22,018 karma · joined May 30, 2015
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If you must run it then make it 100% isolated, for instance in a lambda with no api credentials or IAM permissions, & do s3 input/output by passing presigned urls. Make it ok to have RCE.
It's only free while you have no traffic. Getting a single post on the top of HN could cost you e.g. $10.
[1]: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Th8JoIan4dg&list=PLQ-uHSnFig...
[2]: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z1iF1c8w5Lg&list=PLQ-uHSnFig...
That was not the line, it was linking to this innerHTML call: https://gist.github.com/postmalloc/e2602752d46c5b9dee2446235...
Also as a defense mitigation I don't think escaping is ever going to be effective, it would be better to create anchor elements directly. With your current approach I can still XSS with, for instance:
https://"onmouseenter=alert(1)" https://"><script>alert(1)</script>
and if you click the bookmarklet for the page that comment was discussing then their javascript will execute in your logged in context on that website.[1]: https://gist.github.com/postmalloc/e2602752d46c5b9dee2446235...
As opposed to working at a startup? Stability is way worse, base pay is lower on average, stock is an even bigger crapshoot, less perks, worse work-life balance. Work might be more fulfilling
https://github.com/anacrolix/torrent
It has a few frontends built on top of it (linked in the project readme), but I just run `torrent download <magnet link>` and it downloads at full speed / with no issues.
Hosting your own sync server doesn't prevent this.
FWIW Firefox says they do not have the capability to read your data: https://hacks.mozilla.org/2018/11/firefox-sync-privacy/
> Additionally, on January 1, 2023 for about 1 hour 48 minutes, your mobile phone service was transferred from your SIM card to another SIM card. During the time of this temporary transfer, the unauthorized access could have involved the use of your phone number to send and receive phone calls and text messages. Despite the SIM transfer, your voicemail could not have been accessed. We have restored Google Fi service to your SIM card.
[1]: https://old.reddit.com/r/GoogleFi/comments/10pjtie/google_fi...
But with WebUSB a page _can_ communicate directly to a yubikey and pretend it's being asked to authenticate on a different origin. It's been fixed now but it was an interesting bypass:
- https://www.yubico.com/support/issue-rating-system/security-...
- https://www.wired.com/story/chrome-yubikey-phishing-webusb/
The top comment [0] on this has:
> Counter-measures: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=27121918#27133079
but I don't understand the setup here. If you have the capability to run custom firmware on your router then don't you not need this countermeasure, since you can be confident your router isn't doing this wireframing anyway? Or is it saying that a passive bystander who is not connected to your network can infer the wireframes as well? That seems unlikely to me?
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1283699/000119312523...
I believe them that this is correct but does anyone know why? I thought all the "intermittent fasting" folks were losing weight?
Microsoft has Safe Harbor.
Just once it would be nice if companies were actually held accountable.
https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_roles_te...
> Role chaining limits your AWS CLI or AWS API role session to a maximum of one hour.
Even if the attacker had access to env vars from running jobs (which includes the signed token needed to do an OIDC role assumption), those tokens have a short expiry time, and even if an attacker stole that token and performed a role assumption then that session can only be valid for a maximum of 12 hours in AWS, and then you know the attacker is out of your account.
It just significantly reduces, practically nullifies, anything that an attacker can do in your AWS account.
https://example.com"><script>alert(1)</script>
Then simply viewing the hackernews index page with this extension installed will let the submitter execute whatever javascript they want in your logged in hackernews context - no user interaction necessary.[1]: https://github.com/MostlyEmre/hn-anti-paywall/blob/main/scri...
Original comment:
> Do they have enough logs to reach out to people that were affected?
It happens on the client, there are no server logs that Tailscale could check
[1]: https://www.figma.com/blog/how-we-built-the-figma-plugin-sys...