Niten

Not entirely. The important difference is that instead of generating a secret on the token and passing it to the server, U2F has the token answer a challenge issued by the server and encrypted to the token's (per-domain) public key, stored by the server at token registration time.

The corresponding private key is stored on the token indexed in part by the requesting domain, which is supplied by the browser during an auth request. It is because of browser participation that a MITM domain would not be able to ask the token to answer the challenge with the correct key handle.

The actual implementation can differ from what's described above, see Yubico's description of their key wrapping scheme if you want more detail:

https://www.yubico.com/2014/11/yubicos-u2f-key-wrapping/

U2F would prevent this from being exploitable, but one-time password schemes like TOTP would not.

I do something similar, but at an even lower granularity: "Needs Action", "Waiting", and just a couple other labels.

I haven't actually watched Mann's talks and only have a second-hand understanding of Inbox Zero as a concept, so maybe this is just rehashing his ideas, but the reason I like this approach is that I avoid spending the time and mental effort classifying incoming messages more than once.

As acdha said, no, this type of attack isn't possible with U2F.

I agree, although my takeaway was that the way to fight them is to respond on ACLU letterhead.

> Old Japanese cars are still on the road, running well. My son is driving my original purchase 1990 Honda.

I recently moved out to the Bay Area from south Florida, and one thing that really struck me was how many y2k-ish cars were on the road looking practically new. I think it's mostly a matter of climate.

I would have loved to keep my 2000 Integra on the road, but the unholy combination of Florida's sun and humidity brought an early death to its paint, body, grommets and bushings. In contrast, I regularly see Integras in the Bay Area that look as though they could have rolled out of the factory five years ago.

I think you've recognized something important here, which is that offense is generally a subjective matter. In such cases an clear-headed statement of objection may be warranted, but dogpiling and outright bullying is never excusable.

Nikola Tesla was a great engineer and innovator—and showman—who's been mythologized beyond all reason.

Even at the time, Tesla's greatest contributions were being simultaneously discovered by contemporaries like Galileo Ferraris. Discovery marches on, and is more a product of the existing body of scientific knowledge than of any one man.

There have been too many other great minds in physics and electrical engineering for it to be remotely plausible that we've missed out on "countless inventions" that would be available to us today, if only Tesla had more money for his experiments.

> For SoCs where it's on-die - on the same bus/fabric - they will (if it's not an idiotic design) use an IOMMU of some sort, to prevent DMA from having access outside of its sandbox.

Do you happen to know whether this is the case for the latest generation of Qualcomm SoCs such as the Snapdragon 810 / MSM8994?

It depends on your setup. I've had best results doing my development on a powerful workstation that, when coupled with a good LTS operating system like CentOS 7, doesn't give me any maintenance headaches (or at least amortises any headaches over a sufficiently long time that I don't care), and doesn't force me to deal with the battery issues you mentioned or the other fiddly bits of running Linux on a laptop.

This was pretty easy to setup and has run quite well without much administrative work beyond the initial installation (something I've never been able to say for Ubuntu, unfortunately), and when I'm away I can just SSH in from a Chromebook.

The architecture may exist, by Servo as a day-to-day usable browser does not yet. Don't get me wrong; I absolutely look forward to the day that it does.

Neat that they have a sandbox up and running, though. I wasn't aware of that. Is there a paper somewhere I can read about their sandbox architecture?

CVE counting is a poor proxy for actual security. A browser that does not sandbox its renderers or enforce a permissions model on its extensions cannot reasonably be considered secure in 2015.

No, Chrome has a materially better security architecture than Firefox.

https://seclab.stanford.edu/websec/chromium/chromium-securit...

When it's ready, hopefully Servo will be used as the basis for a browser that can provide security comparable to Chrome. But there's much more to that comprehensive goal than just writing a renderer in Rust.

The claim that deoxygenated orange juice has a fraction of the nutritional benefits of hand-squeezed juice is an assertion that needs to be backed up with evidence, not blindly assumed.

Firefox's security is still nowhere near up to par, unfortunately.

