5,737 karma · joined June 19, 2013
SAAB Automobile was split out from SAAB AB in 1990 with General Motors (GM) taking a 51% stake, and was fully a part of GM ten years later. GM then tried to build SAABs on GM platforms which meant the quality tanked and tanked the company too. And as another posted, What was left became Nevs.
Wikipedia has a good writeup on SAAB, with its many divisions. It's a bit like Volvo. Both companies have had divisions that makes automobiles, heavy vehicles and other types of products. Volvo Cars was sold off from Volvo AB to Ford. The heavy vehicle division of SAAB (Scania) is now part of Volkswagen
Yes using a VM means taking a performance hit. But with the latest Apple machines, and for what I do in the VMs, I haven't experienced any lack of performance that annoys me.
One example for what I do is to run double Wireguard tunnels. In MacOS it has been nigh impossibly to get working (and esp not reliably). But works easily in a Linux VM. With this I can proxy through the VM to access remote resources from applications in MacOS.
I'm using UTM btw: https://mac.getutm.app/
Indeed he don't hold back and is quite funny in his frankness.
Though when it comes to his book draft, he really need an editor. https://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/pubs/book.pdf
1. I read the first part, with Gustav Schwerer etc as an argument against CRQC to ever become possible, so moving to PQC is not needed.
2. I read the second part, about the hardness of attacking classical algorithms, for example the DES cracker as a motivation against attacks on crypto being an actual threat vector. Which ties in to point 1 as a CRQC would be very expensive and hard to use in practice. It is not a computer but a physics experiment.
3. He then talks about real threats and how they don't change very much. Points to OWASP top ten etc.
I totally agree with him on point 1 and 2. I'm just as skeptical. But what I'm saying is that it is too late. We are quite possibly switching to algorithms that will never add any security. Spending huge resources and pushing unneeded changes to systems around the world. Telling the world that it is unnecessary will not change that fact.
Coming to point 3. I don't agree with him. Yes, OWASP top 10 shows the same more or less trivial attack are the ones being used. Nobody use a zero day unless it is needed. If I can become sysadmin through a reused password or a misconfiguration of Teams, why use something more advanced? But I see him using this as an argument against ciphers being broken a real threat vector, and that is a different attack.
The first one is an active attack against a system. It may be a nation state actor that wants to infiltrate, get a persistent access, exfiltrate and possibly destroy the system. It may be a ransomware organization. They will do the same thing, but their timeline is much shorter. (and of course the difference between a nation state and organized crime can be very blurry).
But recording Internet traffic, and over long time (days, months, years, decades) try to decrypt it are solely of interest to a nation state. And for that attack and end game, what OWASP top ten looks like is totally irrelevant. It is not an active attack against a system. It is done in secrecy by entities with a lot of patience by entities that have huge resources. For them Quantum Computers are very interesting and relevant to discuss. But not in public.
I guess that was a waay to long answer. But I hope it explained what I ment.
My view is that IETF and commercial entities such as Apple, Google and open source world are the ones going hybrid. In this case I would love to be wrong.
The world has decided that the percieved risk makes it worth going to PQC and we can't change that fact no matter the nice pictures of Schwerer Gustav. We are in full transition mode and will not go back. Even if CRQC never materialize.
We probably will experience a number of issues, problems that we wouldn't have by not going to PQC. Driving costs, making things vulnerable. More work for us I guess.
The negative thing for all systems with the current NIST PQC algoritms are the longer keys, which gets even worse when going hybrid. See the experiments by Cloudflare for example with PQC in TLS, and adding PQC keys in certificates.
I agree that for certificates, there is a possibility of being compatible with legacy systems by adding the ML-DSA signature as an extension (and the legacy system being able to handle the larger certs). But please show references for the main reason for hybrid is compatibility. IF we look at the motivation for the TLS 1.3 hybrid scheme it states:
"The primary goal of a hybrid key exchange mechanism is to facilitate the establishment of a shared secret which remains secure as long as as one of the component key exchange mechanisms remains unbroken."
(https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design...)
That page states that backwards compatibility maybe is one of several possible additional goals. But it is not the main goal.
The problem PQC algorithms must solve is not only to be resistant to attacks by future quantum computers but also against attacks on classical computers. And the hardness in terms of security as the number of bits in the key must scale about as fast as classical algorithms. And work as about well a classical algorithms on classical computers.
All ciphers have warts. The ones we use are the ones we think are secure, but also have warts we can live with. RSA scales slowly with number of bits (and have other warts). EC scales faster and becomes faster than RSA for the same strength, but has other warts. McEliece seems like a good, conservative PQC algorithm, but those keys... TDEA was deemed to provide a too low security margin, but it also was to slow (48 rounds) and with a too small block size.
