656 karma · joined June 23, 2014
Yes, I think that progress has become rapid enough that we can't predict six months out. I suspect that we are only 1-2 inventions away from something quite large and transformative. Obviously LLMs have already created a lot of excitement and opened up new areas of content generation already, but I think something larger is coming.
As humans we have a tendancy to make linear future predictions based on past observations. Over the timescales that matter significant effects occur from previously unseen kinds of events that become important via interactions with other events.
The important measurement would be what the length of the event horizon - the length of time before our predictions rapidly decrease to zero certainty. In a singularity we would expect that length of time to decrease close to zero. What has it been historically? I would claim that 5-10 years is a difficult period to make meaningful predictions about. I think that 20 years has proven to be very difficult but possible in the past. I am unaware of any 100+ year predictions that have landed with better than random chance.
Interestingly I think we are entering a period where 5 years will be the upper bound, and even predictions over shorter 2-3 year timespans are going to become difficult.
So observing that Rowhammer causes buggy behavior may be simple. But finding the actual bug - i.e. this sequence of instructions on this data causes the memory corruption would be much harder.
Part of this comes down to how you interpret the "many eyes makes bugs shallow" but I suspect that no number of eyes would have found the Rowhammer bugs by looking at the code.
I don't think it is clear how you would do this other than with hindsight. When the bug was discovered, if we avoid architectural knowledge of why the bug was occurring then what information would the discoverer have access to?
- Memory corruption is occuring during execution.
- We can't find any part of code that appears to corrupt the values.
Finding the bug requires finding the Rowhammer affect, which means looking isolating the instructions that are accessing similar uncached addresses, and then finding the pattern of accesses and cache flushes which triggers the corruption.
Could you explain how this would be simple, or do you have a different view of the bug complexity that you could explain?
If anything, these are canonical examples of non-simple bugs.
Oh wow, that one is going in the memory bank for future use.
http://catb.org/~esr/writings/taoup/html/ch15s04.html
Which "certain type" are Stuart Feldman and Steve Johnson?
You are arguing that all change has the same cost. I don't see your reasoning for this. A smaller change to a system has a lower cost in R&D, and a lower cost in manufacture.
Although it is probably true that the cost of updating all equipment dominates the cost of redesign, this is only an issue for a big bang update rather than a rolling upgrade.
Your claim was that any change to the ASIC was the same design cost. But really? A 40-bit routing table design, where there is a 32-bit fall-back to preserve the top 8-bits vs a 128-bit routing table design. Why would these be the same cost?
Add a one-byte option into the header, give it an unassigned value (e.g. 6) and assume that any box that does not understand it will pass it through unchanged. Use it as the most significant byte of the address, and obsolete all routing equipment that doesn't understand it from the backbone so that they can be used to handle routing in one of the new 32-bit super-A class networks.
Sure it's ugly as hell, but it is just backward compatible enough to work.
This will still feel laggy, just a different kind of lag to the one that you perceive using a high latency terminal.
1. They have no information to hand over as they do not keep logs.
2. There is no law that requires them to keep logs.
They proved the first part in court, but there wasn't anything in the torrentfreak article about the second point. The second point is the relevant one here as Mullvad are making both of the same claims. While they have a legal for the first one (case law) the second is still untried as far as I could tell (only made a quick search).
For the second part to be proven, somebody would need to take them to court on the second point. Nobody has tried to do that (yet) and so the question still open, and it depends on how you interpret the wording of the law https://lagen.nu/2022:482. In particular, is the definition strict enough that it applies to the operators of the hardware that makes up the network, or does it apply to a virtual service over the top.
I'm not a lawyer, there is a lot of subtlety in how §7 is written that I do not claim to be aware of, and my swedish is quite basic.
The number is news because Russia is waging a large-scale invasion of another country using cannon fodder tactics. Reporting on that invasion is not simply propaganda.
Sounds like standard operating procedure.