2,219 karma · joined June 20, 2019
However, symmetric algorithms are not nearly as vulnerable. There is one known quantum attack using Grover's algorithm, but with quadratic speedup all it does is reduce the effective length of the key by half, so a 128-bit key will be equivalent to a 64-bit key and a 256-bit key will be equivalent to a 128-bit key. 256-bit keys are thus safe forever, since going down to a 128-bit key you are still talking age-of-the-universe break times. Even 128-bit keys will be safe for a very long time. While being reduced to a 64-bit key does make attacks theoretically possible, it is still tremendously difficult to do on a quantum computer, much harder than the asymmetric case (on the order of centuries even with very fast cycle times).
Finally, it's also worth noting that asymmetric cryptosystems are rapidly being updated to hybrid cryptosystems which add post-quantum algorithms (ie: algorithms which quantum computers are believed to provide little or no speedup advantage). So, going forward, asymmetric crypto should also no longer be vulnerable to store-now-decrypt-later attacks, provided there's no fundamental flaw in the new post-quantum algorithms (they seem solid, but they are new, so give the cryptographers a few years to try to poke holes in them).
Most venture-backed startups would have just paid the AWS or Cloudflare tax. I certainly hope your VCs appreciate how efficient you are being with their capital :)
But it's an academic exercise anyway, since it seems Oracle has no intention of allowing them to relicense.
Since the pre-fork code is from Sun, Oracle owns the copyright, and they won't re-license it.
The idea that the OpenZFS team wants CDDL out of spite for Linux is an absurd conspiracy theory. Their hands are tied - I'm sure they'd move to a compatible license if they could, but they can't.
The modern OpenZFS project is not part of Oracle, it's a community fork from the last open source version. OpenZFS is what people think of when they say ZFS, it's the version with support for Linux (contributed in large part by work done at Lawrence Livermore).
The OpenZFS project still has to continue using the CDDL license that Sun originally used. The opinion of the Linux team is the CDDL is not GPL compatible, which is what prevents it from being mainlined in Linux (it should be noted not everyone shares this view, but obviously nobody wants to test it in court).
It's very frustrating when people ascribe malice to the OpenZFS team for having an incompatible license. I am sure they would happily change it to something GPL compatible if they could, but their hands are tied: since it's a derivative work of Sun's ZFS, the only one with the power to do that is Oracle, and good luck getting them to agree to that when they're still selling closed source ZFS for enterprise.
So, the impact at the end of the day is just lost revenue from antenna users. Cable and satellite would be unaffected. That's got to be a relatively small number in the grand scheme of things.
With all the money that Google has plowed into AI, they clearly could solve this problem if they want to. The fact that it's still an issue means they don't care, or are happy to take the ad money from the fraudsters.
And that only helps with ionizing dose, which is already not really a problem in LEO. The issue is more high energy particles like cosmic rays, which cause single event effects (SEEs) - things like random bit flips in RAM or CPU registers, or transistor latchup that can cause destructive shorts to ground if not mitigated. These are impractical to shield against, unless you want to fly a few feet of lead. So instead we mitigate them (ECC memory, watchdog timers, latchup supervisor circuits that can quickly power cycle a system to clear a latchup before it can cause damage, etc).
If you want to get an idea of how much shielding is effective in a particular orbit, you can use ESA's SPENVIS software (online, free): https://www.spenvis.oma.be/. Despite being free, it's the tool of choice for initial radiation studies for many space missions worldwide.
I would say you certainly need to start seriously considering at least some radiation hardening at around 600 km, but missions that can accept a large amount of risk to keep costs down still operate at that altitude with non-hardened parts. Likewise, missions with critical reliability requirements like the International Space Station use radiation hardening even down at 400 km.
The "hard" limit is probably around 1000 km, which is where the inner Van Allen Belt starts. At this altitude, hardware that isn't specifically radiation hardened will fail quickly.
The inner Van Allen Belt also has a bulge that goes down as low as 200 km (the South Atlantic Anomaly), so missions in low inclined orbits that spend a lot of time there or missions that need good reliability when flying through the SAA may also need radiation hardening at comparatively low altitudes.
I agree though, my dream for years has been an open source CubeSat bus design that covers say 80% of academic CubeSat use cases and can be modified by the user for the other 20%. Unfortunately I have very little free time these days with family commitments.
Yes, a Raspberry Pi isn't radiation hardened, but in LEO (say around 400-500 km) the radiation environment isn't that severe. Total ionizing dose is not a problem. High energy particles causing single event effects are an issue, but these can be addressed with design mitigations: a window watchdog timer to reset the Pi, multiple copies of flight software on different flash ICs to switch between if one copy is corrupted, latchup detection circuits, etc. None of these mitigations require expensive space qualified hardware to reasonably address.
The usual issues I see in academic CubeSats are mostly programmatic. These things are usually built by students, and generally speaking a CubeSat project is just a bit too long (3-4 years design and build + 1-2 years operations) to have good continuity of personnel, you usually have nobody left at the end there since the beginning except the principal investigator and maybe a couple PhD students.
And since everyone is very green (for many students, this is their first serious multidisciplinary development effort) people are bound to make mistakes. Now, that's a good thing, the whole point is learning. The problem is that extensive testing is usually neglected on academic CubeSats, either because of time pressure to meet a launch date or the team simply doesn't know how to test effectively. So, they'll launch it, and it'll be DOA on orbit since nobody did a fully integrated test campaign.
The bigger issue for third party apps will be things like Newpipe, where applying for a key will put the developers in danger of a lawsuit because it affects Google's business.
(The APK signing requirement is a fiasco, I'm not defending Google. Just pointing out that this app will probably not be as seriously impacted as others).
(That does sound like a fun optimization challenge: "write a program to fairly shuffle the most decks of cards per second possible.")
The Wikimedia Foundation does not depend on US government funding and even if the US somehow made life difficult for donors, they are sitting on a substantial endowment fund that can float them for a long time.
And at some point, if the harassment gets to be too much, Wikimedia can just up and leave. There's no reason that the Wikimedia Foundation needs to be headquartered in San Francisco, it could just as easily be in Oslo or Paris. That's a huge advantage that Harvard didn't have.
It's a bit like going to a clothing optional beach with a big camera and taking a bunch of photos. Is what you're doing legal? In most countries, yes. Are you an asshole for doing it? Also yes.
https://www.emc.ncep.noaa.gov/emc/pages/numerical_forecast_s...
Updated four times per day and has predictions out to about two weeks. It's used as the core input of most weather forecasts.
This standard targets hardware without AES accelerators like microcontrollers. Now, realistically, ChaCha20-Poly1305 is probably a good fit for most of those use cases, but it's not a NIST standard so from the NIST perspective it doesn't apply. Ascon is also a fair bit faster than ChaCha20 on resource constrained hardware (1.5x-3x based on some benchmarks I found online).