Yep: https://www.yubico.com/applications/fido/

Yes, but there's a kernel of truth there. I wouldn't say I managed to learn Go in a day, but after perhaps six months using it I was much closer to mastering Go than to mastering other languages I'd been using for years. Go's road to proficiency is a shorter one, there's just less stuff to cover.

Take initialization for example: look at all the edge cases belabored in section 8.5 of the C++14 spec, or even the intricacies of initialization in a simpler language like Python. Now contrast this with how much lexical and conceptual space it takes to describe zero initialization in Go's spec: https://golang.org/ref/spec#The_zero_value

As in other areas, Go's approach here has downsides. (Possibly major ones.) But those tend to be conscious design decisions to minimize the total number of concepts and idioms present in the language.

> Googling suggests that DNA evidence shows that about 5% of "white" Americans carry Native American genes

I'm one of these, at least according to my Genographic Project results.

Prior to getting my results, I assumed my father's family's oral tradition of a Cherokee ancestor was fiction. But maybe it's true after all.

All else being equal it would be nice if the keys' casing were more tamper-resistant. But the article doesn't even touch on the tamper resistance of the NXP A7005, which is the part that actually matters.

> That 0.08 g/km figure is using the 'new european driving cycle' which features unrealistically low loads on the engine, engines are known to increase their NOx emissions quite a bit when under load.

Doesn't that lend further support to the point that U.S. regulations, while also obviously not perfect, are stronger in this area?

> Anyway, NOx is not the only gas that the EU is concerned about, C02 figured very large in the whole reduction program as well.

But you were challenging pwthornton's assertion that "The US is also much more concerned with air pollution that affects human health." While CO2 emissions are undesirable, NOx and particulates are what actually kill people in polluted cities.

The Euro 6 standard allows 0.08 g/km of NOx emissions for passenger diesel; the EPA allows a fleet average of 0.04.

The U.S. certainly is ahead of Europe on the regulation of toxic emissions, and European cities are much more likely than American ones to have dangerous levels of pollution:

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/31/upshot/pollution-around-th...

I wouldn't consider Keepass the most secure choice. One of the most common attacks in practice is phishing, and browser integration discourages carelessly pasting your password into something that looks like your bank's site. The Chrome password manager and LastPass can help there, but Keepass does not.

> European privacy laws are very consumer-friendly and usually very reasonable.

Cookie notifications and censorship of the news under the guise of the "right to be forgotten" come to mind as obvious counterexamples.

It's interesting to see the regional differences in this discussion, because that attitude is pretty foreign to the way I think about the Internet.

I know that if I use Yandex, at least some of my data is going to reside in Russia. If Dailymotion, France. I consider it up to me as a consumer to decide whether that's what I really want. I don't consider it my local government's job to force those companies to change their business models.

> It is possible that social media start-ups will be unable to operate across borders due to regulations, but this will hardly be a staggering setback to the European populace's ability to share photos of their food.

There will be services that have not yet been invented. We cannot presume to know what they'll look like, but there's a big chance the startups that invent them will be harmed by this ruling. No, big services run by established players will not die, but that's hardly the point.

> if you could manage to get malware onto such a computer, then there are likely easier ways to exfiltrate the data than presented in this paper.

I'm not so sure. It's much easier to drop an infected thumb drive in a parking lot than to get that thumb drive back after it's been plugged into a facility computer.

> Or, a QR code (or bar code) could be sent to the phone which pops up on the screen. This is held up to the PC's web cam which scans it.

The opposite of this (bar code on computer is scanned by the phone) is roughly the user experience of SQRL.

Regardless of what is actually uploaded, a phone app and website implementing this would need to get microphone permissions from the user, and it would be difficult for the user to verify that raw audio isn't being captured as well. (There's no separate "audio fingerprint" permission.) That could become a barrier to adoption in practice.

I'm also not sure how I feel about a second factor that would allow an adversary to authenticate by simply sitting in the same coffee shop as me. Manual authentication seems important, and U2F already addresses some of the nusiances of TOTP-based schemes.

This is a really clever innovation, though.

You're incorrect, 20 μN was measured in the Dresden test at 700W.

To be clear, the Chinese test used 2500 watts, and this latest test used 700 watts. That is a decrease, but it's within a factor of 4.

On the other hand, the decrease in effect size is closer to a factor of 40,000.