150 karma · joined April 21, 2020
If R&D were not allowed to be capitalized, then a company would have an incentive to create a specific entity to develop its internally used software, then sell that software to parent company. If it set up the entities properly, it would capitalize the software as purchased software rather than R&D. Many firms with international development teams do this to manage in what country they pay taxes - the goal being to derive no value in high-tax countries and high value in low/no tax countries.
Because software development did not already fit in the definition of a capitalizable expense, the lawmakers modified the research and development rules to allow it.
Note, by accelerating the depreciation, they are reducing taxes in the current year(s) while the program is in place (always have a limited period) but increasing them when the program expires.
Before someone mentions Excel, most firms have a threshold the expense has to clear before it is considered for capitalization. Excel is under most firm’s threshold.
Section 174 relates to Research and Development expenses. The idea originally was they firms were spending a lot of money to develop a product that might have long useful life, but the expenses were all hitting the operating expense in the current year. This is great for cash tax purposes, but bad for metrics like operating income and net income which impact many firms valuations. Arguably it also misrepresents the firm’s business model. A fundamental idea is that costs should be reflected consistently with the period that revenue is earned. With R&D, the revenue is expected to be earned over many years but the costs are incurred upfront.
The better example is not a residential home, but an apartment building. The builder spends $300M to build the apartments then leases them for the next 30 years. In that example, the $300M is depreciated over 30 years so the costs track with the expenses.
The FASB accounting rules drive the capitalization of software expenses, not the tax rules. The FASB definition of GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principals) for US firms is very specific and requires significant detailed tracking to comply.
As noted in one of the other posts, many companies want to capitalize as much software engineering expense as possible as that leads to higher operating income and net income. Bonuses, option grants and stock prices tend to be tied to those metrics. The argument is that building a piece of software should be treated like purchasing it off the shelf. If a firm pays $1M to implement SAP, it does not have to expense it all in one year, but rather depreciates it over its “expected life.” Since “expected life” is difficult to define for every piece of software, there are default lifetimes (similar to saying motor vehicles default to a 5 year depreciation schedule).
Tax then generally follows the GAAP accounting except when the government intervenes to try and increase capital spending. Periodically the government will allow accelerated depreciation which increases operating expenses for tax purposes only which reduces current period cash taxes. Note total taxes do not change, only when they get paid.
The Section 174 under discussion here is simply the same idea then applied to software development in an effort to juice hiring.
For the people discussing whether the IRS is effectively tracking and enforcing this - the IRS really does not matter. A companies auditors enforce it. Without all of the necessary paperwork/digital audit trail, a firm in not permitted by the auditors to capitalize the expense. The same auditors have to sign off on the tax treatment as well. Finally, with respect to maintenance, the idea is meant to be similar to the treatment for machinery ( i.e. traditional capital expenditures). When a firm puts gas in the company truck or replaces tires or fixes a windshield, they do not capitalize those expenses. The idea is the expense do not fundamentally improve the item or meaningful extend the life beyond the initial expectations. Following that line of thought, maintenance releases are not thought to extend the life of the software while significant improvements to the software do and therefore can be capitalized.
DISCLAIMER - while I was a CFO, I was not a Certified Accountant. What I have described above is what the accountants and my audit firms described to me as I worked through this issue in preparing financial statements.
Most of the comments highlight that you will likely be several years behind the curve of cohorts before you just because of when you were born and went to school. I agree with that. However, it can be overcome, you will simply have to work harder at it. You will likely have to change jobs more often, ideally within the same company. This means you will have less comfort and calm in your early days, but it can help catch you up to where you expected to be.
Good luck. You have to stay positive to succeeed at this.
In my follow up comment I attempted to clarify my comment in response to giantg2's reply. "I do not have a disability (my wife may disagree) and I agree it makes life more challenging (wouldn’t be called a disability otherwise)." I completely agree a disability makes life more difficult. I simply added that it is not the only thing that makes life more difficult. All of these things need to be considered when making career/job decisions.
As for starting a family, I agree not all can. My mistake was jumping from their assertion that I must be young to mean I did not have the responsibilities of an older worker such as taking care of a family. The less generous interpretation of that accusation is what? I am stupid? Ignorant of life? Not suffering from the impact of issues that I did not choose?
As for bringing up children, I did make the leap that that is generally a big difference between younger employees and older employees.
I have been thinking about this a lot recently. A former boss and good friend who is incredibly smart and effective in the work place asked why the two of us had never gone the PE route and been more successful. While he is very successful by most standards, he sees people flying private jets all the time who do not appear more skillful, yet have been more successful. As I think on this, I feel I simply was never willing to go all in on the risk required to achieve that level of financial success. I tried co-founding a company once when I was 28 while engaged and importantly, before children. I felt I could take the risk and if I failed, could bounce back. I did fail - company did ok but my I ended up disliking working with my senior partner - and I did bounce back, ending up at GE.
After that, I did not feel comfortable taking that level of risk until my children were off to college and no longer dependent on me an I had enough money saved that my wife and I would be ok for a long time. The people I know who have been jet-money financially successful took huge risks. They were all in on their venture(s). Frequently this cost them their marriage and/or relationships with the children. This was their choice. Their cost/benefit analysis to optimize their success criteria. Some regret the decisions - they underestimated the effort and impact on those they cared about. However, most have not. They are happy with how things have turned out.
Different strokes for different folks.
I worked at GE when Jack Welch was there. First of all we never had a systematic firing of the bottom 10%. That is a myth. We ranked everyone each year and clearly identified the bottom 10% but they were not always fired. The manager did have to have a development plan for these individuals.
More importantly, GE did have consistent layoffs. I assert this was a good thing. I vividly remember asking an EVP at GE Capital when I first joined GE why we did this. It seemed inhumane. Wasn’t it better to try and fix the so-called ‘C’ players? His response fundamentally changed my view on hiring, leadership, and firing. He told me two things. 1) Hiring people is always a gamble. The best interview/onboarding processes will not produce 100% success. There will people that do not have the skills that are needed. There will also be people for whom GE is simply not a good cultural fit. 2) In good times, when a GE business unit is doing well, they always over hire. People working 50 hours a week want to work 40, process problems that have built up need to be addressed (similar to tech debt), etc. Over time this leads to bloat and inefficiency.
For these reasons, consistent layoffs make sense for the company. They also make sense for the employee. By not waiting for an economic downturn and then making dramatic cuts, the exiting employees would have an easier time finding the next job as odds are the economy would doing well. Particularly in the case where the person was not a good fit for the GE culture, they learned this and could find a better fitting role elsewhere. And GE was great on the resume back in those days (sadly not so today). If we waited for the downturn, then the exiting employees would be looking for a new job in a bad economy with everyone else who had just been laid off. Not a good situation.
Finally, an additional point I learned later by observing when and where we made headcount reductions. GE made many bets on new markets, new products, etc. We had to if we were to grow by 10% each year (GE Capital’s rigorous requirement for business and strategic plans). The successful GE leaders understood is was easier to grow revenue to achieve 10% net income growth than to cut expenses. Unfortunately, not all new business ventures worked out. In those cases, we had to make a decision to shut them down (all new ventures had off-ramps). As a result, some people were repurposed, but others had to be let go. I posit that is consistent with the tech approach of “fail early, fail often.” In industries with significant people required to try a new approach, the consequence of failing will be layoffs.
On a related note, it is odd that HN comments rarely seem to include a manager’s perspective.