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amckenna

477 karma · joined October 22, 2012

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amckenna··on From Poop to Potable
That is an interesting idea. Putting one of these plants on a dairy farm for instance could cut down on waste significantly. The machine would take the animal byproducts and provide water and electricity that could in turn be used to power the farm and hydrate the animals. It could close the waste cycle quite a bit.
amckenna··on From Poop to Potable
That is an interesting idea. Putting one of these plants on a dairy farm for instance could cut down on waste significantly. The machine would take the animal byproducts and provide water and electricity that could in turn be used to power the farm and hydrate the animals. It could close the waste cycle quite a bit.
amckenna··on Hardware startups should consider local manufacturing
I have backed a half dozen Kickstarters and Indigogos that were hardware based (consumer electronics) and chose to manufacture in China. Seeing the time and money they spend in order to fly someone over to China to troubleshoot and issue with manufacturing or testing has left me wondering - why do small startups choose to manufacture in China to begin with?

> Is it because they assume that despite the initial cost over local manufacturing the investment will be worth it if their product takes off?

> Is it because everyone else seems to do it?

> Or maybe because there aren't any good local places to have electronics manufactured? This I would find a little hard to believe given the concentration of hardware startups in SF, NYC, SEA, which have local hardware manufacturers.

amckenna··on Slur, a decentralized, anonymous, Bitcoin-based marketplace for information
The most straightforward way of enforcing the exclusive sale model I can think of is to use reputation and reviews similar to how the online drug sales sites work. Create a financial incentive for the seller to build a positive reputation and deliver on their products quality and promises (exclusivity in this case). If the seller creates a name for themselves and they can be trusted to sell information exclusively then that will add value to the information (buyers would pay extra to ensure it's exclusive). That model will incentivize sellers to hold up their end of the bargain and prevent duplicate sales.
amckenna··on Salted Password Hashing – Doing It Right
I am not ignoring the issue, I am advocating the more secure system configuration. I know that it is expensive, and it can introduce additional performance requirements. When choosing to implement proper password hashing or not there is a tradeoff. That is a decision that needs to be made on a case by case basis.

None of that changes the fact that the _more secure_ thing to do is implement bcrypt/scrpt/PBKDF2. I bet there are plenty of people at Sony, Target, Adobe, Home Depot, Staples, etc. that wished they had taken the more secure route and spent that extra money.

amckenna··on Salted Password Hashing – Doing It Right
I don't think it is a significant UX benefit to reveal to a user that their username is correct but their password is incorrect. How many times has an incorrect username been what's blocking you from logging into an application? Just look at the username you entered right there in front of you. Is it correct? No? Then enter the correct one. The hangup during login most of the time is people fat fingering or forgetting their password. Telling them that their password is incorrect isn't going to help, they will assume that and re-type their password again anyways.

I agree, implement throttling anywhere you have authentication or registration, that's a good idea to have in place in any case. I'm not arguing that.

It seems there is always the problem of balancing security, performance, and usability. You just have to decide which is more important when examining features. I this case I would advocate security. The decision you make with your applications is up to you, but it's important to understand you are making a tradeoff.

amckenna··on Salted Password Hashing – Doing It Right
It's defense in depth. Why tell a probable attacker that they have the correct username if you can hide it from them. The less you give them the better. Most users will know if they got their username incorrect, it's right there in front of them on the screen.

The slowed down responses (exponential back-off) is a the preferred method of rate limiting over account lockout.

"Or they'll dump the username:passwd database if they get in. In that case, obfuscating usernames is moot anyways."

Well if they can dump your DB it's game over for your whole app and possibly infrastructure anyways.

amckenna··on Salted Password Hashing – Doing It Right
I assess the vulnerability of applications for a living and I have been told over and over again by dev groups and ops that they can't upgrade their systems because it is too expensive. That's fine, but you need to understand you are making a security for money tradeoff and realize the risks you are bringing on in doing so. Make your own cost benefit analysis, but know that you are making a tradeoff and what that entails.