A bit off topic, as a European, what is happening with DOGE, slashing funding for CISA, TAA etc, I'm seriously worried about NIST. As you say, NIST is very important in many areas. For USA, with things like the coordintated universal time normal. But also for federal cybersec standards that have led to interop with the rest of the world cryptographically. Will NIST be slashed, and if so will the crypto department be spared? If not, what would remain? New standards, the validation program? Will Falcon become a standard, or for that matter the new lightweight symmetric algo based on Ascon? (For which I'm eagerly waiting for NIST to publish test vectors so that I'm able verify that my implementation is compliant.)
The decision to move the world to PQC has already been taken, and we are in full transition mode. Orgs like NATO has transitioned. Many have published time plans to phase out classical algos (NSA, GHQC, Australia) or will shortly (EU). Orgs like ETSI will transition to PQC in upcoming revisions (5G) and next gen systems (6G). Just to name a few.
In general, looking at agencies, nations pushing for PQC algorithms and transition time plans seems to be curiously well aligned. All using the NIST PQC algos, no real mentioning of hybrid solutions. Australias plan to ban the use of SHA-256 is one that sticks out a bit from the others.
Regarding time plans, I find the suddenness, almost haste to be quite interesting. I've been searching quite extensively to gather info for PQC talks, and the motivation for a stated time plan are rarely well motivated. Much hand waving. And what drove the rush? I'm suspecting a bit of a crowd panic. But there is a clear change around 2022, 2023. Suddenly the PQ threat became very important. And within 10 years (or less) the world will be using PQC basically everywhere PKI is used besides legacy systems where lifetimes and update issues makes the change unrealistic.
And are we really sure the schemes used will be hybrid? If DJB is right, NIST is pushing for PQC only. The NSA recommendations that was released last year AFAIK does not state anything about hybrid solutions. Details are less clear what NATO has transitioned to but seems to be PQC only. And the ETSI push for PQC in 5G, 6G does not seem to aim for hybrid solutions. I would love to be told to be wrong about the use of hybrid schemes.
The iMessage protocol, Signal and things happening in IETF goes for hybrid schemes, which I think is the right way (if that count for anything). So it seems we have the open world and private sector versus governments, orgs fairly close to governments when it comes to hybrid vs PQC only.
For anyone having, being friends with, are interested in cats will recognize this behavior. If you meet a cat on the street and it raises its tail like this, it will also probably come up to you. A cat that sweeps the tail back and fort, often with the end of it a bit jerky is probably afraid, angry, hesitant and does not want to engage. It should be left alone unless you want to feel the sharp end of those retractable razor blades.
Cats also use the same patterns between each other. And interestingly some dogs use the same patterns too. Tiger puppies seem to do this also (as seen in documentaries). So, at least to me, there seems to be common 'language' to express feelings and interests between some animals equipped with tails.
I would have thought this should have been a known thing, possibly even for the driving rat scientists. Anybody on HN that have some references into known ´tail language´?
https://collection.sciencemuseumgroup.org.uk/objects/co85650...
https://www.polarbrod.se/smorgasar/polarklamma-renkott/
Anyway, Renklämmas are sold frozen, and at the university could be bought cheaply from several student orgs trying to earn money for a final year trip. This made them perfect snacks for those late night programming sessions - completing assignment and other things a curious student with free access to the Internet may do. The problem is eating the Renklämma frozen. If only there was a way to reheat them? Luckily the school (Luleå University of Technology: https://www.ltu.se/en) had just invested in a lot of Sun SPARC ELCs:
These were great UNIX terminal++ machines. Importantly they had no fans, relying instead of passive cooling caused by heat rising from the bottom to the top of the enclosure over the main board mounted vertically on the backside of the screen:
http://john.ccac.rwth-aachen.de:8000/alf/sparc_elc/
Now, if the machine was made to work harder, more heat would be generated. Thus the 'Renklämma reheater' program was born. Basically it just forked more and more processes doing nothing but randomly writing and reading memory, and sending them between each other. Probably not the optimal solution, but reheated (defrosted) the Renklämma sufficiently to be enjoyed without getting brain freeze.
Just place the Renklämma on top of the upper ventilation gilles on the back side of the screen and run the program until the computer beeps. Preferably not on the machine you are working on, but the machine next to you, so YOU don't have to live with the increasing sluggishness. UNIX remote login ftw!
I would even venture to say that senior engineers are probably much better at documenting, writing clean code, not over engineer things. My personal experience is that bad engineers move into project management, administration much faster. Which is a problem in itself since they end up being the boss of the engineers that are better than what they are.
https://outdoorswimmer.com/coach/myth-busting-can-a-swan-bre...
The beak is probably more dangerous, or at least give you a nasty pinch or nibbing.
The catchzilla solution is an example of their amazing ability to think out of the box. This solution, and things like the rapid evolution of the Raptor engine (see picture, story here: https://medium.com/@futurespaceworld/the-evolution-of-spacex...), dynamic engine configuration (33, 13, 3, zero, up again) and control is almost magically impressive. This is the stuff of Sci-Fi, brought to life.
You even have different types of drones providing different function. A mama drone carrying smaller drones to the place of operation for example.