (Seinfeld episode content included)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YXgI7XsY0WQ

It's hilarious he actually raised the price of bread.

Video version: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k-GhLNZm8G0

Yep, I got a 10 and the fingerprint sensor broke after a day. Pretty fortunately I got a refund with no return so I can't complain.

My 9 has had no hardware issues besides the designed ones.

A quick search came up nothing. It seems he sold a company for 15 billion to Intel and now pursues Torah study.

While individual examples of crime and murder are upsetting and are certainly abused by politicians to gain more power, they are actually a small cause of death and they don't justify destroying privacy.

A warrant is better than no warrant, but:

A warrant requirement is not a reasonable bandaid to consider allowing mass surveillance. There should be no mass surveillance, only targeted surveillance.

A warrant requirement makes sense for something like the locations of customers on cellular networks, because, although it should be improved, it's been built into the tech.

When you make the optional choice to create mass surveillance, safeguards do not make it acceptable.

Plenty of places have very low crime without mass surveillance.

It has such a strong story despite being so simple.

Not to be confused with the forum software.

https://www.discourse.org

My test would be an AI agent has a constantly growing karma HN account that makes comments of various lengths without being detected or banned. Wait...

I think Lockdown mode on Android just requires your primary password and hides notifications. It doesn't bring the device to BFU. Much better to shutdown/restart.

https://www.reddit.com/r/GrapheneOS/comments/1qv8y7d/what_do...

I believe it's CBP that does this, not TSA. Therefore Americans don't have to worry about it during domestic flights.

> Despite all the nonsense that's posted about UK on the internet

How is it nonsense? I'm not debating the warrant thing, but it's very reasonable to assume the UK has terrible protections for these sorts of things.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Key_disclosure_law#:~:text=Uni...

https://eylenburg.github.io/countries.htm

What is the reasoning for this? Do AI companies want this?

I wonder what some experienced OSM editors think when they see StreetComplete edits.

Yes, in fact on GrapheneOS it's less necessary and it's only necessary if you don't want to rely on the secure element rate limiting.

GrapheneOS allows using a passphrase with more convenience because of the fingerprint plus second factor pin (I don't think you can just have a pin as a secondary unlock). You don't need to enter the passphrase every time you unlock with this setup, only when first starting up.

The official opinion: https://hn.algolia.com/?dateRange=all&page=0&prefix=true&que...

> Shut down the phone in areas with a high snatch risk.

Yes this is of course safer. What evidence do you have that it doesn't work on GrapheneOS, though?

https://www.computerweekly.com/feature/Journalist-Richard-Me...

Huh, so this is essentially very similar be what this guy said to my suggestion of a factory reset timer in GrapheneOS being flawed. Apple's implementation of the reboot timer is flawed.

This goes to show for all the people that want GrapheneOS to implement a feature like hidden profiles–flawed features give people a false sense of security and should not be implemented (that's not to mention deniability may not even be a good feature if it was technically possible to implement it well).

Me:

>What about a duress timer working as the reboot timer but it wipes if you don't unlock within the time period. Would that have any advantages for destruction of evidence or deniability?

HybridStatAnim8:

>That would not be viable because the hardware does not support it. It cannot be implemented in the OS because the OS can be turned off or exploited endlessly. For GOS to consider it, it would likely need to be backed by the secure element.

>Duress PIN is deemed acceptable to implement in the OS because it is expected that the user is the one to enter it, so it has not fallen into the hands of attackers who may bypass it. Once attackers have it, you are effectively gambling. Account for that in your threat model and do not let it get to that point.

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49040342

Offtopic:

>Even if that device doesn't have the ability to turn on Airplane Mode or to turn off the transmitters through the Control Center of iOS.

IIRC, the default on iOS is that anyone with your locked device can enable airplane mode which is concerning simply for thieves. But I suppose they have to use faraday bags anyway because of the Find My network.

It would seem wise to at least keep a backup in an E2EE cloud [1]. This could possibly allow you to not give access even if legally compelled.

>As I understand it this encryption is a significant additional barrier to technical or legal access to those files. If someone knows otherwise, please let me know. Being wrong could cost me my home and life savings.

Yes, it seems that way in the US: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49922513

If your threat model includes someone using violence to coerce you, an option could be to use a cloud storage account entirely over Tor from the browser (preferably download the app because of web cryptography risks) with the login memorized. That way you can access it on any computer even if yours is lost and you can remove traces of it from your phone.

[1] https://www.privacyguides.org/en/cloud/

For those who don't know, automatic reboot restarts your device if you haven't unlocked it in a set amount of time. Cellebrite and other digital forensics companies are able to get into AFU devices much more often. The automatic reboot feature was first introduced by GrapheneOS and was later added to iOS and stock Pixels.

