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JoachimS

5,737 karma · joined June 19, 2013

Embedded security expert at Assured AB https://www.assured.se/
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JoachimS··on Fixing the TPM: Hardware Security Modules Done Right
With TKey Unlocked you will be able to generate the UDS as you please.
JoachimS··on Fixing the TPM: Hardware Security Modules Done Right
This is soo cool! Very happy to see this.

One thing I mentioned in a talk about at the TKey at FOSS-North this spring was that the internal name for the project at Mullvad that ultimately lead to the TKey was "TPM-ish". The idea was to develop a evice with just the parts of the TPM API needed to perform measured boot, but that we could control and trust.

This idea got simplified into a hardware Root of Trust device that could only do Ed25519 signing. Basically an iCE 40 UP FPGA mounted on a PCB talking SPI or LPC. And since it was based on RISC-V it didn't take long until Mullvad founder Fredrik Strömberg proposed that by combining with the DICE concept we could generalize it into what has become the Tkey.

The TKey Unlocked will be available very soon. These devices are not provisioned and not locked by Tillitis. This allows you to provision the UDS and UDI yourself, and do anything else you want with the TKey. This includes modifying the FW and the FPGA design. There will also be a TKey programmer to allow you to program TKey devices:

https://shop.tillitis.se/

JoachimS··on Quantum physicists design unconditionally secure system for digital payments
Every time there is a story about physicists solving security, and especially cryptographic problems, I wonder how well they actually know these fields. Usually there is a statement of problem that simply isn't correct. In this case there is this:

´´´ In today's payment ecosystem, customers' sensitive data is substituted by sequences of random numbers, and the uniqueness of each transaction is secured by a classical cryptographic method or code. However, adversaries and merchants with powerful computational resources can crack these codes and recover the customers' private data, and for example, make payments in their name. ´´´ Ignoring the strange statement that "sensitive data is substituted by sequences of random numbers", the second part is second statement about powerful computational resources is simply wrong.

And the suggested solution to the problem is also quite typical - it relies on equipment that basically require a lab to use. And it does not work with the infrastructure used today for payments. It doesn't scale, it would require replacing a lot of equipment and indeed the Internet itself.

JoachimS··on The quest for a simple smartwatch
I bought one of these for the solar charging, great battery life. And that works. But it is really hard to read the LCD. The automatic lightning works quite unreliably, and even when it works the tiny screen is hard to read. At least with my old man eyes.
JoachimS··on Our right to challenge junk patents is under threat
And you will be able to buy TKeys that are unlocked, and you (your organization) will then be able to personalize and lock them yourself. Does it then start out as SW, and then become hadrdware? Also not a lawyer. ;-)

https://shop.tillitis.se/

JoachimS··on Fitting 44% More Data on a C64/1541 Floppy Disk
I still have my disk puncher in a box. A nice niche product.
JoachimS··on Microbes discovered that can digest plastics at low temperatures
I'm curious to what is the output from the digestion - apart from more microbes.
JoachimS··on A professor found her name on an article she didn’t write. Then it got worse
Also, looking at the article in question. It seems to suggest a policy of punishment as a solution to solving the issue of people, companies not following recycling rules: "the government should continue to closely monitor and punish violators of laws and regulations."

So I'd like to add incentive (4): A way to seemingly have established researchers suggest punishment as accepted way of enforcement. Drive agenda, basically.

JoachimS··on A professor found her name on an article she didn’t write. Then it got worse
Ah, I missed that detail. Checking the actual article, and you are correct:

https://www.internationalscholarsjournals.com/articles/impac...

JoachimS··on A professor found her name on an article she didn’t write. Then it got worse
Good point, and not unheard of.
JoachimS··on Quantum doomsday planning (1/2): Risk assessment and quantum attacks
Probably the best summary of what quantum computers are, what types of problems can benefit from quantum speedup, and the consequences for todays crypto algorithms and protocols that I've read.
JoachimS··on A professor found her name on an article she didn’t write. Then it got worse
At least two possible reasons, all bad.

1. Steal, increase credibility for the article and the (assumed) real authors by attaching the name of a successful researcher with high credibility. People need to publish a number of papers to get their degree. Doing this may help them getting published easiser. A bit like also stealing the actual contents of the paper from an already published paper.