This is a solved problem: use 10,000+ rounds of PBKDF2, 4-5+ rounds of Bcrypt, or a sufficient work factor for Scrypt.

amckenna··on Salted Password Hashing – Doing It Right
They are correct, it is important to show a generic message on the login. The login is the first place an attacker will look for user enumeration. Just because you may be able to find user enumeration somewhere else doesn't mean you should leave it open everywhere.

For user enumeration on registration you have two choices:

1. Provide a unique registration link to an email for signup. The prospective user goes to the registration page, submits and email, checks their email, then follows the link to a registration page. On this page it's easy to see if someone is enumerating usernames, and every request contains the token from their unique signup link so the token can be invalidated quickly.

2. Provide a slow rate limited lookup to verify an existing username, every 2-3 seconds, which shouldn't negatively affect users as they signup because they have to fill out a registration form in the mean time. This will however greatly slow down a bot.

amckenna··on Salted Password Hashing – Doing It Right
If you server cannot hash incoming authentication attempts properly with bcrypt or scrypt, then the solution is to upgrade the server, not weaken your authentication to compensate.
amckenna··on Google Self-Driving Car Project's first vehicle prototype
A lot of people are bashing the car's appearance, but I think people forget that putting the first driverless cars on the road is as much a PR challenge as it is a technological challenge. Truly autonomous driverless cars is a huge shift in the way we have operated for almost 100 years. There will be a lot of caution and resistance from political groups, concerned citizens, entrenched interests, etc. The car that they put forward first needs to be non-threatening, safe, and easy to adopt.

Given Google's stake in Uber the car will be part of a fleet that can be summoned by a mobile app, not some product you go out and buy. Because there will be no dealerships and individual owners, they don't care about attracting buyers for the vehicle - it doesn't need a cool factor. What it needs is to be non-threatening and safe so you will feel comfortable getting in one and going for a ride.

Additionally, the first car on the roads will just be making in town trips and will be limited to 25mph - no highways or major arterials. This means it makes more sense for the car to be compact, light, and similar to a Smart Car, than a Camry or SUB.

amckenna··on Update on Sony Investigation
It's probably not wise that they release malicious binaries or details about foreign hacking infrastructure to the general public. That doesn't leave the with much direct evidence they can release at this point. Remember, it is an ongoing investigation and will be for quite some time considering the scope and severity of the breach.
amckenna··on Theater Chains Decline to Show Sony’s ‘The Interview,’ Citing Threats
A line at the end of the article caught my eye: "Hackers claim to have taken at least 100 terabytes of Sony data, or about 10 times of the amount stored in the Library of Congress."

Which struck me as very small. So I did some digging and it looks like as of 2009 (almost 6 years ago) the Library of Congress had 74 TB of online data available to the Internet. Additionally the U.S. Library of Congress Web Capture team claims that "as of March 2014, the Library has collected about 525 terabytes of web archive data" and that it adds about 5 terabytes per month. That just includes the web archive team which is one of 8 featured digital collections (http://www.loc.gov/library/libarch-digital.html).

Here the LOC debunks the 10TB figure directly: http://blogs.loc.gov/digitalpreservation/2011/07/transferrin...

I'm not sure where the author got their figure, but they are way off the mark.

[1] - http://blogs.loc.gov/loc/2009/02/how-big-is-the-library-of-c...

amckenna··on Special K, a Hallucinogen, Raises Hopes and Concerns as Treatment for Depression
You took MDMA while on an SSRI? You really should research a drug's mechanism of action and how multiple drugs may interact before taking them together.

Im not a medical professional, I just want to give you a quick overview so you don't repeat that mistake. Do your own research.

