3,730 karma · joined November 6, 2018
If random malware the user chose to install does that, then that is not the bank's fault. The bank is no more involved than anybody else. And no, I don't think "regular people" want to make that the bank's fault.
You don't have to trust somebody not to track how the resulting credential is used. And that is what "zero knowledge" means. It means that after you finish the protocol, nobody has learned anything but what they were supposed to learn (in this case, "the person at the other end of this connection is over 18"). If it leaks anything else about the person, it's not zero knowledge. If somebody learns which of the issued credentials was used, it's not zero knowledge. If parties can collude to get information they're not supposed to get, it's not zero knowledge.
It's a technical term of art, not some politician's bullshit. And it isn't complicated to understand.
... and if you create one, they can, and it's starting to look like they will, outlaw using it, regardless of what you use it for.
That is not zero knowledge. Given that actual zero-knowledge systems are well understood, the only reason to deploy a system that allows that would be if you planned to abuse it.
It'd be more likely to make more people do it.
You are wilfully unaware.
> For sure there are causalities when protests go from speech to violence or directly interfere with the ability of law enforcement to enforce the law.
The protests and other resistance to the crackdowns have been amazingly disciplined in maintaining nonviolence. Shockingly good at it.
Almost all of the violence that's actually happened has been both started and finished by ICE/CBP/etc.
Not to mention the fact that the structure of the operations, and the organizational culture in which they are conducted, are obviously intended, at a command level, to create conditions for violence on both (all?) sides. And, yes, Those In Charge are absolutely responsible for that.
When Noem, Bondi, Homan, Miller, Trump, and friends talk about "violent riots", "domestic terrorism", "ramming agents with cars", or whatever, they are lying. It's not a difference of interpretation. They are intentionally lying (except maybe Trump, who probably doesn't have enough of a sense of reality to be strictly lying). They have lots of allies who systematically spread their lies and add more. Don't believe anything they say unless you have personally seen and authenticated video. You have to authenticate it, because one of their favorite tricks is to use video of things that happened years ago, sometimes in other countries, and claim it's what their agents are reacting to. AI video isn't quite good enough yet, but they'll use that where they can. And of course they're also all about selective editing. And after all that they still ask you to ignore the evidence of your own eyes.
If you are failing to be skeptical of notorious baldfaced liars, that's motivated ignorance on your part.
> But your framing makes it sound like roving bands of beat down squads.
In Minneapolis, yes. But those squads are mostly aimed at intimidating anybody resisting the agenda, not at actual potential deportees.
The more on-topic problem is revoking every completely legal status in sight, and then acting as though the people whose status got revoked had done something wrong.
> If there was not a concerted effort to interfere with law enforcement or dox the people that work at those places, the masks would not be necessary.
You know, normal cops frequently deal with actual violent criminals who may be inclined to violent vengeance. But they don't wear masks.
ICE agents are just going to have to deal with the fact that, so long as they keep doing what they're doing, decent people who find out who they are are going to shun them. They might even get heckled on the streets. Comes with the territory. Does not justify trying to conceal your identity.
Slowed population growth, or even population shrinkage, is worldwide.
The fertility "problem" is only inside some people's heads.
What the hell is more effective than getting root with a trivial MITM?
Not only is it effective, it's stealthy, in that it doesn't out you. It's obviously possible to both find and exploit it without a huge investment, which means nobody knows you're a nation state when you use it. You don't have to risk burning any really arcane zero-days or any hard to replace back doors.
Nation states are absolutely going to use things like that. And so is everybody else.
Man in the middle attacks may be "out of scope" for AMD, but they're still "in scope" for actual attackers.
Ignoring them is indefensibly incompetent. A policy of ignoring them is a policy of being indefensibly incompetent.
If you own everything, and you bomb the populace, you bomb your own stuff.
If everybody works for you, and you bomb the populace, you bomb your own serfs.
And those faceless individuals who are actually holding the weapons, and actually know how they work, and actually know, in a detailed, hands-on way, how to do coordinated violence with them? It turns out they're secretly members of the populace. You'd better make sure they think it's in their interest to keep using the weapons the way you want them to.
Which is the whole damned problem, obviously.
> This quite literally the standard of Signal [1].
Yes, Signal is weak in a similar way. Although there is a difference between having to set up a bunch of wiretapping to do traffic analysis, and having the information handed to you on a plate.
> And this is of course assuming the worst from the national id implementation; any sensible law would require the id provider to delete all information as soon as the login is complete.
Assumptions that laws will be followed are out of order. Yes, you have the laws. Yes, you punish violations. But you still deal with the fact that violations will happen.
Nobody "mandates" work to survive right now. But we do have a system where everything is owned by somebody, and ownership tends to concentrate. You can convince people to give you stuff they own (or money, which stands in for stuff) by doing work. The risk is that nobody will need your work, so you won't be able to convince them to give you any stuff, ownership will concentrate even more, and you will end up with nothing.
If Those In Charge require that "owners" continue to give you stuff for work that they don't need, that crude patch still doesn't provide you with any other way to get stuff. Which means you have to keep doing this useless work forever.
It's not about "don't mandate work". It's about fundamental change to the entire system.
Be careful not to create a permanent future of mandatory makework.
'tis a consummation devoutly to be wished.
There must be a billion things in the "sterile" area of your average airport that would make better clubs than vise-grips.
Well, it doesn't. Absolutely none of the systems people are putting into place, or suggesting putting into place, are actually zero trust. The ones that claim to be are "somewhat lower trust if you don't think hard about how to exploit them". Yes, we know in theory how to do zero trust. The reality of these mandates is that people can easily get de-anonymized to all kinds of actors who should't be able to identify them.
It's also a "solution" to a massively exaggerated problem, one that's not in any way specific to any given age group. But that's unrelated to the fact that nobody is, in practice, doing or planning to do anything privacy-preserving.
Via the UUID. Also via the fact that the authentication service sees what you're logging into, regardless of whether the social media site does or not.
This isn't complicated. It's obvious if you're not desperately trying not to think about it.
You misspelled "never".
If you get a clear notice that a user wants you to delete something, you act on it. It doesn't matter if it was sent by carrier pigeon. Can't automate it? Tough doo-doo. Interferes with your business model? Change your model or close.
No, it just won't get very good deliverability, because everything it talks to is now fundamentally broken.
DKIM shouldn't exist. It was a bad idea from day one.
It adds very little real anti-spam value over SPF, but the worse part is exactly the model you describe. DKIM was a largely undiscussed, back-door change to the attributability and repudiability of email, and at the same time the two-tiered model it created is far, far less effective or usable than just end-to-end signing messages at the MUA.