2. Destroy the credibility of a researcher by attaching their name to a paper that is falsified, plagiarized.

My very unfounded guess is that it is more (1) than (2) at play here. But research in political science is probably more at risk to cause anger and enemies than say cosmology. Unless the research is related to dwarf planets or some such.

JoachimS··on Lego breaks ground on first US manufacturing facility
Will it be built out of LEGOs?
JoachimS··on Z Garbage Collector: The Next Generation
And also in system design, computer architecture and engineering. T. H. Meyer and I. E. Sutherland coined this generational behaviour the "Wheel or Reincarnation" in their paper "On the Design of Display Processors." IMHO a paper that is still well worth reading:

http://cva.stanford.edu/classes/cs99s/papers/myer-sutherland...

JoachimS··on Biggest companies in the world by market value 2022
How well can we trust the valuations behind the rankings?

I'm a wee bit skeptical on the valuations of companies from China and to some extent Saudi.

JoachimS··on Yubico is merging with ACQ Bure and intends to go public
Not the same person. The Caroline af Ugglas on the ACQ board is this person: https://www.acq.se/styrelsen/caroline-af-ugglas

This is the artist: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caroline_af_Ugglas

JoachimS··on Yubico is merging with ACQ Bure and intends to go public
No and yes. ;-)

The TKey does not have any persistent memory available for applications to store things. The idea is that we measure (calculate a keyed digest using BLAKE2s) the application during loading. The keyed digest (called CDI) is used as a base secret, random value by the application to derive the secrets the application needs. The Ed25519 signer for example derive its keypair based on the CDI.

A PGP application could use this to determinstically derive a keypair.

The FW application loader will also accept a User Supplied Secret (USS), which is also used during the calculation of the CDI. This means that the keypair derived will be based on the specific TKey device, the integrity to the device application and the USS. One way to use the USS is to control which keypair to derive. For example for SSH, different USS can derive keys used for different servers.

Also, a device application may use the CDI to derive wrapping keys, and then use authenticated encryption to protect a cookie that can be stored on the TKey client machine between usage.

We are working on providing libraries and examples for app developers to do this.

And to the yes part of the answer: Yes, a TKey could talk to a PGP agent and be called upon when needed. This is similar to how a SSH agent can talk to TKey today.

JoachimS··on Yubico is merging with ACQ Bure and intends to go public
Due to the way the configuration state machine in the Lattice iCE40 UP device operates, we can't block a warm boot-attack, even though the FPGA bitstream is stored and locked into the on-die Non-volatile configuration memory. However we can, and try to, make it really hard to successfully perform an evil maid attack.

First: all registers and logic (LUTs) will always be cleared during the reset phase of the FPGA configuration. So any secrets stored there will be secure. We store the Unique Device Secret (UDS - the primary asset) in registers. Registers that can also only be read once between power cycling. The block RAMs (EBRs) however can be cleared or retain data based on the configuration <-- these are the ones to worry about.

Right now we have to touch the FW-RAM (implemented using EBRs) with the UDS for a few tens of cycles. After it being used, it is wiped from memory. So a successful exfiltration must trigger the warm boot-reconfiguration during that window of time. In order to make this harder (i.e. more time consuming) we do a few things:

1. We randomize when the UDS is moved to the FW-RAM and thus when the window to hit is. And we should not leak any indication when that is.

2. We use ASLR to randomize where and in which order the UDS is stored in the FW-RAM.

3. We use randomized data scrambling of the contents in the FW-RAM. And yes we do fill the memory with randomized, ASLRed data first.

The randomization control values are all stored in registers, and will be lost as part of the reset phase of the attack. So an exfiltration must:

1. Hit the window of time.

2. Extract the contents of the FW-RAM.

3. Be able to distinguish the random data words that make up the UDS from the other contents of the FW-RAM.

4. Descramble the UDS words and place them in the right order.

It is not an impossible attack, but it should take a long time. And it should not scale easily from one device to all other. One could automate it of course, but the work should be the same (multiple exfiltrations) for each device.

But we still think that the attack IS possible, and it is therefore out of scope of attacks that we mitigate for this version of the TKey. The next version will hopefully be able to keep the UDS in registers only. When we have that working, the threat model will be updated to reflect that.

