4,521 karma · joined October 17, 2010
Journalists will be allowed to use Instagram, Twitter and other social media to post still photos and news from the Sochi Olympics, International Olympic Committee spokesman Mark Adams confirmed to For The Win in an email on Monday.
"Please take as many photos as you like!" he wrote.
"Sharing pix on social media positively encouraged," he added in an additional email.
I wonder who that could be.
Google will captcha-block IP addresses (not just Tor) if they get too many queries from them in a short period of time, so that bots can't crawl the search results.[1]
1: https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#GoogleCAPTCHA
http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-57597954-83/lavabit-chief-p...
"What happens to your customer's e-mails and data?
Levison: I'm looking into setting up a site where users can download their data and set up a forwarding [e-mail] address, but that may take a week or two to set up. That's all I can do until I feel confident that I can resume the service without having to compromise its integrity.
I will make it clear that I don't plan to use any encryption for that site. [People] should only use it if they feel comfortable with the information being intercepted. And yes, I do plan to have that disclaimer on the site.
Unfortunately, what's become clear is that there's no protections in our current body of law to keep the government from compelling us to provide the information necessary to decrypt those communications in secret.
I'm still looking at seeing if that's even logistically feasible -- there's half a billion messages [sent in the 10 years Lavabit operated]. By shutting down the service, I will be losing the infrastructure that I used to support all those people.
There's stuff that I can't share with my own lawyer. This is going to be a long fight."
https://class.coursera.org/crypto-preview/lecture/6
https://class.coursera.org/crypto-preview/quiz/attempt?quiz_...
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6191171
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6155502
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6192777
Edit: Here's what Bruce Schneier says about it: https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/08/the_cryptopoc...
https://ubuntuone.com/5k7x6BwtO1g3i643pyxhnf
(sha256sum: 015e5a8b5b8a438a0c30558708b4d05e610f2ef152174555a9e791596b3dd980)
"It would have been nice if TR had asked an academic researcher for comments. After all, if discrete logarithms are ever broken, it'll likely be by academic researchers.
Diffie-Hellman is based on discrete logarithms, but RSA is not. RSA is based on integer factorization, not discrete logarithms. Integer factorization and discrete logarithms share some common techniques, but neither is known to be based on the other, and opinion is split as to whether they are truly equivalent. I can't think of a single respectable academic researcher who thinks that the latest results threaten RSA.
The new discrete logarithm attacks require the existence of a nontrivial intermediate subfield, and work best in small characteristic. They do not apply to the most common instances of Diffie-Hellman in deployment (no subfields, large characteristic), and we currently have no realistic approaches that could make them apply. A similar story actually played out with ECC some 10-15 years ago, when Weil descent attacks were new. Those attacks on ECC also require an intermediate subfield, and 10 years of follow-on research has been unable to sidestep this requirement. To date, there is no indication that Weil descent can be used on the most common instances of ECC being deployed today, and nobody is going around saying ECC is at risk from new algorithms. (Quantum computers, yes, but not new algorithms.)
It is possible that the new discrete logarithm attacks will extend to cases with large characteristic and no intermediate subfields, but I personally think that it is extremely unlikely. I would not put the chances at "small but definite." It would be a major surprise if this happened. Even if it did, RSA may still be safe. I can't speak for others, but my sense of the crypto community is that most experts agree with my assessment."
"What happens to your customer's e-mails and data?
Levison: I'm looking into setting up a site where users can download their data and set up a forwarding [e-mail] address, but that may take a week or two to set up. That's all I can do until I feel confident that I can resume the service without having to compromise its integrity.
I will make it clear that I don't plan to use any encryption for that site. [People] should only use it if they feel comfortable with the information being intercepted. And yes, I do plan to have that disclaimer on the site.
Unfortunately, what's become clear is that there's no protections in our current body of law to keep the government from compelling us to provide the information necessary to decrypt those communications in secret.
I'm still looking at seeing if that's even logistically feasible -- there's half a billion messages [sent in the 10 years Lavabit operated]. By shutting down the service, I will be losing the infrastructure that I used to support all those people.
There's stuff that I can't share with my own lawyer. This is going to be a long fight."
And here's a video of it being demonstrated: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O7ZELOUIyvw
This link has a nice rundown of why RC4 is no longer recommended for SSL/TLS: http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/03/attack-of-we...
Basically:
"According to AlFardan, Bernstein, Paterson, Poettering and Schuldt (a team from Royal Holloway, Eindhoven and UIC) the RC4 ciphersuite used in SSL/TLS is broken. If you choose to use it -- as do a ridiculous number of major sites, including Google -- then it may be possible for a dedicated attacker to recover your authentication cookies. The current attack is just on the edge of feasibility, and could probably be improved for specific applications."
> We're aware and are planning accordingly. Thanks for the heads up, though.