GrapheneOS's default is 18 hours and it can be set to between 10 minutes and 72 hours. iPhones and Stock pixels have it non customizable at 72 hours.

On GrapheneOS, for privacy and convenience, it's best to use a long random passphrase [1] for your primary unlock and then a fingerprint with a second factor pin as the secondary unlock. You enter the passphrase every time the device restarts.

If you're encountering someone that's going to seize your phone, try to restart/shut it down yourself so you don't have to trust the AFU protections.

[1] https://strongphrase.net give memorable ones which is cool.

IANAL. This is my understanding.

For US citizens entering the US: If you're concerned about protecting your data from this threat, you should use GrapheneOS (or less good would be a latest iPhone in lockdown mode and BFU) and not talk to the police. The 5th amendment does not seem to have an exception at the border, so you can't legally be compelled to hand over your password by border agents (there's not strong case law here). They can lie, they can detain you, search you, they can seize your stuff. You shouldn't be the one arguing with them, you should be silent (besides identification) and ask for an attorney (you don't have a right to an attorney at a routine search). As a US citizen, you can refuse and still enter.

GrapheneOS has demonstrated to be robust against physical access even in AFU [1]. It's still a good idea to shut down / restart because BFU is much more secure. To maintain convenience while avoiding reliance on the rate limiting of the secure element, you can use a long random passphrase as your primary unlock (you enter it every time the device is in BFU) and a fingerprint with a second factor pin as the secondary unlock.

Even if you factory reset your phone and backed up data (to an E2EE cloud provider, over Tor and memorized the credentials), you should still not disclose your password because it could allow evidence to be planted or your device to be compromised. Nothing you say to the border agents can help you in court, it can only be used against you.

The duress pin is generally not how you should handle a situation like this. You do not need the duress pin to prevent access, its purpose is if you're being physically coerced as well as to give the attacker the dillema of whether to enter a coerced password (it even gives this benefit for people that don't use the duress password).

Sure, if police are behaving illegally and the information that would be disclosed is worth the possible punishment, then that's a personal decision.

[1] Based on leaked Cellebrite documentation, GrapheneOS was the best performing device against AFU attacks. It also has a customizable reboot timer to bring the device back to BFU after a set time of not unlocking. The options are between 10 minutes and 72 hours of unlocking and 18 hours is the default iirc. Apple and Google added this to their phones after GrapheneOS without the option to customize. Theirs are set at 72 hours.

GrapheneOS is open source and more secure than stock Pixels and MacOS is closed source and more secure than traditional desktop Linux. Open source does not make software more secure by itself and neither does making it closed source.

There's no such thing as friendly neighborhood mass surveillance. We need to treat data as a bad thing to have. All data that is collected can be abused. There's probably a manifesto or something saying this more eloquently.

No, the government is bad for privacy no matter the left-right affiliation. See: Europe, all recent Republican and Democratic presidents. Both Republicans and Democrats abuse FISA when they're in power. Trump was allegedly tracked using FISA when he was out of office, so he called for it to be shut down. Now that he's back in office, he's allegedly using it to spy on Democrats. The answer is not get your people in charge temporarily, it's outlaw mass surveillance.

You make the government powerful while the people you like are in charge, then when the people you don't like are in charge you're gonna get fucked.

Actually you're getting fucked all the time, unless you take a bipartisan approach to safeguarding privacy.

If you try to enter a SSN e.g. "219-09-9999" it blocks you with something called Rampart.

Have we made any progress on a cracked version?

https://www.reddit.com/r/wallstreetbets/comments/8aiz67/how_...

It's added automatically so they must have edited it. Also [2019] is customary.

Here's a similar discussion from a few weeks ago: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49622042

Brave search is the best alternative to Google. They have an independent index and good UI. Very rarely do I switch to another engine. Brave does well at surfacing forum threads and the AI summary has been surprisingly good for a while.

https://www.privacyguides.org/en/search-engines/

What are you referring to? Cashless is terrible so that would be good but I don't know what you mean.

I guess we will see by October 2030. They'd be getting a class action lawsuit for clear fake marketing.

https://grapheneos.org/faq#device-lifetime

It doesn't seem like they are ending support for updated software on these devices before 10 years, it will just be different software.

The Whitehouse learned about vibecoding. See this and arcade.gov.

Also, what?? https://america.gov/privacy

At least realfood.gov was decent [1].

Shouldn't the government websites work on very slow internet connections?

Where's the source code for these websites? First of all, if they are vibe coded by government employees they have to be open source, and secondly, if they are vibe coded (even by a contractor), then they can't be copyrighted.

[1] https://fedtechmagazine.com/article/2026/04/national-design-...

Edit: it says this one is made by the National design studio at the bottom.