- An SSRI (Selective Serotonin Re-uptake Inhibitor) blocks your brain's re-uptake of serotonin and effectively increases your brain's levels of serotonin.[1]

- MDMA acts as a presynaptic releasing agent of serotonin. Increasing the amount of serotonin in the synaptic cleft (space between neurons).[2]

- That means the two of these drugs combined can cause a huge spike in serotonin and potentially lead to serotonin syndrome (toxicity).

Be safe.

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Selective_serotonin_reuptake_i...

[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MDMA

amckenna··on Quantum Attack on Public-Key Algorithm
I wonder how the attack would fair against other Lattice-based schemes such as NTRU, which was recently open sourced.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NTRU

https://github.com/NTRUOpenSourceProject/ntru-crypto

amckenna··on NASA’s Orion Spacecraft Splashes Down in Pacific After Test Flight
For those who saw the launch but are looking for a video of the splashdown:

Longer NASA coverage (5:23) - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tdmZAvwznOU

More concise coverage by the AP (0:54) - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aCF4dkGqV78

amckenna··on Electrical brain stimulation beats caffeine and the effect lasts longer
I purchased it. I am hesitant to recommend a particular device because I am not a medical professional and there are inherent risks involved in using any of the devices. I would encourage you to check out www.reddit.com/r/tdcs and do some research yourself. In their FAQ they list several devices that you can start looking at.

Sorry, I know that isn't a satisfying answer but it's the only one I am comfortable with.

amckenna··on Electrical brain stimulation beats caffeine and the effect lasts longer
Thank you for the links Gwern!

You're right, the placement is the same as previous studies. Though from what I remember those were testing for the alleviation of depression, so it's nice to see there are other positive effects with that placement.

amckenna··on Electrical brain stimulation beats caffeine and the effect lasts longer
I wish they would release the placement they used for the testing. I would be interested in trying this out at home with my tDCS device.

My guess is they are using one of the following placements:

Accelerated Learning (DARPA) F10/Left Arm - http://tdcsplacements.com/placements/accelerated-learning/

"Savant Learning" (Chi & Snider (2011)) T4/T3 - https://www.reddit.com/r/tDCS/comments/2e7idx/simple_montage...

amckenna··on Electrical brain stimulation beats caffeine and the effect lasts longer
I was interested in the same question but there hasn't been any research as far as I have found. There are anecdotal accounts in various tDCS communities such as /r/tdcs
amckenna··on Neural Networks That Describe Images
Yup! That's exactly why there has been so much work on this from the likes of Google. Video and images represent a "dark media" in terms of indexing and search. It is very difficult without robust tagging (which is time intensive or relies on the articles and descriptions that surround the images) to search through images. This technology would make it much easier perform robust querying of this data.
amckenna··on Judge threatens contempt for declining to reveal cellphone tracking methods
In the article it says the prosecutors dropped the evidence found from the resulting home search.

"Finally, Seidel said prosecutors would drop all evidence found during the search of the home — including, authorities have said, a .45-caliber handgun and the cellphone."

amckenna··on U.S. Navy Deploys First Laser Weapon in Persian Gulf
Even at its full range of 10 miles it would have a tough time hitting a commercial plane. 10 miles is 52,800 feet so the warship would have to be very close to the plane to hit it (almost under it), and within visual range for sure, meaning it wouldn't happen by accident. A ballistic missile on the other hand can travel 1-3,000 miles to hit a target.
amckenna··on Chinese hack U.S. Weather systems, satellite network
There are many details left out that could reasonably pin the attacks on the Chinese. While communication back to the source may be obfuscated and hard to pin on any particular actors the exploits, shellcode, and malware they use can possibly be tied to other breaches. Like regular programmers, hackers tend to reuse modules, code blocks, techniques, etc. from attack to attack. So whereas the NOAA breach may not conclusively point to China something found during the incident response and forensics phases may connect it to the USPS breach, Lockheed Martin breach, or others. A good example of this technique would be how researchers were able to tie Stuxnet, Flame, DuQu, and Guass to the same actors (probably the US and Israel).
amckenna··on Stuxnet: Zero Victims
It is possible they chose not to encrypt things with public/private keys (asymmetric crypto) because generally that is slow and computationally intensive, as compared to using symmetric crypto. If the goal was to be as stealthy as possible then creating asymmetrically encrypted blobs on the victims machines may have been too obvious. They couldn't have used symmetric crypto because the key would need to have been kept on the machine performing the crypto, thereby rendering it useless.