JoachimS··on Yubico is merging with ACQ Bure and intends to go public
There is a touch sensor that detects touch events. The signer application (used by the SSH agent and other things) for example detects user presence by waiting for a touch event before performing the signing operation.
JoachimS··on Yubico is merging with ACQ Bure and intends to go public
No, not yet. Physical attacks are out of scope for the TKey1, even if we have some mechanisms in play which try to extend the time and effort required to perform a successful evil maid-attack extracting the Unique Device Secret (UDS). See the threat model for the release:

https://github.com/tillitis/tillitis-key1/blob/main/doc/thre...

The current casing is fairly tamper evident (it will break), but we do not yet use real, tamper evident sealing. We are looking at tamper sealing for future versions. And ways to further protect against physical attacks.

JoachimS··on Yubico is merging with ACQ Bure and intends to go public
If you are looking for a tiny, Swedish company working in a similar area as Yubico, there is Tillits AB. Tillitis is a spin off from the Swedish VPN provider Mullvad. In contrast to Yubikeys, The Tillitis TKey as well as tools, device verification etc is 100% open source.

https://tillitis.se/

https://github.com/tillitis

https://mullvad.net/en

(Full disclosure: I work for Tillitis.)

JoachimS··on Yubico is merging with ACQ Bure and intends to go public
Tiny is a bit misleading. The turnover is about 100 MUSD. The company has about 300 employees, with offices in all regions of the world and a lot of R&D in the USA.
JoachimS··on Yubico is merging with ACQ Bure and intends to go public
Though started by the Swede Boris Hagelin.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boris_Hagelin

JoachimS··on The Mullvad Browser
And Mullvad is a Tor project sponsor.
JoachimS··on Robot Learns to See in 30 Minutes (2022)
A suitable cost function to optimize. It could be moving faster, reducing energy consumption. Or maximizing the harvest of the use case type called "money" from the environment called "humans". Whatever that means.
JoachimS··on Verilog Ethernet: Work-in-Progress 100BASE-TX PHY
No, companies that abuse license agreements won't care about AGPL anyway. So the license only makes it impossible for the companies that don't want to abuse your work, but play ball and work with you.

The issue here is liability and what the lawyers counseling a company will recommend. If your design contain IP that the company has valued (very common), risking leakage of that IP by using a library that in legalese seems to suggest that you may have to release your design, you can probably bet that the lawyers will recommend to find another technical solution. Protecting business value and avoid exposure, liability drives conservatism. And in my experience will always triumph over technology choice. Esp if there seems to be a possible choice to be made. Including developing your own solution.

As an open source HW creator I have to decide if I develop stuff for my own amusement, or if I do it to (in somehow small way) help the world - which means other using my creations. And then consider if the license I use support that goal. Since I don't just develop stuff for my own amusement I've decided to use a permissive license since I think that makes it easiest for others to use my stuff.

https://github.com/secworks

Judging by the number of downloads, messages and additional work I've gotten, it seems to work out pretty ok.

JoachimS··on Verilog Ethernet: Work-in-Progress 100BASE-TX PHY
Yes I have. Any company I've been involved with, met that look at and use, contribute to open source at all (SW as well as HW) avoid AGPL. Many ban employees from downloading, clone something known to be AGPL licensed.

Releasing under AGPL is a great way to not see your design being used and contributed to. At least by entities that wants to abide by the license and do the right thing. Entities that steal work done by others, have no intention to contribute back may do differently.

JoachimS··on TextSynth Server
The Fabrice Bellard web page must be one of the most underselling ones on the entire web. So many amazing projects. Not a word that really emphasize the importance, coolness. Just a simple list with short factual descriptions.
JoachimS··on Speak English to me: The secret world of programmers
Just like many other types of higher education. Doctors, Lawyers etc. A CS, CE, EE degree is for many the first step on a career path. In many cultures becoming an doctor, lawyer, engineer is something to strive for. It is an upstanding position and is well payed. Too bad being a teacher seems not to be like that anymore in many western countries.

We here at HN are quite probably not the norm. Being hobbyists that have been tinkering with computers since early childhood should not be a requirement to become a programmer. If it were, the industry would not be able to scale as it has. There are simply too few of us in the human population.

JoachimS··on Dragon Programming Language
Hard pass.
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