My guess is they figured stealth would provide the protection they needed and the possibility that errors/corruption during encryption, storage, and transmission was an unacceptable risk at the time. Another possibility is that large blobs of encrypted data on the victim machines would be obvious and possibly flagged, thereby compromising the stealth of the operation. Or the devs simply didn't have time.

amckenna··on The Darkhotel APT
Check out the whitepaper they published along with the article. It goes into more detail about the attacks. It appears they have a record of the traffic from the hotels' networks, probably from an IDS or something similar. Some relevant quotes from the whitepaper:

"The Darkhotel APT’s precise malware spread was observed in several hotels’ networks, where visitors connecting to the hotel’s Wi-Fi were prompted to install software updates to popular software packages." - page 5

"As a part of an ongoing investigation, our research led us to embedded iframes within hotel networks that redirected individuals’ web browsers to phony installers. The attackers were very careful with the placement of these iframes and executables on trusted resources - the hotels’ network login portals themselves." - page 6

"We observed traces of a couple of these incidents in late 2013 and early 2014 on a victim hotel’s network. The attackers set up the environment and hit their individual targets with precision. As soon as their target’s stay was over and the attack-frame was closed, the attackers deleted their iframe placement and backdoored executables from the hotel network." - page 6

amckenna··on The Darkhotel APT
For those that are interested in a more technical analysis of the malware, infection vectors, and C&C infrastructure check out the whitepaper linked at the top. It goes into significantly more detail than the main article.

Below is a link to the PDF directly (I know the URL looks shady):

http://25zbkz3k00wn2tp5092n6di7b5k.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/f...

If you manage security infrastructure for your organization and want details on C&C URLs, compromised certs used for signing, and relevant file hashes check out the technical apendix they published, also linked at the top of the article (and below):

http://25zbkz3k00wn2tp5092n6di7b5k.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/f...

amckenna··on Running a South Pole data center
Last time I looked into it you don't pay for room, board, food, cold weather gear, or the flight down/back. So in reality your take home pay and savings are fairly high.
amckenna··on Contactless cards fail to recognise foreign currency
Well with contactless payments a unique CVV is generated by the card for every transaction. The attacker would have to steal the card info, CVV, and use it to purchase something before the victim uses their card again or the card will automatically be disabled by the payment processor. In any case they can only make a fraudulent purchase once for every time they trick the card. That's certainly better than the current situation where once your card is compromised you are screwed.

Sources:

research - https://www.shmoocon.org/2012/presentations/Paget_shmoocon20...

presentation - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HRXb-FZ6WFM

summary - http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2012/01/30/hackers...

amckenna··on Reversing D-Link’s WPS Pin Algorithm
Yup! Basically the problem boils down to:

"An attacker can derive information about the correctness of parts the PIN from the AP´s responses.

> If the attacker receives an EAP-NACK message after sending M4, he knows that the 1st half of the PIN was incorrect.

> If the attacker receives an EAP-NACK message after sending M6, he knows that the 2nd half of the PIN was incorrect.

This form of authentication dramatically decreases the maximum possible authentication attempts needed from 108 (=100.000.000) to 104 + 104 (=20.000).

As the 8th digit of the PIN is always a checksum of digit one to digit seven, there are at most 104 + 103 (=11.000) attempts needed to find the correct PIN."

Reference - http://sviehb.files.wordpress.com/2011/12/viehboeck_wps.pdf

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